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Abstract
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: SMALLPOX VACCINATION AND THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH IN CUBA
by
Stephanie Gonzalez

Adviser: Professor Herman Bennett
This dissertation tracks the introduction and development of smallpox vaccination in
colonial Cuba from the early nineteenth century to the American occupation of 1898. Native
(creole) medical practitioners utilized smallpox vaccination as an instrument for securing status
as professionals and conceptualizing new identities in a colonial slave society. The smallpox
vaccination program allowed licensed practitioners to create a medical monopoly, foster
scientific standards and cultivate a medical ethic. Creole vaccinators initially identified with a
colonial state that protected their professional interests as necessary for the maintenance of
Cuba’s slave-based, agro-industrial sugar complex. By the end of the nineteenth century
however, professional divestment and ethnic strife convinced fledgling medical professionals to
mobilize their creole, scientific identities against Spanish colonial rule.
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Introduction

My project lies at the intersection of the sociology of professions, the history of science
and empire. Few scholars have analyzed the impact of smallpox vaccination on medical
professionalization in the colonial periphery. Traditional narratives in the historiography of
professionalization privilege Western European and North American models concerning the
context and general attributes of medical professionalization. In the 1950s for example,
sociologist Talcott Parsons located the origin of sharply contained, medical “communities of the
competent” in the late nineteenth-century, industrialized West, where scientific advances in
bacteriology required the specialization and organization of expert authority to sustain a growing
knowledge base.1 By the early twentieth century, medical professionals in Europe and North
America enjoyed the unique characteristics which defined genuine professionalization, including
high educational and scientific standards, professional monopoly on the market and autonomy of
medical organizations from state intervention2. A number of historians, such as Robert Gidney
and Winnifred Miller, propose more flexible and historically contingent definitions of a Western
“professional” dating back to the early modern period.3 Scholars Sanjoy Bhattacharya and
Steven Palmer, in turn, have utilized more flexible paradigms to identify and understand

1

Talcott Parsons, “Professions,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, vol. 12
(New York: Macmillan, 1968), 536-47.
2
Some criticisms of this model, notably those of Eliot Friedson and other “power” theorists, challenge the ethical
motivations behind medical professionalization but maintain much of the same chronology and definitions of a
professional. Eliot Friedson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970).
3
For studies on early nineteenth century professionalization in North America and Europe, see Robert D. Gidney
and Winnifred P.J. Millar, Professional Gentlemen: The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Ontario (Buffalo:
University of Toronto Press, 1994), Charles E. McClelland, The German Experience of Professionalization (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Matthew Ramsey, Professional and Popular Medicine in France
1770-1830; The Social World of Medical Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

manifestations of medical professionalization in colonial India and Latin America.4 My research
on the formation of the medical “professional” in nineteenth-century Cuba offers new
perspectives on the history of professionalization in the periphery.
What constituted a medical “professional” in late eighteenth and nineteenth century
Cuba? What position did these licensed practitioners occupy in an agro-export economy
powered by African slave labor? How numerous and self-conscious were they as a group, both
within the general population and amongst the wider healing community? In a racially stratified,
colonial society, the concept of a professional had very explicit connotations. Only white men of
a certain status or with connections to the elite could aspire to become licensed medical
professionals and their exclusive composition as a group guided their understandings of
professional entitlement.
Even allowing for the particularities of nineteenth-century Cuba, creole medical
professionals shared many attributes with what Gidney and Miller identify in nineteenth-century
Ontario, Canada as “professional gentlemen.”5 Most creole, licensed practitioners in Cuba were
part of an elite cohort of graduates of the standard triad of liberal professions (law religion and
medicine) offered in the University of Havana. They were well versed in classic languages and
literature and this shared foundational knowledge, more than its application to specific expertise
in the ancient medical texts of Galen and Avicenna, gave them privileges as “gentlemen.”6 An

4

Sanjoy Bhattacharya, Mark Harrison, and Michael Worboys, Fractured States: Smallpox,Public Health and
Vaccination Policy in British India 1800 to 1947 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005) and Steven Palmer, “From the
Plantation to the Academy: Slavery and the Production of Cuban Medicine in the Nineteenth Century,” in Health
and Medicine in the circum-Caribbean, 1800-1968, ed. Steven Palmer, Juanita de Barros, and David Wright
(London: Routledge, 2009), 53-75. For an excellent investigation of the ways in which nineteenth-century scientific
investigation and medical professionalization shaped identity in the tropics, see Julyan Peard, Race, Place and
Medicine: The Idea of the Tropics in Nineteenth Century Brazilian Medicine (Durham: Duke University Press,
1999).
5
Gidney and Miller, Professional Gentlemen, 3-14.
6
Gregorio Delgado García, Historia de la enseñanza superior de la medicina en Cuba, 1726-1900 (Havana:
Editorial Ciencias Médicas, 1990), 11. Ramón de Armas, Historia de la Universidad de la Habana, 1728-1929

2

educated minority in a colonial, slave society, Cuban “professional gentlemen” were imbued
with notions of their own social relevance and shared the socio-economic expectations that came
with genteel recognition and prestige. They were, at least discursively, expected to adhere to
gentlemanly codes of professional etiquette and honor with regards to, for example, intraprofessional competition and ethical client interaction. The relationship of elite practitioners to
the larger population, including the indigenous and African slaves, was also to be marked by
expressions of charity and humanitarianism.7
In Cuba, furthermore, “professional gentlemen” lived and worked within a unique
environment. As historians Steven Palmer and Adrián López Denis have noted, economic
growth in the slave-powered plantation sector and some of the highest levels of urbanization and
militarization in the Atlantic world spurred medical professionalization. Together, these
conditions created a peculiarly “colonial modernity” for medicine, financing the employment of
licensed physicians and providing a cache of available bodies for practitioner experimentation,
clinical observation and autopsy. Throughout the nineteenth century, slavery, urbanization and
militarization encouraged the growth of one the highest ratios of physicians to population in the
New World. In the late 1820s for example, there were 777 practitioners per million inhabitants,
more than most European countries would have at the close of the century.8 Extraordinarily high
ratios prevailed throughout the century and were even surpassed in urban environments such as
Havana.

(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1984) also provides a good general review of the university’s history and
curriculum.
7
For example, aspirants to the position of regular vaccinators regularly cited their “humanitarian” contributions to
justify their professional inclusion, as demonstrated in “A los Secretarios de las Subalternas de Matanzas,” March 9,
1852, Junta de Sanidad, Cartas de Matanzas, No. 2, File 38, Archivos Nacionales, Havana, Cuba (hereafter AN).
8
Adrián López-Denis, “Disease and Society in Colonial Cuba, 1790-1840” (Ph.D diss., University of California,
Los Angeles, 2007), 66.
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Country
Cuba
United Kingdom
Holland
Belgium
France
Germany
Spain

Doctors and surgeons
(per million)
777
578
410
390
380
355
305

Table 1: Doctors and surgeons per million inhabitants by country, circa 1890.9

Though foreigners comprised a majority of licensed practitioners until the 1840s and 50s,
when student enrollment in medicine at the University of Havana rose substantially (see Figure 1
below), creole physicians and surgeons were galvanized by the professional opportunities of a
uniquely “colonial modernity,” particularly in the sugar-rich zones of the western provinces of
Havana, Matanzas and Las Villas. The abundance of licensed practitioners and opportunities for
research on accessible bodies spurred an increasingly self-conscious creole medical community
to foster institution-building, with the first petitions for the establishment of a Royal Academy of
Medicine drafted as early as 1826.10 Long-standing, local public health institutions such as the
Central Vaccine Board of Havana were also overwhelmingly dominated by creole practitioners
graduated from the University of Havana. Throughout the century, creole vaccinators comprised
a small percentage of the licensed medical community; in 1868 for example, only 14 officially
sanctioned vaccinators operated in a capital city inhabited by over 130 licensed practitioners.11
Yet they benefitted from professional dynamism in the medical milieu and played a
9

Michael G. Mulhall, The Dictionary of Statistics (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1892).
Pedro M. Pruna Goodgall, La Real Academia de Ciencias de La Habana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas, 2004).
11
os A Mart nez-Fort n y Foyo, Cronología médica cubana: Contribución al
estudio de la historia de la medicina en Cuba, Fascículo cuarto (1840-1880) (Havana: [s.n.], 1951).
10
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disproportionate role in the construction of medical monopoly and a medical ethic for the
cultivation of the “professional gentleman ”

Medical students enrolled in the University of
Havana
Number of students
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Figure 1: Medical students enrolled in the University of Havana, 1800-1873.12

Of the numerous licensed medical practitioners in the capital, not all professed the status
of a “professional gentleman ” There was great variation in rank among the licensed medical
community, who, in turn, distinguished themselves from diverse healers of varying backgrounds
vying for the attention of the ill. Claims to gentlemanly status also clashed with the socioeconomic realities of most licensed physicians. Unlike the rising sugar elite, Cuban professional
gentlemen did not always base their claims for elevated social status on sugar, land and slaves. 13
Charitable organizations and/or wealthy patrons sponsored the education of many white creoles
of the middling and humbler classes who entered the medical field as a vehicle for upward

12

R.A. Cowley, Breves noticias sobre la enseñanza de la medicina (Havana: A. Pego, 1876).
The growth of the agro-export sector spurred the creation of a creole aristocracy on the island, as a small number
of wealthy, landed creoles bought titles from a monarchy eager to curry favor with local elites. Allan Kuethe, Cuba,
1753-1815: Crown, Military, and Society (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
13

5

mobility. Yet the number of licensed practitioners and opportunities for medical research on the
island were unique in many respects, and fostered the construction of a distinct professional
identity amongst licensed, creole medical practitioners.
The origins of such scientific dynamism in colonial Hispanic America were integrally
tied to late eighteenth century scientific activity across the Hispanic territories. During the past
three decades, literature on the history of science has moved beyond limited historiographical
paradigms which privilege the North Atlantic.14 Inclusive definitions of what constitutes
scientific activity and the contextualized nature of knowledge production provide new and
exciting avenues for research. Historians understand the central contributions of Latin American
scientists to what is considered mainstream science, and recognize as scientific practice
pragmatic forms of knowledge production that privileged the “useful ” Eurocentric notions of a
simple diffusion of ideas from center to periphery ceded to a much richer history of
collaboration, reinterpretation and appropriation of science for utilitarian ends.
The historian of science Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra writes that Western scientific ideas
and practices played an integral role in colonization throughout the early modern period.15 Fed
by indigenous cultural traditions, colonists and their allies used the diverse fields of natural
history, astronomy, chemistry, mineralogy and metallurgy to understand and exploit the new
environments they confronted. Scientific activity was overwhelmingly pragmatic and conducted

14

For a historiographical review, see Juan José Saldaña’s, “The Latin American Scientific Theater,” in Science in
Latin America: A History, ed. Juan José Saldaña (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 1-28. A good narrative
review of scientific activity in the region and its potential as an analytical lens for understanding Latin America’s
past and present can be found in Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Marcos Cueto, “Latin American Science: The Long
View,” NACLA: Report on the Americas 35, no. 5 (March/April 2002): 18-22.
15
Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian
World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), Antonio Barrera, Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American
Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006) and Stuart George McCook,
States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2002).
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outside the ideologically orthodox scholasticism of the university in mines, agricultural estates,
barracks and cloisters as well as in the comfortable homes of eclectic local scientists.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, a propitious environment emerged for
integrating the isolated activity of diverse Latin American “communities of experts” and local
scientists through the socialization and institutionalization of scientific activity. Spurred in part
by Bourbon economic reform in the colonies, greater opportunities for communication and trade
diffused late Enlightenment ideals amongst local elites, who eagerly united the concept of human
progress with science. Under local initiative, bourgeois associations called Patriotic Societies,
dedicated to promoting education, economic growth and science and technology sprang up
across the major capitals of colonial Hispanic America together with a nascent scientific and
medical press. Even lay periodicals such as Cuba’s own Papel Periodico expoused the virtues of
“useful science,” regularly running articles on science and medicine for a general readership.16
Patriotic Societies, press organs, and local elites forged unprecedented linkages with
different social and economic sectors who hoped to benefit from the new science. Miners,
merchants, and export agriculturalists welcomed and often financed new institutes for technical
and scientific training in the hopes that scientists would be able to apply their knowledge to
augment production in the mining sectors of Peru and Mexico or the agro-export economies of
New Granada, Guatemala and Cuba.17 For its part, the Spanish crown embarked on its own
mission to utilize science to maximize resource extraction and bind the colonies more firmly to
the metropolis as colonies rather than autonomous kingdoms. Receptive to local scientific
impulses that promised to serve imperial needs, the crown sanctioned many institutional

16

Juan José Saldaña, “Science and Public Happiness during the Latin American Enlightenment,” in Science in Latin
America: A History, ed. Juan José Saldaña (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 51-92.
17
Ibid.
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innovations and sent waves of scientific missions to create linkages and foster awareness
amongst Hispanic American scientists.18
Colonial Latin American scientists gained a prominent role for themselves as emerging
professionals who could play a pivotal role in the construction of the local “patria.” As a group,
their influence on regional identity formation and independence from colonial Spanish rule has
been the subject of much investigation. Historians working from a paradigm which condemned
the old metropolis as hopelessly backward and obscurantist in all matters scientific, relate the
process of Latin American scientific modernization to anti-colonial resistance. Historian
Thomas Glick argues that colonial scientists in New Spain, New Granada and Peru were part of a
class cohort of creoles politicized by their exposure to ideas of political sovereignty and
emancipation.19 Creole scientists acutely felt the burden of defending the Americas from the
scientific and cultural slander from Europe (e.g. Buffon, Raynal, Robertson) and harbored
resentment towards their dependence on European science. Conflict between creole scientists
and metropolitan representatives, whether over discrimination, ideological rigidity or
contradictory goals in the application of science, exacerbated feelings of alienation from the
metropolis. Creole scientists were thus particularly open to “anti-European” ideas that packaged
political independence with scientific renaissance on behalf of the local “patria ”
Historians José Saldaña, Antonio La Fuente and Luis Carlos Arboleya note that creole
scientists didn’t automatically harbor revolutionary sympathies as a result of their scientific

18

An impressive historiography has been constructed around these expeditions. For an overview, see Alejandro R.
Diez Torre et al., La ciencia española en ultramar (Madrid: Doce Calles, 1991).
19
Thomas F Glick, “Science and Independence in Latin America (With Special Reference to New Granada),”
Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 2 (May 1991): 307-34. See also José Luis Peset’s, Ciencia y libertad:
El papel del científico ante la independencia americana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
1987).

8

activities.20 Certainly, creole scientists resented their marginalized position in the scientific
realm and tended to reinforce a certain scientific localism that quickly became political. In some
areas for example, particularly those with large indigenous populations such as New Spain,
scientists developed their own eclectic and autochthonous scientific traditions that drew upon the
pre-hispanic past and creole cultural symbology.21 Even where this was not the case, many
creole scientists favored working towards what historian Luis Carlos Arboleya calls a “patriotic
science,” self-sufficient, reform oriented and which directed economic prosperity to the
exclusive benefit of the creole “patria.”22 Historian José Saldaña points out that this scientific
localism and the creation of “a framework in which science could fulfill a social function” forged
avenues through which creole scientists justified their struggle for freedom and independence
from the metropole.23
In practice however, “patriotic science” did not necessarily conflict with metropolitan
objectives or lead scientific enthusiasts to revolt in the name of independence. After all, multiple
parties saw experimentation with effective metallurgical techniques, exploration of natural
resources in uncharted territories, and the establishment of scientific and technical schools to
train future generations as beneficial to what was a fluid concept of “patria.” Collaboration and
compromise between Spanish scientific representatives and local scientists were also quite
common, and the colonial administration often aided in the construction of institutional channels
20

Antonio Lafuente, “Enlightenment in an Imperial Context: Local Science in the Late Eighteenth Century Hispanic
World,” Osiris 15 (2001): 155-73, Lafuente and José Sala, “Ciencia colonial y roles profesionales en la América
española del siglo XVIII,” Quipu 6, no. 3 (1989): 387– 403, Luis Carlos Arboleya, “La ciencia y el ideal de ascenso
social de los criollos en el Virreinato de Nueva Granada,” in Ciencia, técnica y estado en la España ilustrada, ed.
Joaquín Fernández Pérez and Ignacio González Tascón (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1990), 193225, and Juan José Saldaña, “Nacionalismo y ciencia ilustrada en Am rica,” in Ciencia, técnica y estado en la
España ilustrada, ed. Joaquín Fernández Pérez and Ignacio González Tascón (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y
Ciencia, 1990), 115-29.
21
Juan José Saldaña, Los orígenes de la ciencia nacional (Mexico City: Instituto Ibero-Americano de Estudios sobre
la Ciencia y la Technología, 1992).
22
Arboleya, “La ciencia,” 193-225.
23
Saldaña, “Science and Public Happiness,” 87

9

for local scientists to articulate professional roles for themselves.24 The disarticulation of science
from revolutionary activity offers new analytical avenues for the study of scientific
modernization under colonialism. In terms of cultural identity, historians have also moved
beyond simple dichotomies of mutually antagonistic “creoles” and “peninsulars” to carefully
uncover the circumstances which politically radicalized creole scientists.25
Creole physicians were well represented in the colonial Latin American scientific
community. Their relationship to smallpox vaccination, widely considered a “useful” application
of science for the prosperity of populations, can reveal much about their professional goals and
identities in relation to the public. The historiography related to smallpox vaccination under
empire thus offers another prism from which to understand the problem of professionalization,
identity and the state. Historians of vaccination have utilized post-colonial theory to move
beyond heroic monographs of Western medical initiative and models of simple scientific
diffusionism. Some of the first critical scholarly perspectives, such as those of David Arnold and
Anil Kumar, invert traditional representations of vaccination as a beneficent Western medical
initiative upon grateful colonial populations. They instead portray the procedure as a “tool of
empire,” which literally and figuratively marked its resistant subjects with a symbol of invasive
state power. The role of a professional cadre of vaccinators in the ideological justification of
empire looms large in these histories, where Foucauldian themes of the interconnection between
scientific knowledge and state power have found particularly fertile ground.26 This perspective

24

See for example, Lafuente, “Enlightenment,” 155-73, Lafuente and Sala, “Ciencia colonial,” 387-403, and Juan
José Saldaña, “The Failed Search for ‘Useful Knowledge’: Enlightened Scientific and Technological Policies in
New Spain,” in Cross Cultural Diffusion of Science: Latin America, ed. José Saldaña (Mexico City: Sociedad
Latinoamericana de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnología, 1987), 33-57.
25
See for example Lafuente, “Enlightenment,” 155-73 and Arboleya, “La ciencia,” 193-225.
26
See David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and Anil Kumar, Medicine and the Raj: British Medical Policy,
1835-1911 (New Delhi: Sage, 1998). Deepak Kumar, “Unequal Contenders, Uneven Ground: Medical Encounters in
British India, 1820-1920,” in Western Medicine as Contested Knowledge, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Bridie
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has also facilitated the blurring of lines between metropole and colony as scholars investigate the
problem of civilizational discourses and state compulsion amongst the domestic populations of
imperial powers.27
More recent revisionists have addressed problems with the use of the post-colonial lens to
investigate vaccination under empire, particularly the tendency to reduce complex professional
and cultural identities within dualities of European/indigenous, scientific/traditional and colonial
imposition/resistance. Sanjoy Bhattacharya, for instance, depicts the colonial state as a
multilayered complex of institutions rife with intergovernmental conflict over vaccination
strategy, technique and organization. In the process, he reveals a rich multitude of players with
different agendas and opinions about the proper definition of and approach to the public good in
a colonial setting. Lauren Minsky renewed interest in the technical difficulties of maintaining
and transporting fresh lymph over long distances and/or in certain environmental contexts,
bringing attention to the process of experimentation and indigenization of vaccines by local
practitioners. Historians of vaccination under empire no longer consider colonial subjects who
resist vaccination part of a unanimously defiant and culturally-religiously conservative “other,”
but instead portray them as rational actors whose receptivity fluctuates with the relative
advantages of a painful and sometimes dangerous operation. Together, these studies not only
dispel simple dualities and highlight the shifting allegiances of state, professional and popular

Andrews (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 172-211. For a more recent treatment in the case of
Cuba, see Adrián López Denis, Disease and Society, 110-47. Outside a colonial context, more complex interactions
between native populations and Western medicine can be found in Ann Bowman Jannetta, The Vaccinators:
Smallpox, Medical Knowledge, and the "Opening" of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
27
In Germany for example, Claudia Huerkamp has noted that nineteenth century smallpox vaccination initiatives
spearheaded by medical professionals touched a large percentage of the population and were thus key ingredients for
the “medicalization” of the general population Claudia Huerkamp, “The History of Smallpox Vaccination in
Germany: A First Step in the Medicalization of the General Public,” Journal of Contemporary History 20, no. 4
(October 1985): 617-35.
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actors, but present spaces for historians to investigate the process of identity formation in local
settings.
Histories of smallpox vaccination in colonial Latin America have advanced revisionist
strains in the literature and present an important lens for the study of professionalization. The
region hosted one of the world’s first major public health campaigns, the Crown sponsored
Balmis expedition, which transported fresh vaccine across Latin America, the Philippines and
China between 1803 and 1810.28 While this campaign often lent itself to uncritical, heroic
narratives, revisionist scholars such as Angela Thompson, Susana Ramírez Martín and José
Rigau Pérez have investigated the nuanced ideological underpinnings of the campaigns and their
impact on professionalization and institution-building in Spain’s colonies.29 However, relatively
few historical works directly address the relationship between the creation of a professional
community of the “learned” and the institutionalization of smallpox vaccination in Latin
America beyond the early nineteenth century. The dynamic processes by which communities of
licensed practitioner-vaccinators engaged the state and the impact of their shifting alliances on
colonial identities over the longue duree also remains very much in the dark.30

28

For a standard, English language account of the expedition, see Sherburne F. Cook, “Francisco Xavier de Balmis
and the Introduction of Vaccination to Latin America,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 11, no.5 (May 1942):
543-60 and Michael M. Smith, The “Real Expedición Marítima de la Vacuna” in New Spain and Guatemala
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1974), 1-74.
29
Angela T. Thompson, "To Save the Children: Inoculation, Vaccination, and Public Health in Guanajuato,
Mexico," The Americas 49, no. 4 (April 1993): 431-55, José Rigau Pérez, “The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in
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Dissertation Outline
My dissertation fills a gap in the literature on the history of medical professionalization
by emphasizing the central importance of smallpox vaccination for creole, medical
professionalization throughout the nineteenth century. In tandem with revisionist scholarship on
science in colonial Latin America and smallpox vaccination under empire, I argue that the creole
“professional gentlemen” who protagonized vaccination campaigns maintained a complex
relationship and identification with colonial power. The colonial government’s support for
vaccination reinforced local pride and contributed to the construction of distinct cultural and
professional identities amongst licensed, creole practitioners. Rather than serving as a basis for
political dissent and anti-colonialism, these identities dutifully served both empire and a colonial
economy built on African slavery during much of the nineteenth century. Late nineteenth
century limitations upon professional growth and the termination of a service which granted
creole, licensed practitioners a source of prestige and sense of mission in society led vaccinators
to marshal these identities against colonial power.
It is precisely the space between medicine as a “tool of empire” and a public good
utilized as a weapon against colonialism which lies at the center of this dissertation. The doctor
was not only a benevolent figure who defined his mission as a “sacred” service on behalf of the
population, he was part of a paternalistic, monopolistic elite bent on inserting itself into
mechanisms of social engineering. Professional definitions of the public could be limited to
critical economic producers or embrace persons across condition, socio-economic status and
race. Such elitism and inclusive ideologies could co-exist and reinforce each other, or be pitted
in conflict by professionals in a contest over meaning and position. Processes of
professionalization and the notions of professional duty for the public good they reinforced were
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conduits for the construction of cultural narratives which had decidedly political character. This
dissertation is not intended to be a prosopography of the medical profession in nineteenth century
Cuba, nor even a detailed biographical sketch of the vaccinating corps itself. Rather, the
emphasis is on the effect of professional modernization upon cultural identities and the
professional circumstances which transformed creole vaccinators’ political loyalties over time.
The format is largely narrative, with analytical interludes embedded within the text.
Chapters One focuses on the close collaboration between elite Cuban creoles and Spanish
colonial reformers in their joint project to domesticate the technology of smallpox vaccination on
the island after its introduction in 1804 Spearheaded by creole medical “high priest” Dr Tomás
Romay y Chacón, the Central Vaccine Board of Havana was a center for licensed medical
“professional gentlemen” to formulate scientific standards that would justify a monopoly on a
relatively simple surgical procedure. Participation in the Vaccine Board also created
professional platforms and collaborative spaces for aspiring creole public servants to back up
their claims of socio-political and economic relevance with direct intervention upon a significant
percentage of the colonial population. Their social mission, framed as a “sacred obligation” was
in many ways a “tool of empire,” primarily geared towards augmenting productivity amongst
epidemiologically susceptible slave populations and reinforcing dominant socio-cultural and
racial hierarchies.
Chapter Two discusses the problem of professionalization and bureaucratization in a
changing colonial slave society. Vaccination was a symbol of creole initiative long after the
colonial pact between creoles and Spanish administrators began to fray in the 1820s and 30s.
Yet the powerful discourses of imperial paternalism and maintenance of this “preferential”
professional service stymied the articulation of any serious resistance to Spanish policy in spite
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of a worsening epidemiological portrait. Over time in fact, public health policy more closely
resembled the political economy of a militarized colony, as vaccinators won unprecedented state
support for the use of coercive interventions and eventually, compulsory vaccination for the
entire population in 1867. The polyvalent and often contradictory discourses of imperial
paternalism, professionalism and humanitarianism could, however, be problematic. Vaccinators
had to adapt to a changing target demographic and voiced sympathy for and recognition of the
underlying socio-economic and technical foundations of low popular turnout. Bureaucratic
inefficiencies, low salaries and limited opportunities for advancement tarnished the image of
imperial paternalism and stirred intra-professional strife amongst a vaccination corps that saw
themselves primarily as public servants rather than genteel benefactors of charitable services.
When the central vaccinating corps was suppressed between 1868 and 1871, these colonial
servants would not be resigned to the dissolution of their newfound social mission or
professional identities.
In Chapter Three, the relationship between a specifically creole medical professional
consciousness and colonial smallpox vaccination policy emerges in the context of late nineteenth
century conflicts over the technical innovation of using calves as sources of renewable vaccine.
Creole vaccinators had experimented with calves as sources of abundant and purified smallpox
vaccine before the technique was granted an institutional base by Spanish public health
administrator and vaccinator Vicente Ferrer in 1868. But in the midst of war and worsening
ethnic strife, Ferrer’s association with destructive colonial public health reform and the
professional disenfranchisement of a corps founded by creole patricians over 60 years earlier
offended creole medical professional sensibilities. The reaction of the creole scientific
establishment, embodied by the Cuban Royal Academy of Science, demonstrates the political
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and cultural basis of scientific method and belief systems. The “calf vaccine” became associated
with decentralization and privatization, running contrary to a medical ethic built on a discourse
of humanitarianism and public service The “sacred” public obligation which served as a
building block of professional identity was now in defiance of colonial policy.
By the 1880s and early 90s, the dismal sanitary and epidemiological legacies of Spanish
colonial rule were calling into question the viability of Spanish colonialism as a whole amongst
many elite, creole medical professionals. Chapter Four discusses the reformist roles these
professionals assumed for themselves in the construction of an autonomous (or in extreme cases,
politically independent) “Cuban” nation and their definition of Cuban identity. The idealized and
in many ways reinvented history of smallpox vaccination as a largely independent, creole
initiative of service for the public good was a vital part of a dynamic narrative of creole cultural
assertion. However, the question of how to honor this legacy and participate in the associational
flourish of post-Zanjon Cuba pushed medical professionals in different directions, particularly
concerning the thorny issue of engagement with the colonial state.
The final resolution of colonial collaboration was of course, preemptively proffered by
American intervention and occupation of the island from 1898 to 1901. During these years, the
American military contracted Cuban physicians to stamp out epidemic foci and vaccinate, under
martial law, the majority of the Cuban population. The occupiers also installed a complex and
unprecedentedly invasive system of public health intervention against smallpox and yellow
fever, diseases considered epidemiologically dangerous by both North Americans and Cuban
physicians on a “civilizational” mission A dream of social engineering had seemingly come
true. However, credit for the early twentieth century successes in public health were not left for
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northerners to appropriate, as Cuban interest in the history of smallpox vaccination was
reawakened in the context of US colonialism.

A Note on Sources
Most information on early nineteenth century smallpox vaccination is based largely on
documentation left by Cuban creole medical patrician and Secretary of the Vaccine Board Tomás
Romay y Chacón. The documentation Romay left as Secretary of the Vaccine Board is very
selective, intended to streamline the messy, evolving project into a coherent and selfaggrandizing narrative for the colonial administration. While these documents can be
problematic and are used with caution, Romay’s central role in directing the program for over 40
years ensure that they reveal much about the ideological foundations for institutionalizing
vaccination and the progress of medical professionalization within the Board.
With the bureaucratic transition from the Sociedad Patriótica to the auspices of the Junta
de Sanidad in the early 1840’s, different secretaries dominated administrative oversight of the
service and produced somewhat more diverse documentation and correspondence in terms of
professional and bureaucratic perspective. These sources are a critical lens for determining
Romay’s administrative and ideological legacy upon creole vaccinators Histories of the vaccine,
which appear throughout the nineteenth century, are also extensively utilized for their revelation
of an evolving professional and cultural narrative. The voices become even more pluralistic after
termination of the service from 1868 to 1871, with growing associationalism and its attendant
press organs. The growth in the diversity of public voices illuminates the larger creole medical
community’s attitudes towards the procedure and vaccination’s reception amongst the general
population.
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This study is not intended to map the linkages between smallpox vaccination and medical
professional identities on the island as a whole. The great majority of sources are limited to the
sugar-rich provinces of Havana and Matanzas, where the confluence of plantation slavery,
militarization and urbanization provided uniquely fertile ground for medical professionalization.
For reasons of time and space, the far western province of Pinar del Rio, and the eastern regions
of Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente are largely excluded from analysis, though vaccination
services extended into these areas.
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Figure 2: Provinces and their corresponding capitals on the island of Cuba after colonial
reorganization in 1879. This study focuses on the major sugar producing provinces of Havana
and Matanzas.
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Chapter One: Medical Professionalization and the Lancet

Introduction
Secretary Tomás Romay’s summary of the activities of the Central Vaccine Board for the
members of colonial Cuba’s prestigious Economic Society in December of 1835 was bittersweet
Since the introduction of smallpox vaccination in 1804, officials boasted a total of 311,342
vaccinated persons over the last 31 years. Yet overall tallies obscured more troubling
fluctuations over time; the fact that since the early 1820s, the number of persons vaccinated had
dwindled to a mere thousand or so per year was probably a most glaring omission for those few
vaccinators present.
These alarming downturns in activity on the part of the vaccination board and the high
percentage of the population subsequently left vulnerable to smallpox were only tangentially
addressed. Instead, the secretary emphasized the positive. Romay insisted that in the long term,
vaccination had not only “preserved the inhabitants of this island from the most deadly and
generalized of diseases [smallpox]”; it had also “augmented the population, fomented
agriculture, increased commerce, industry and the arts, and in this land privileged by nature, the
level of prosperity and opulence that is its destiny ”31 The faculty present was to be especially
praised for their professional contribution to this achievement in public health Even if “[our]
hopes have not been fulfilled, if the number of vaccinated persons progressively diminishes
when it should increase, this has not been a result of any defect of zeal or constancy on the part
of vaccinators ”32 In fact, after 31 years of hard work “the Central unta abound[ed] with faculty
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members distinguished by their experience, understanding and practice”, more than capable of
taking charge of the organization upon his departure.33
Romay’s closing address to his medical colleagues in December of 1835 is testimony to
both the opportunity and daunting challenge that the introduction of smallpox vaccination
offered to a growing medical elite in colonial Cuba. Acquired through a chance visit to Havana
by vaccinated children from Puerto Rico in February of 1804, the vaccine arrived at a propitious
time in the island’s history During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a core group of creole
and peninsular intellectuals witnessed an economic and social transformation of unprecedented
proportions. From the fairly diversified agricultural economy and low population characteristic
of colonial peripheries, the island’s economy and social structure was converted into a brutal and
cosmopolitan slave society. In densely packed port cities such as Havana, the resulting
population growth from immigration, natural increase and the slave trade facilitated the spread of
disease.
It was the danger that disease posed to the island’s economy and the rise of a trend in
preventive medicine based on scientific precepts in Europe that allowed a growing number of
elite creole physicians new professional and public functions in colonial Cuba As “one of the
first milestones in the advancement of preventative medicine,” vaccination inspired some of the
first attempts to combat disease at the national level in many countries.34 It also opened doors to
the early exercise of expert authority for revalued concepts of popular health. Using the Spanish
colony of Cuba as a case study, this chapter uncovers the processes by which an interest group
emerged in the wake of the vaccine’s introduction to engage the state in a struggle for privilege
and status as bearers of the public good. What role did an autocratic state imbued with
33
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Enlightened Absolutist ideals play in medical professionalization and the construction of
institutional platforms for licensed practitioners? How was the new technology assimilated to
local ideologies and praxis and how did physicians use its introduction as an opportunity to
garner support for new social roles in the public sphere?

Early Forms of Professionalization under Spanish Administration
Prior to the introduction of vaccination on the Spanish colony of Cuba in 1804, a few
important public institutions existed to offer licensed physicians the opportunity to regulate the
profession and/or intervene on behalf of public health. Spanish legislation regarding medical
matters dated from Roman times and was based on the principle that it was the State/Crown’s
obligation to intervene in the medical marketplace in order to assure that licensed medical
practitioners were available to the population. According to historian of medicine John Lanning,
“[for the Spaniards] nothing was more relevant to public health than the proper education,
examination and licensing of doctors, the inspection of apothecary shops, the prevention of false
or dangerous medical publications, the enforcement of medical laws, and the suppression of
quackery ”35
Since at least the days of Alfonso the Learned (1252-84), a small tribunal of Crown
physicians composed what became known as the proto-medicato, which regulated the medical
sphere and served as the highest court in cases involving the art and science of healing on the
peninsula.36 Through successive reorganizations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the
proto-medicato’s power and jurisdiction over medical practice and practitioners increased in
volume and vitality. As Spaniards across the Americas sought to reproduce those regulatory
35
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institutions which set the framework for “civilized,” urban life, over a half dozen protomedicatos were eventually established throughout the major cities of the Spanish empire,
including Havana.37
Even in major towns and/or cities where tribunals did not exist, proto-medicos or
“public” physicians could be hired as consultants to municipal authorities seeking to curb illegal
medical practice. Contracts between municipalities and individual physicians could also require
physicians to attend to the needy populations of growing urban centers, make rounds in hospitals
or, in port cities, inspect quarantined ships.38 By the eighteenth century, the (sometimes forced)
retention of such physicians in growing cities such as Quito, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Santiago de
Cuba became commonplace. In cases of epidemic emergency, pre-eminent practitioners could
also be called upon to serve on city health councils, institutionalized as Juntas de Sanidad in
early eighteenth century Spain. Together with agricultural, commercial and political leaders,
physicians on these mixed councils offered advice on quarantine and sanitary controls until the
specter of disease had passed over the population.39 Satisfactory service in hospitals, the
retention of elite clientele or even the simple advantage of licensure in an environment where
such personnel were scarce offered physicians professional step-ladders and subsequent leverage
in their approach to these opportunities in the civil bureaucracy.
In Cuba, as elsewhere in the Atlantic world, cycles of trade, war and disease stirred the
formation of a professional medical infrastructure. Even as Spanish attention turned from the
demographically and mineral-poor island to the riches of the great indigenous empires of the
37
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mainland, the town of Havana quickly became an important transit point and commercial depot
for fleet ships.40 By the middle of the sixteenth century, recognition of Havana’s strategic
position with respect to Atlantic trade and imperial defense led to its designation as a central port
of call for a regularized fleet system. Shipyards, armaments industries, garrisons and
fortifications brought capital, slaves and more frequent communication with the Atlantic world. 41
Commerce blossomed to serve military needs, Circum-Caribbean inter-colonial networks and
insular circuits of exchange.
The city’s subsequent growth resulted in a worsening epidemiological portrait even as
local administration worried about the lack of licensed practitioners at port.42 Institutionalizing
some minimal form of regulation in the spheres of medicine and public health became an urgent
matter for local authorities. Various legislative acts not only authorized the establishment of
public institutions for the ill, but appointed licensed physicians to attend them. As early as 1634,
Spanish physician Manuel Muñoz de Rojas went further, successfully petitioning the Crown to
accept the establishment of a proto-medicato in Havana with himself at its head.43 While
prestigious and potentially lucrative for Muñoz de Rojas, there were few licensed practitioners to
govern and persistent jurisdictional disputes tended to breed stagnation in these early attempts at
institutional reform and what many elite contemporaries considered a critical component of
cultural uplift.
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However, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the influx of capital associated with
Havana’s role as one of central nodes of imperial defense and commercial exchange had
irrevocably transformed the social fabric; a new, largely creole mercantile and agricultural elite
emerged to reap the benefits of a trade boom in what had become a multi-national, colonial
enterprise across the Caribbean. This emerging and increasingly self-conscious class pushed
against the limitations of their local milieu and “could no longer be satisfied that their city was
dirty and pestilent, without grace or diversion ”44 Foreshadowing events almost a century
afterwards, a select group of reformers lobbied on behalf of their economic and cultural
aspirations not only for urban beautification but for institutional changes in the administration of
public health and access to higher education. Not only was the protomedicato reinvigorated in
1711, but the Royal Pontifical University of Saint Geronimo was founded under Dominican
auspices 17 years later.45 The university in particular served as a cultural symbol for the nascent
elite and assured a steady (if meager) stream of medical graduates for the population at port.
The emergence of “public” physicians and the creation of institutions to educate and
regulate medical practice offered some level of professional opportunity in the public sphere for
a small number of licensed practitioners resident in Havana. The university, for example, held
full faculty of medicine on par with the faculties of theology, philosophy, and civil and canon
law Assuming they fit the racial and religious dictates for “purity of blood,” had references for
“good character” and were able to afford the schooling and requisite field experience, aspiring
practitioners could obtain an education for licensure as barbers, surgeons or full-fledged
physicians.46 For much of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the medical education
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available at the university was antiquated at best, with little recourse to practical clinical and
surgical courses to balance the outdated anatomical and physiological lectures on Hippocrates
and Avicenna.47 Despite its reputation as a bulwark for scholasticism, the existence of a
prominent academic center for the dissemination of medical degrees contributed much to the
creation of a local nucleus of licensed “professional gentlemen” with a shared corpus of
knowledge and a sense of social and professional entitlement.48
For its part, the proto-medicato was one of the first medical regulatory institutions to be
founded and led by licensed practitioners For medical professionals, this institution’s most
important success is that it provided some (albeit very limited) forum for debate, local initiative
and opportunity for upward mobility in the medical world. With the graduation of the
university’s first set of medical students in 1730, the proto-medicato’s charge to grant licenses to
competent medical practitioners began in earnest. And as a truly local nucleus of medical
activity began to coalesce in the port city, expansion of the proto-medicato became imperative,
creating a small but significant career step-ladder for Havana’s most renowned and wellconnected medical practitioners.49 From making rounds in hospitals to inspecting quarantined
ships at port, Havana’s proto-medicos and affiliated physicians formed a small interest group
which, though largely advisory, played some role in broadening physicians’ public space and
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making their presence felt in hospitals (then under almost exclusive jurisdiction of the clergy)
and municipal sanitary services.50
In the long term however, this administrative organization did not much benefit the
extension of medical jurisdiction in the civil sphere. Although the title granted to the second
proto-medico Francisco Teneza y Rubira in 1711 was explicit in its assurance that the
prerogatives of the proto-medicato in Havana were equal to those of its sister institutions in the
Indies, the proto-medicato’s jurisdiction over medical licensing and questions of competency
was constantly infringed upon by colonial officials and a Spanish Crown loath to give up
traditional regulatory powers.51 Energetic proto-medicos who sought to expand the institution’s
authority beyond that of a merely consultory body earned the enmity of important governmental
authorities and could expect lengthy litigation, public calumny, risk of personal injury and even
exile.52 A persistent dearth of licensed medical practitioners at port only exacerbated problems of
poor administrative authority Havana’s central position in the Spanish fleet system as a transitstop and port of call resulted in a constant traffic of medical military personnel through the city.
Yet Havana “was all but without [licensed] medical care” for nearly a century after its
occupation and in the centuries that followed suffered “frequent periods of medical scarcity” as
medical practitioners moved on to more lucrative prospects on the American mainland. 53
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In times of epidemic, licensed practitioners approached the civil realm as consultants,
without the ability to either organize or execute action. Indeed, the prevailing philosophy of
public health intervention, in Spain and across Western Europe, ran contrary to such a role. As
Lanning has pointed out, “public health [in the eighteenth century Spanish Empire] was
somewhat different from the contemporary American perception of that same enterprise;
enforcement of sanitation and drug standards, detection of disease and preventive medicine
generally (usually at no cost to the individual)” was not considered within the jurisdiction of
public health institutions as they pertained to the active medical community.54 Even the
protomedicato, as the only centralized medical authority in the colonial realm, was essentially
powerless in the face of an epidemic, lacking the effective authority and resources to execute
preventive measures and/or interventions. Instead, viceregal or local officials were the main
protagonists during times of crisis, leaving the protomedicato on the “fringes of efforts to remedy
public health problems ”55
The public welfare was not necessarily prejudiced by the medical community’s lack of
civil control over public health administration and private medical practice. Aside from ancient
and well-known prescriptions for various types of quarantine, street cleaning, and purification
rituals involving fire and cannon, university-trained practitioners didn’t have much to offer in the
way of public interventions against epidemic disease. The religious orders, curanderos, military
empirics and healers of all backgrounds tended to the everyday needs of the population alongside
licensed personnel. Their outcomes were certainly no worse than those of the licensed elite.56
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Indeed, it is a wonder so many private clients and public patients survived the heroic strategies of
heavy bleeding, purging, and blistering commonly used by educated galenists to restore balance
to the body. Of course, officials and lay people alike believed in the efficacy of educated
practice and regularly expressed concern about the “many persons who with little fear of God
and in contempt of royal justice,” undermined the public good by “freely practice[ing] the art of
medicine ”57 But the ingenuity and ample experience of many unlicensed practitioners, some of
whom experimented freely with the best that popular and elite healing strategies had to offer,
often earned them a better reputation than the most learned of physicians.58
Professionally however, the effect of a subordinate role on the outlook of the licensed
medical community could be profound. Relegated to recommending solutions to problems of
inoculation and quarantine during times of crises, there was little incentive for practicing
physicians to publicly take charge of combating an epidemic After all, “this was the moment
when their private practice was most needed and their income at its peak ”59 Throughout the
Americas, and even in times of relative health, proto-physicians and their disciples were
notorious for moving on to better financial prospects without a glance towards what royal
officials identified as the public interest.60 The persistently curative bent of medicine, a lack of
scientific knowledge, and the small number of licensed practitioners available (to those elite
sectors of the population who could afford to submit to their generally dangerous treatments)
aggravated the professional legitimacy of the medical profession in the eyes of both the state and
wider public.
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Alternative frameworks that would allow for monetary interest to be channeled towards a
“shared professional mission for social prestige and/or the public articulation of ethical and
scientific standards” were also stymied by the general, systemic neglect common to overseas
empire.61 Budgets were low, facilities few and institutions such as hospitals and isolation houses
for the poor were dependent on charity. New conceptualizations of state responsibility for the
“public good,” and fresh paradigms for understanding disease prevention would be required to
gain enough leverage for an effective foray into the public sphere. By the turn of the nineteenth
century, both of these developments would ripen and coincide with the emergence of another
influential wave of creole reformers eager to test the boundaries of local autonomy and imperial
responsibility in the midst of great political and social-economic transformation.

Smallpox Vaccination: A case study in professionalization
On the advent of the introduction of smallpox vaccination to the Spanish Americas,
smallpox was a well-known and little controlled scourge of the Caribbean. Arriving to the
Americas with the ships of Spanish conquest in the early 16th century, the disease decimated
native populations.62 As trade and communications increased and more importantly, as African
slaves were imported to meet labor needs, the re-introduction of smallpox to ports across the
Caribbean became intimately associated with the slave trade that sustained commodity
production on the plantation model.63 Though variola inoculation was widely practiced
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throughout Western and Central Africa, the social displacement, malnutrition, and overcrowding
which accompanied the trade facilitated the spread of disease. Intensification of the trade was
felt in the frequency of epidemics, particularly after the mid-seventeenth century development of
slave-based plantation systems in the new British and French Caribbean. In Cuba, where the
disease had not been seen for decades, smallpox caused great mortality amongst the African
slave population in a flurry of epidemics from 1677 to 1684 and again in 1693.64
The advent of Cuba’s own export revolution almost a century afterwards added urgency
for solutions to the increasingly frequent epidemics ravaging the major port cities of Cuba.
Precipitated by enlightened Bourbon trade policies and the fall of Saint-Domingue as a
competitor in the sugar market, Cuban exports in primary goods boomed during the last three
decades of the eighteenth century.65 Meeting the demand for sugar, coffee and tobacco
production, as well as the growing urban industries thriving on the trade, required labor. In
1763, a brief occupation of the city by the English prompted Spanish authorities to reverse
previous restrictions on large-scale importation of enslaved Africans. Between 1774 and 1792
the slave population increased from 44, 000 to 85,000 persons, representing a jump from 26 to
31 percent of the total population. Over the next forty years, particularly as the labor-intensive
sugar economy expanded, hundreds of thousands more were imported so that by 1827, the
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island’s 287,000 slaves constituted an unprecedented 41 percent of the total population 66 On the
eve of the introduction of smallpox vaccination in February of 1804, Cuba (particularly its
western region) was incorporated into a global network as an importer of slaves to produce
commodity agricultural goods for export.
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Figure 3: Growth of the sugar industry, 1790 to 1894.67
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These transformations had a profound impact on the major port city of Havana.69
Dramatic demographic growth linked to the export sector was augmented by subsequent
militarization of the colony, which brought tens of thousands of Spanish soldiers and
administrators to Havana’s shores in order to maintain order and defend colonial claims in the
new economy. The city expanded beyond the old walls and its center pulsed with the movement
of people, animals and goods of all kinds, including massive quantities of bulky exports.70 As
Prussian scientist Alexander von Humbolt noted during his travels to the island at the dawn of
the nineteenth century, the circulatory systems of increasingly congested streets and
thoroughfares were generally muddy, foul-smelling and insalubrious.71 It was in this context that
epidemic disease made its most dramatic appearance. Regular bouts of measles, influenza, and
yellow fever periodically spread panic amongst the population and directly interfered with
economic growth Smallpox, that “ancient scourge of the colony,” precipitated epidemic
emergencies at least once every seven to nine years, burning on the combustible fuel of nonimmune children and newly arrived adult slaves to carry it through city and countryside. 72
Such a situation worked to the advantage of licensed practitioners, which by the 1820s
already formed a disproportionate percentage of the population in relative terms. Particularly
during the early nineteenth century, the dynamism of the slave-driven economy and the influx of
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epidemiologically vulnerable populations in a city infamous for its unhealthy conditions opened
opportunities for healers in the private sphere. In rural outskirts, the insatiable demand for
African slaves and the abysmal working conditions associated with the export sector created
employment for iterant and regular surgeons and physicians on plantations.73 In the city, disease
etiologies emphasizing local conditions and personal habits made local experts the ultimate
reference for those stricken with diseases like yellow fever, which preyed almost exclusively
upon the non-immune European population. Across both city and countryside, the bodies of
soldiers, the urban poor, and slaves provided doctors with fodder for clinical experience,
experimentation and autopsy.74 However, as intense urbanization, militarization and commodity
production spurred medical professionalization on the island, the influence of “professional
gentlemen” in the public realm remained slight, especially in the struggle against regular
scourges such as smallpox.
Prior to the introduction of vaccination on the island in 1804, various preventive
measures existed to halt the advance of a smallpox epidemic. Because re-introductions of
smallpox very often accompanied incoming slave ships, maritime quarantine was considered the
easiest means of preserving populations against possible epidemics and was the technique most
frequently utilized.75 In theory, if the epidemic was severe enough, other more cumbersome and
controversial measures were available to authorities. Land quarantine could separate contagious
persons from the larger population. Royal promulgations throughout the eighteenth century
73
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advocated the construction of isolation houses (degredos) in which “[individual] smallpox
victims [could be] maintained with utmost care and gentleness, assuring that all the precautions
to avoid contagion are met” 76 If larger numbers of people were affected, cordones de sanidad
(or forced quarantine) also had the potential to restrict the possibilities of disease transmission
between communities. However, the expense and inconvenience of these latter options made
them of little recourse and indeed, with few exceptions, land quarantine was rarely implemented
against the pox during the colonial period.
In April of 1785, a royal promulgation concerning smallpox control reached Cuba which
advocated inoculation with smallpox virus, a procedure only recently sanctioned by the Spanish
Crown.77 The procedure consisted of taking matter from the pustule of a person infected with a
relatively mild form of the disease and transferring it to the punctured skin of a healthy person.
Supporters across the Atlantic world hoped that in this way the relatively benign case that
resulted could be treated with ease and by a licensed practitioner. Disseminated throughout
Latin America during the second half of the eighteenth century, inoculation was successfully
adopted amongst elite sectors in the colony and a small group of specialists quickly sprang up in
the major port cities of Havana and Santiago to meet demand.78 By the turn of the nineteenth
century, the relative merits of inoculation were being publicly debated in the recently
inaugurated Papel Periodico, leading the Cuban medical patrician of the period to judge the
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procedure “so generally good, that even its most acerbic detractors could not but admit its
usefulness ”79
Despite the abundance of royal and municipal statutes proscribing rigorous quarantine
measures and the growing acceptance of inoculation by leading patricians, authorities were
generally less than successful in preventing or containing smallpox epidemics during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hundreds of miles of shoreline and a widespread and
lively contraband trade made maritime quarantine logistically difficult for an island colony such
as Cuba.80 Inoculation with smallpox virus, while it lay a promising foundation for the
understanding and practice of preventive medicine, was controversial and unpopular. The risk of
suffering a severe bout with inoculation and the need for isolation of contagious individuals
terrified people enough to prevent utilization of the preservative on a large scale.81 Combined
with the myriad deficiencies of an unresponsive colonial administration and the general hostility
towards strict adherence to any preventive measures that could negatively impact trade, the
possibilities for effectively curbing the increasingly frequent epidemics were few.
Vaccination however, offered much potential for effective prevention and for a different
conceptualization of professional medical authority at the turn of the nineteenth century. In
1796, the English physician Edward Jenner (re)-discovered that inoculation with material from
cattle infected with cowpox (the more benign bovine virus related to smallpox) provided an
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effective protection against smallpox and could be used as a preventive.82 The procedure had
several important advantages over rival methods. It was targeted, relatively simple and cheap to
administer to large populations in short time and it was not contagious, making controversial
measures of quarantine unnecessary This “first great social application of medicine” could
serve not merely as a weapon to combat smallpox epidemics, but was also the “basis for
prevention of disease and thus an antidote for the profit incentive that had traditionally motivated
doctors ”83 As a preventive measure that necessitated medical intervention of populations on an
individual level, vaccination offered the possibility of expanding the reach of “medical
gentlemen” and other licensed practitioners amongst the public and creating a more active
dialogue between these and state and ecclesiastical authorities.

The Vaccine Arrives
Jenner published his findings in 1798; by 1801 they had been translated into several
languages.84 Physicians and many sectors of the public, already familiar with inoculation,
eagerly accepted the promising new method and as a result, applied it all over Europe. In
comparison with the rest of Western Europe, Spain received the preventative relatively late.
Although, printed information regarding vaccination appears in the Spanish journal El
Semanario de Agricultura y Artes in the spring of 1799, the first vaccination was not performed
until 1801, with the arrival of live vaccine from Paris.85 After its introduction, the technology
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spread rapidly throughout the peninsula and by 1803, Crown officials finalized preparations to
share the benefits of vaccination with her colonies. In what became the first global health
initiative, Doctor Francisco Xavier de Balmis, the ambitious and energetic Honorary Physician
of the Royal Consul, set sail in November of that year to “introduce the coveted preservative”
into parts of the Spanish empire and “establish institutions so that its benefits may be enjoyed for
generations to come” 86
By the time of Balmis’ arrival to the Americas however, most major cities in the Spanish
colonial empire had already acquired the vaccine through the ingenuity of a handful of impatient
medical elites who utilized trans-Atlantic networks of travel and trade.87 Beginning with its
introduction into Puerto Rico from the Danish colony of St. Thomas in February of 1803, the
vaccine quickly circulated through the major ports of the Caribbean Gulf, reaching Caracas, the
port of Veracruz and Mexico City in short order.88 Through this circuit, the vaccine enjoyed a
briefly successful round in the far eastern city of Santiago de Cuba under the direction of French
physician Dr. Vignaud and Cuban practitioner Miguel Rollan. This success, however, was shortlived. In February of 1804, a creole from Santo Domingo and her two servants informally
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introduced the vaccine to Havana, and it was anxiously received by creole medical “high priest”
and future national icon Dr. Tomás Romay Chacón (1764-1849).89

Figure 5: Portrait of Dr. Tomás Romay y Chacón

Thereafter, the progress of the vaccine was to become intimately intertwined with the
history of medical professionalization and creole cultural assertion on the island. A physician of
relatively humble origins with close ties to the sugar sector, Romay was an active member of the
Sociedad Económica de Amigos del Pais, an institution established in 1792 by a small clique of
wealthy creole reformers who sought to stimulate economic growth and cultural development on
the island. The Economic Society, which according to one scholar “most exemplified the
craving for progress experienced by the new [creole elite],” enjoyed a privileged relationship
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with the imperial state at the turn of the nineteenth century.90 Reforms associated with the
“enlightened despotism” of Charles III favored the placement of royal and ecclesiastical
authorities on the island that were receptive to the moderate (and very selective) liberal
reformism of privileged creoles tied to a rising sugar economy. During the tenures of liberal
Captain-General de las Casas (1790-1796), the Marques de Someruelos (1799-1812), and Bishop
José Diaz Espada y Landa (1802-1832) elite, creole initiatives in the formation of local societies
and a regular press enjoyed much success and provided a springboard for reform initiatives in
matters of medicine and public health. While contemporaneous imperial overtures towards and
impositions upon powerful local interests across Spanish America often sparked feelings of
alienation and resentment, in Cuba the partnership and sense of shared mission between a certain
subsection of the elite and imperial reformers crystallized into what historians would later term a
“colonial pact ”
Whatever their effect upon Spanish American sensibilities, the renegotiation of
relationships with creole elites was an integral component of late eighteenth century Bourbon
political programs of which the island was a centerpiece Humiliated by Spain’s defeat in the
Seven Years War (1754-1763), Spanish reformers sought to reverse Spanish geopolitical and
economic decline and stave off further European threats through a rationalization of the old
imperial framework.91 The semi-autonomous “kingdoms” of Spanish America were to become
modern colonies. Systematic intensification of social and political connections between
metropolis and colonies and enhanced policies of economic extraction included a prominent role
90
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for science. Royal scientific expeditions, the foundation of botanical gardens, natural history
collections and mining seminars served to survey, quantify and ideally, maximally exploit the
natural resources of the New World.92 Subject “populations” were also considered vital resources
whose health (and education) reflected the presence of a wise government and the basis for
industry, agriculture, and trade Medicine and public health, as emerging “scientific” tools for
assuring abundant populations, thus served not only a humanitarian function but were useful
vehicles for economic growth and a vital justification for state interventionism in the public
sphere. 93
Heightened concern with the health of “populations”, magnified on an island that had
become a centerpiece to the introduction of continent-wide reforms, could have profound
repercussions for those “professional gentlemen” who claimed the mantle of expert. Romay and
other creole medical elites demonstrated eagerness to capitalize professionally on a political
climate that might favor the creation of a public role for licensed medical practitioners under
state auspices. If, as Romay argued, disease had impeded progress on the island since conquest,
the doctor’s patriotic mission is to reduce its ravages, “conserving useful citizens for the nation
and humanity” to the benefit of agriculture, industry and trade ”94 The call to save lives was also
an opportunity for licensed professionals to elevate the prestige of an under-rated profession and
solidify its ties to the larger scientific community. Only through a consistent demonstration of
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the benefits of scientific method would professors finally “put aside the disdainful sneers with
which [they] view medicine, that science so useful to humanity”95
As across Latin America and within other scientific initiatives in botany, natural history,
astronomy and mechanics, late eighteenth and early nineteenth century scientists and/or licensed
experts were politicized by the experience of working towards colonial regeneration. They had
become agents of empire, endowed with the responsibility of fulfilling, at least in rhetoric,
“enlightened” objectives on behalf of the same As historians of science and medicine in Latin
America have demonstrated, the results were often as unexpected and contradictory as the
Spanish American reaction to the Bourbon political project more generally. Some rejected
reform altogether on behalf of older, more prestigious and/or more culturally relevant
dogmatisms.96 More often, scientists and/or experts associated with the imperial project were
energized by the fight against old scholasticisms but disappointed by administrative frugality,
ideological inflexibility, and cultural and professional prejudice. These creoles usually turned to
challenge the state by assimilating foreign ideas and agendas on their own terms, remaking them
in the process. The most radicalized, drawing from different registers on the definition of
“enlightened” objectives and management, could identify science with republicanism itself!97
Such diversity is not surprising considering the vastly diverse colonial contexts, cultural
practices, local scientific traditions and political agendas of the Ibero-American world.
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In the political, economic and scientific realm however, Cuba is a case of successful
cooperation and cooptation by Bourbon reformers. Even prior to the introduction of vaccination,
the creole patrician’s effective initiatives demonstrate the extent to which authorities were
willing to entertain a new medical protagonist in service of the colony. Proposals on educational
reform in medical instruction on the European model, the burial of the dead in cemeteries
(instead of churches or sepulchers), and experimentation with new treatments for scourges such
as yellow fever were introduced and in their majority enacted, despite sometimes considerable
controversy and resistance, as the necessary ingredients for modernization of society and the
medical community.98 In the context of widespread imperial reform, or more importantly, of a
reform which sought to incorporate emerging forums for scientific debate and investigation
across Latin America into the imperial project, such a political and public role for a licensed
physician had the potential to expand the concept of medical professional responsibility.99
Nowhere was this more certain than with smallpox vaccination.

The Course of Vaccination
The vaccine arrived in Romay’s hands on February 12, 1804, in the midst of an
especially severe smallpox epidemic. The urgency and excitement upon receiving news of a
relatively harmless preventive for the disease was palpable.100 Just two weeks after its
introduction, “the extraordinarily long vaccination sessions and the insistence with which many
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wanted to be treated at the same time prevented the four vaccinators from working in the light…
and with the calm necessary to perform a delicate, albeit simple, operation ”101 By the second
week of its introduction, more than 200 persons had been vaccinated in Havana. The vaccine
spread rapidly outside the city walls, as lay and ecclesiastical officials were as eager as many
leading physicians to acquire the coveted preservative.
Dr. Romay, who led the publicity campaign for vaccination using the Economic Society
and the Papel Periodico (one of Cuba’s first newspapers) as initial forums, predictably argued
that the procedure would ensure against another “season of terror” precipitated by smallpox in
his public pronouncements. However, Romay understood the potentially important role this
medical intervention could have on productivity in the colony and echoed the language of
political and economic utility in his struggle over the years to promote the procedure and
conserve the vaccine. As Romay put it, in preventing another disaster, vaccination would not
only free the public from fear but stimulate the growth of population and the development of that
“marvelous soil which Nature has provided, [so that it] reach[es] the high degree of prosperity
and well-being its destiny has decreed ”102
Any discussion of productivity and “prosperity” in the colony had to take African slaves,
who were both valuable property and the labor force powering the island’s dramatic economic
growth, into account. Indeed, as historian of medicine Adrián López Denis argues, the
administration of early nineteenth century vaccination reflected and reinforced the racial and
class stratification and economic priorities of Cuban slave society. The very first vaccinations in
the major cities and towns of the island largely benefited various luminaries of the elite, their
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servants and/or slaves.103 When the service was codified and institutionalized, slaves at port or
on agricultural estates received priority in the administration of preventative (see below) and
served as a critical fount of vaccine propagation and production.104 Slave bodies going through
the course of both smallpox and vaccination were also subject to clinical observation and
experimentation, inviting commentary on supposed racial differences that caused variation in the
way a similar procedure would “take” across race 105
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Figure 6: Correlation between slave imports and numbers of vaccinated persons. Note the
divergence in trends after the end of the legal slave trade in 1821 made rigorous vaccination at
port impracticable. 106
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Even as Africans were targeted for a preventative that would increase their productive
value, slaves were publicly inculpated for bringing the terror of epidemic to Cuban shores. Early
nineteenth century creole elites such as Romay understood smallpox to be a fundamentally
“African” disease intimately tied to slavery, both in its mode of introduction on slave ships and
its propagation to the rest of the population via the plantation and domestic service. In popular
legend, incoming African slaves were even inculpated for initiating the demographic disaster of
the Columbian Exchange with infectious smallpox!107 Harbingers of illness, later victims of the
trade were indirectly punished for their epidemiological sins with a tax of two pesos per head at
port in Havana, thereby providing the necessary funds for maintenance of the vaccination
program.108
As historian Angela Thompson asserts, children, the other population most vulnerable to
smallpox, also took precedence in the propaganda and administration of the vaccine. Children
were central to reformist ideological preoccupations with preserving “populations,” and they
constituted the rhetorical centerpiece of Balmis’ state-sponsored philanthropy.109 A certain brand
of humanitarianism, informed by aristocratic paternalism and religious obligation, is most
discernible Romay’s repeated petitions for families with children to voluntarily congregate at
public vaccination sessions. Even here, however, the racial and class priorities of Cuban slave
society wove their way into the fabric of vaccination outreach and tested the limits of the
service’s “humanitarian” rhetoric
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Children were only a secondary priority in Cuban statutes drafted for the service, and
despite guarantees of free vaccine provision to all who sought prevention, their inclusion was
framed in exclusive terms. Romay spent decades beseeching “good fathers to bring their
children and domestics” in the name of “self-interest and that of humanity and nation,”
prioritizing lives for protection to the invariably white youth of sufficient status to have African
servants and/or slaves.110 In truth, attempts to integrate vaccination into churches and later (to a
much lesser extent) in the relatively few schools available in the city were often successful,
particularly in the early years of vaccine propagation.111 But a paternalistic and elitist rhetoric of
persuasion aimed against the “ignorance” and “fanaticism” of the uneducated majority tended
only to reinforce class, gender and racial divides even as it failed to dissipate popular rumors
against the vaccine.
Initially however, spurred by epidemic terror and the widespread enthusiasm that greeted
the arrival of the potentially life-saving preventative, many free Cuban subjects across race and
class proved receptive to the new procedure. Those few persons with the education and status to
have been somehow involved in procuring the vaccine or convinced by literature regarding its
significance were, as a matter of course, usually receptive to the vaccinator’s zeal and readily
submitted to the operation. However, as vaccinators spread south, east and west from the port of
Havana, they encountered populations of all classes whose trust needed to be won. Some
vaccinators succeeded in persuading the wider public of their scientific authority. According to
Romay’s monthly reports, in Santiago de Cuba the physician Don Pedro Simanca was greeted
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with “the most docility and confidence” by the larger population, making that town
“impenetrable to contagion ”112 Don Juan de Castellanos, in the company of the sympathetic
Bishop Estrada, managed to successfully vaccinate “thousands of townspeople” in the cities of
Santa Clara, San Juan de los Remedios and Sancti Spiritus to the east.113
Others experienced less success. Doctor José Bernal’s attempts to propagate vaccine in
the city of Jaruco were energetic but “ignorance and fanaticism were opposed such to his
endeavors that by the end of April he was only able to vaccinate 209 subjects ”114 Making
matters worse, during the initial weeks of its introduction into Havana some physicians began
propagating a “false” vaccine using material from the desiccated pustules of María Bustamante’s
children a full day after they had been extracted by Romay.115 Bad “takes,” and what was
probably a multiplicity of vaccines of varied effectiveness in use, sowed distrust amongst the
public. Cases of vaccinated persons who contracted the disease after undergoing the procedure
began cropping up.116 In Santiago de Cuba, pioneer vaccinator Manuel Rollan lamented the
“mistrust and vulgar preoccupations that obstructed his progress in a town that so much needed
his help” 117 According to the doctor, “the public is so terrified that the vaccine does not
preserve against smallpox that they do not want to expose their children to a fruitless
operation ”118
After the first few years of its installation in cities and major towns across the island, the
smallpox vaccination service eventually dwindled in scope and outreach. As was common with
smallpox vaccination campaigns across the globe, the initial spike in public interest waned after
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the threat of epidemic had passed.119 As early as 1804, Romay lamented that “in spite of such an
incontestable proof [of vaccination’s benefits], the vaccine is not solicited with the ardor that
such an advantageous and simple preservative deserves, one which can be acquired with such
facility ”120 Vaccinators failed to attain their stated goal of reaching parity between the numbers
of baptized infants born in Havana and children vaccinated; never more than roughly half of the
city’s baptized children received the vaccine in any given year.121 Particularly after 1808,
subsequent spikes in vaccination numbers were correlated with the fluctuations of the slave
trade, as vaccinators focused their activity away from a generally recalcitrant public to the
accessible and coerced bodies at port (see Figure 6). With the end of the legal slave trade in
1821, a dearth of income combined with the health priorities of a militarized, colonial society
and slave-powered export economy to suppress ambitious and/or transformational notions of
medical responsibility and intervention amongst the majority of the island’s population

Professionals and the State
Professionally however, the first fifteen years of the vaccination program were a great
success in the development of a self-conscious, licensed and largely creole medical community.
Physicians in support of vaccination had the two most powerful imperial institutions in the
colony, crown and clergy, firmly in their favor. The Catholic Church at the time of the arrival of
the vaccine was led by liberal Bishop Espada y Landa, a Spanish-born director of the Economic
Society who was a fervent sympathizer of creole reformism and held particularly close ties to
Romay Upon the vaccine’s introduction, Bishop Espada enthusiastically embraced the
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procedure and was “everywhere accompanied by a practitioner who vaccinated at his
expense ”122 Parish circulars sent throughout the island instructed priests to encourage
vaccination at all baptisms and make public announcements of vaccination schedules. The
clergy, both on the island and in the wider Spanish empire, for the most part responded favorably
to the charge.123
Even had this particular bishop been lukewarm to the introduction of vaccination, State
Consul members and ministers of Carlos IV firmly supported the procedure. The Royal
Expedition for the Propagation of the Vaccine was the most dramatic illustration of state
initiative for a larger role in public health in the service of empire and laid the groundwork for
medical professionals to assume leadership in the new programs. Landing in the port of Havana
on the 26th of May, 1804 (several months after the introduction of the vaccine) the Expedition’s
Director Xavier Balmis was happily surprised to find not only a successful vaccination program
in Havana but also a serious proposal for its institutionalization.124 The accomplishments of the
Balmis expedition in places with an already thriving vaccination program (such as San Juan and
Havana) have at times been overestimated; yet the mission did have significant practical effects.
Prior to his departure for Campeche only 20 days later, Balmis’ public vaccination spectacles,
carefully orchestrated to demonstrate the power of state authority and imperial paternalism, had
exposed thousands to the procedure.125 He also left dozens of physicians well-versed in the
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technique and a strong foundation for the creation of a new institution in charge of organizing the
program.
Most importantly for early nineteenth century “professional gentlemen” looking to
bolster the repute of the profession as a whole under the banner of a new medical technology, the
royal expedition quieted resistance to vaccination amongst licensed practitioners. Intraprofessional conflict had begun just a few days after the vaccine had arrived. Some physicians
saw patients contract smallpox after having been vaccinated with false or badly applied vaccine;
others appear to have confused the skin eruptions of measles with smallpox on vaccinated
persons.126 As Romay bitterly complained, “instead of assuring the people that the [illness] was
measles or a minor skin eruption [these physicians] foster fear and cause great alarm amongst
parents with two motives; the first to discredit the vaccine and the second, to make a profit by
repeated visits to the patient ”127 The resistance seems to have been fueled by a combination of
legitimate alarm at vaccination’s malfunctions and professional intrigue, as some practitioners
and especially inoculators saw their livelihood dissipated by vaccination. Romay, as the most
prominent vaccinator and an active disseminator of the latest European literature concerning the
subject, was a leading target. The reformer was charged with playing a slave to foreign
opinion.128 Dr. Pachón, a prominent physician in Havana, took a different tack. Acknowledging
the legitimacy of foreign scientific publications on the efficacy of vaccination in general, Pachón
declared that the vaccine on the island had degenerated in transit from arm to arm and thus lost
its “preservative virtue ”129
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Whatever their motivations, inoculators in Cuba were fighting a losing battle. Along
with the legitimacy granted by “the premier physicians of Europe, the enormous evidence in its
favor and its acceptance by the United States and our sister colonies”, vaccination was supported
by a “benevolent Monarch who consulted with his most enlightened ministers and professors
prior to remitting the vaccine”130 According to Romay, who developed a close working
relationship with Balmis during his short stay, “the [Balmis’ mission] settled the vacillating
opinions of some professors…confounded the impostures and manipulations of anti-vaccinators
and dissipated the mistrust with which the procedure was viewed by the population at large ”131
Indeed, with such a powerful display of state support, rejection by either licensed practitioners or
the general public could be considered a sign of disloyalty. Addressing common parental fears
over the lives and health of their children under the lancet, Romay angrily posited the question,
“should paternal love take precedence over that of humanity and Nation?”132

Setting Norms and ‘Scientific’ Standards
Besides ideologically laying the groundwork for the acceptance of vaccination by most
licensed, medical practitioners, the Royal Expedition helped consolidate the formation of a
professional “corps” of vaccinators by reinforcing the implicit educational requirements in the
selection of potential vaccinators One of the initial attractions of enner’s method, particularly
amongst ecclesiastical circles, was its simplicity. Vaccination was considered such a simple
operation that anyone could execute it without the slightest danger.133 However, Balmis and
leading Cuban medical authorities strove to emphasize that although vaccination did not
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necessarily have to be performed by licensed physicians, the official medical sphere was to
closely supervise its practice and dissemination. Recruitment campaigns stressed that
vaccination required not merely delicacy but education for proper execution. Fully licensed
practitioners were most encouraged to adopt vaccination as they could “use the lancet with skill,
properly detect the best time for vaccination, discern the good from the false vaccine, and aid the
patient in whatever illness could overtake him during this time ”134
As a result, the public vaccinations held by Balmis almost immediately upon his arrival
in the ports of the New World were attended by dozens of physicians interested in becoming
potential vaccinators. In Havana, advertisements for the event encouraged attendance by
“professors of medicine and surgery in and around this city” along with the general public 135
Through close observation of Balmis’ technique, these professors could learn “not only recent
advances that have simplified the operation, but also to perfectly discern the quality of the
vaccine, its varieties, the precautions one must take to assure effect, and all the other details
conducive to its best use ”136 In well-traveled port cities such as Havana, where the number of
licensed physicians was relatively high, requirements of medical licensure effectively closed the
door to potential unlicensed vaccinators.
Adherence to professional norms and “scientific” standards was considered crucial for
ensuring a positive reception amongst the greater public. According to the Director of the
Expedition, the disfavor for vaccination evident amongst certain sectors of the population was
due to “the ignorance of those vaccinators that did not know how to avoid using false vaccine,
utilize deficient matter, or poorly perform [the operation] ”137 Prominent Cuban physicians
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agreed that the ultimate responsibility for promoting a favorable image of vaccination in the eyes
of the public lay with the licensed medical community and their adoption of rigorous scientific
standards In Santiago de Cuba, the vaccinator Manuel Rollan argued that “the fear towards
vaccination originated from faulty methods of vaccination that are continually implemented,
without moderation, by some physicians ”138 As a group of mothers complained to Rollan only a
few days prior, “they did not want their children to suffer through an operation that would not
ultimately benefit them” and although he at last succeeded in convincing them of its efficacy,
“only with difficulty were their worried spirits relieved [of this negative judgement]” 139
The new preventive measure thus provided avenues for licensed medical practitioners to
assert their scientific credentials and perhaps convince a larger segment of the public that these
were to be respected. Physicians were charged with using their scientific knowledge to
“dissipate those rumors spread by ignorance and antiquated thought” so that general populations
could recognize “the good that [vaccination] has accomplished, saving many lives and
redeeming our generation of so many deformities ”140 Through a technique whose relative
simplicity (as compared to inoculation) was often lauded, licensed practitioners ensured some
limited professional protection as vaccinators and/or supervisors of the vaccination project.

The Central Vaccine Board
Secondly, imperial support for the establishment of a central vaccine board
institutionalized a new service around which standards of professionalism could be set. Any
initiative of scale would require the management of the emerging corps, maintenance of fresh
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vaccine and provision of an authoritative reference for those vaccinators seeking to corroborate
their observations with others working in the field. Both the Crown and local creole elite chose
not to elevate the Protomedicato to this position. Seen as a largely defunct institution, the
Protomedicato was without the necessary clout to effect a large-scale operation as required by
vaccination. Instead, in what can be considered part of a current of late enlightenment
institution-building, central vaccine boards were erected to manage the new preventive project in
the peninsula and major colonial cities.141
The “most important center for the development of sanitation services in the Caribbean”,
the Central Vaccine Board of Havana, was inaugurated on the 13th of June 1804.142 According to
the plan established by Balmis, the Central Vaccine Board was responsible for ensuring the
production and preservation of quality vaccine.143 It also had important obligations to the larger
public. Board members were to strive their upmost for widespread dissemination of the
procedure and the maintenance of favorable public opinion towards vaccination.144 Rather than
standing as an independent body, the board was placed under the auspices of the Economic
Society, and this institution greatly facilitated the incorporation of influential or prominent
persons into the program. The archbishop, captain-general and president of the royal audiencia
were all invited to participate in summary meetings, along with numerous other decorated social
luminaries distinguished by their “beneficence, patriotism and support for the vaccine ”145
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Romay, as the chief protagonist of the vaccine and the author of his own plan for the
institutionalization of the vaccination project, was named Secretary.
The Central Vaccine Board created a new center of authority for the professional
development of an emerging group of vaccinators. For one, the new public health structure
rewarded those physicians willing and able to demonstrate enthusiasm in disseminating the
procedure throughout the island. Exemplary behavior or performance was often made public in
the Secretary’s annual report to the Economic Society Doctor Esteban Gonezara, for example,
stood out during the initial training sessions in Havana by “the rapt attention with which he
observed my [Romay’s] operations, his close listening and the questions he asked ”146
Physicians such as Havana vaccinator Marcos Sanchez Rubio who Romay praised for “selflessly
volunteering to vaccinate in the [slave] barracks” and other public places, “taking care to visit the
recently vaccinated at their homes in order to see the[ir] progress”, were presented as role models
worthy of emulation.147
Several of these vaccinators went on to play direct supervisory roles in the new
infrastructure being formed for vaccination throughout the country. The bachiller José Govin for
example, having distinguished himself in his “disinterest and zeal” during his rounds in the areas
of Calvario, Xiaraco and Managua in 1805, proposed the creation of a sub-alternate vaccination
board in Santa Maria del Rosario to assure preservation of the vaccine. Seeing the possible
benefits in delegating some authority out to the most active vaccinators throughout the island, the
Central Junta named him secretary of the new sub-alternate board in “remuneration for his
distinguished achievements,” establishing separate boards in Sancti Spiritus and Santiago shortly
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thereafter.148 Subsequent petitions for the secretariat of sub-alternate boards, or just official
recognition as vaccinator (which could include a modest stipend), were overwhelmingly
preceded by an exposition of the candidate’s professional history and “humanitarian zeal” as a
pioneer of vaccination in the region.
The Central Vaccine Board also provided a limited forum for the discussion of technique
and the distribution of empirical observation related to vaccination. Several physicians wrote to
the Board upon encountering anomalies in the vaccine material or their subjects. In 1809,
Joaquín Navarro published a long inquiry into the possible degeneration of the vaccine through
continuous arm-to-arm transmission, noting that several patients took ill with suspicious
“eruptive fevers” after having been vaccinated Though the secretary of dismissed his argument,
appealing to the inalterability of the vaccine, the author was lauded for his “intelligence,
dedication and the interest with which he serves the public good [through open inquiry]” and
calls were made for an intensified program of cattle inoculation from which to draw vaccine.149
Others, such as Pedro Nolasco Almanza working from the province of Guines in 1815, published
local propaganda pieces in order to persuade the larger public of the benefits of vaccination.150
Indeed, on August of 1804, in one of the earliest (and rare) instances of genuine popular health
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education on the island, Romay published an informational pamphlet designed for mothers to
learn the skills necessary to vaccinate their own children.151
There were definite limitations to the formation of a professional “esprit de corps”
amongst vaccinators under the umbrella of the Central Vaccine Board. Upward mobility within
the institution was restricted as only a handful were able to secure official positions or salaries
for their troubles, much less publish works for collegial review and the general public.152 Many
vaccinators quickly lost contact with the Central Junta, leaving its Secretary to lament that
despite the apparent dedication amongst these “apostles of enner”, active sub-alternate board
secretaries routinely neglected to “remit either the minutes of their annual sessions or the number
of persons vaccinated” for evaluation 153 Nor was their adherence to a shared professional
mission through the articulation of ethical and scientific standards one inclusive of the wider
healing community. Licensed or unlicensed, the Central Junta exhibited very little tolerance for
empirically-based criticism by healing practitioners outside the organization Despite Romay’s
calls for anti-vaccinators to “execute experimentations and publish the results [in order to engage
in a dialogue with the community of vaccinators and better serve the public]”, the observations
and scientific ability of outside physicians were publicly derided.154
Yet the Central Junta was unique in that it offered a semi-official forum with
opportunities quite unlike that of the existing medical hierarchies. Built up alongside the
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Protomedicato, the Ayuntamiento and the executive institutions which traditionally dealt with
public health issues, participation in the Board offered some upward mobility, peer review and a
set of professional standards for vaccinators. Institutions such as the Central Vaccine Board, its
subsidiaries and sister organizations across the Americas created new centers of authority from
which vaccinators could negotiate their position with state and ecclesiastical structures and
dictate some professional space for themselves. These centers were effectively utilized by
physicians to augment both their own authority and legitimacy in the public sphere and that of
the licensed medical profession. Through subsequent reorganizations in sphere of public health,
(e.g. the creation of Sanitation Boards in 1807, the centralization of charity health institutions a
year later, and the eventual elimination of the Protomedicato in the 1840s) the new public roles
gained by physicians in the implementation of the smallpox vaccination program remained an
important precedent for those looking to expand the authority and reach of licensed medical
practitioners in Cuba.

Conclusion
The successful reception and assimilation of vaccination as a scientific practice under
creole auspices involved, in Cuba and across the world, a domestication of foreign practices.
Creoles such as Romay adapted the new technology to meet very specific local agendas and
social, cultural and political needs. Vaccination was associated with the moderate (and very
selective) liberal reformism of the creoles tied to a rising sugar economy. Intimately interlaced
with the goals of Bourbon reformism in the New World, the service paired the rhetoric of
“humanitarianism” with utilitarianism in furtherance of local economic growth and professional
development in a militaristic, slave society. Neither the disease nor its prevention conformed to
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neat immunological identities based on culture and race. However, vaccination was most
certainly a mark of culture for elite, white Cuban creoles and a painful imposition for African
populations deemed epidemiologically dangerous.
Even as ever-shifting nineteenth-century epidemiological realities challenged traditional
assumptions and corresponding discourses of both smallpox and vaccination, the service’s
professional triumphs remained a symbol of creole achievement for the rest of nineteenth
century. Unlike the case with many reform era scientists and intellectuals in the Spanish
colonies, the scientific “republic of letters” never clashed with a sense of responsibility in the
civic realm.155 Official sanction and active cooperation between state, ecclesiastical and medical
authorities facilitated the articulation of new scientific and professional standards amongst
licensed physicians and granted legitimacy to emerging public health institutions coordinating
the vaccination project. Vaccinators basked in many years of support for both their scientific and
civil missions and pursued the program set out by paternalist, Bourbon reformers.
Existing documentation sheds little light on whether early nineteenth century popular
perceptions of licensed medical responsibility in Cuba were significantly affected by the
extension of vaccination services. Clearly however, and on a scale never before seen, religious
authorities and officials at the highest levels of government recognized the role of the licensed
physicians as a fundamentally “public” one Led and maintained largely by creoles, vaccinators
were expected to maintain strong links with both a supportive colonial administration and the
wider Cuban population. But the synergy between the state and this important sub-section of the
licensed, medical population would be relatively short-lived. As the linkages begin to break,
disillusionment and doubt would become widespread amongst a medical community in deep
socio-economic and political flux.
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Chapter Two: The Tower Falls

Introduction
For Rafael Hondares, the extinction of the Central Vaccine Commission in 1868 was
“without a doubt, the most terrible pain he had ever felt in his life ”156 Born of relatively humble
means in larger Havana Province in 1807, Hondares’ medical career was inextricably linked with
the history of vaccination in the capital. Entering into service as a meritorious vaccinator in
1841, he spent almost 20 years advancing his position within the vaccine service to become the
Commission’s Dean by 1859, a post equivalent to the Secretariat as held by Romay under the old
Vaccine Board.157
Coming to see the services he offered there as his “most important obligation,” Hondares
scrambled to pick up the pieces of both his career and the vaccination corps upon
decentralization of the service from 1868-1871.158 Without an official post or salary and in
despair for an institutional umbrella under which the vaccine could be protected, he turned to the
Royal Academy of Science, a creole symbol of cultural achievement and civilization from its
foundation in 1861. The Academy not only incorporated Hondares into weekly public
vaccination sessions, but gladly acceded to his petition to create a Vaccine Subcommission “with
the goal of sustaining this important branch of public health” in 1871.159 According to the many
words of praise and sorrow published upon his death five years later, Hondares’ “perserverance
and continued zeal” made it possible for this vaccination center to acquire “such great public and
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official confidence” that its services were solicited by both eager locals and administrators across
the colony. 160
By the time of its effective extinction between 1868 and 1871, Romay’s old Central
Vaccine Board had undergone extensive permutations. This chapter will trace the transformation
and eventual disintegration of the original Central Vaccine Board within the context of a
changing colonial politic that viewed creole participation in the public realm with suspicion.
During the 1830s, as the liberal state consolidated its gains on the Spanish peninsula, colonial
policy towards Cuba hardened. Successful Latin American wars for independence promoted an
influx of tens of thousands of peninsulares from the American mainland. Resentful of their
displacement and suspicious of creole initiative, what would eventually become known as the
“Spanish party” emerged to defend and reassert Spanish privilege under colonialism 161 Likeminded administrators in Madrid closed the door to creole reformism, sending hardline captaingenerals to govern the island under “special laws” Until a relatively brief respite in the late
1850s and again after the conclusion of the first war of independence in 1878, a repressive and
exclusionary policy was enforced against creoles in both the public and private spheres. Creoles
were excluded from positions in public administration, commerce and the military.
Associational culture protagonized by white and afro-cuban creoles suffered greatly as
accusations of conspiracy and treason were successfully wielded by anxious administrators.162
The colonial pact was broken.
However, as the old symbiotic relationship between creole elites and peninsular
administrators began to fray, vaccinators’ professional pact with a “paternal” and “vigilant”
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Crown remained secure. In fact, colonial administrators favored the assumption of state
responsibility for provision of public health services, including vaccination. The petty indignities
suffered by vaccinators legislatively converted to “civil servants” were more than compensated
by a greatly increased power to enforce medical will over a changing demographic. But early
after the incorporation of the service under colonial state auspices, internal contradictions,
corruption and inefficiencies led to convulsive episodes of reform that signaled the final demise
of the service in favor of alternative approaches. With it was extinguished a symbol of creole
professional development that had survived decades of intermittent repression, leaving open the
doors to a reinterpretation of imperial legacies and creole historical achievements in public
health.

The New Order and Public Health
The captaincy general of Miguel Tacón from 1834 to 1838 in many ways embodied the
new order and set a precedent for future colonial administrators. A Spanish veteran of wars for
independence in Colombia and Peru, Tacón deeply distrusted the creole oligarchy. To the ire of
elite creole reformers, the Captain General surrounded himself almost exclusively with other
peninsulares at court, including those of humble origin, and granted commercial and
administrative privileges to his compatriots in order to counter the wealth and power of the
creole elite.163 Eager to establish law and order on what he perceived as an unruly populace,
Tacón’s expansion of police forces and the penal system was extended to political repression and
the exile of one of Cuba’s literary lights, José Antonio Saco. Indeed, the legendary CaptainGeneral’s obsession with political security inspired him to initiate one of Havana’s greatest
urban transformations. Tacón inaugurated a system of nocturnal watchmen and street lighting
163
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throughout certain parts of the city and, decades before Haussmann made such urban
development iconic of modernity, introduced visual clarity and a sense of control through
rational planning of streets, avenues and public spaces.164
But creole upstarts were only one of Tacón’s myriad enemies Fastidious with his own
personal hygiene and contemptuous of the filth in an overcrowded city, Tacón found another
enemy in hygienic disorder, whose “cleanup” in both the public and private realm dovetailed
nicely with the imposition of a new political and social regime. City beautification projects
included the pavement of muddy and narrow streets, construction of drainage pipes and more
rigorous enforcement of public sanitation laws (such as that of street cleaning and garbage
disposal) long fallen to neglect.165 Of course, Tacón was largely riding a wave of initiative set
into motion by predecessors years prior to his mandate. The most recent occurred in 1833, just
five years after a serious outbreak of dengue had triggered sanitary reorganization, when the first
great wave of cholera swept through the island and laid bare painful deficiencies in the sanitary
administrative apparatus. Quarantine and the tepid sanitary measures failed and those without
the resources to flee the cities and towns shuttered themselves in their homes, “their days eternal
nights interrupted only by the tolling of funeral bells and the monotonous clatter of carts carrying
away the dead ”166 By the epidemic’s end, ten percent of Havana’s population was decimated,
with poor and slave populations suffering twenty percent mortality rates.167
As with emerging public health administrations across the Americas and Europe, the first
great wave of cholera on the island provided the pretext and foundation for the establishment and
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reinforcement of sanitation. In the scramble to effectively respond to present and future threats,
colonial authorities modernized, secularized and centralized the administrative architecture of
disease control. The Junta de Sanidad, an eighteenth century institution reorganized on the
peninsula to meet modern needs, had been established on the island since at least 1807.168 But
its authority on the colonial, provincial and municipal level were greatly expanded as cholera
approached the colony. The Junta became responsible not only for the surveillance and control
of epidemic disease, but also oversight and management of information from the myriad
institutions charged with sanitary matters in times of relative health Since “the law of public
health was supreme”, the Superior unta de Sanidad had “absolute jurisdiction over all classes
without exception” and could count on executive authorities on its board to enforce legislation 169
Control of dirt and disease was intimately linked to that of poverty. The tumult of socioeconomic and political change in the early nineteenth century reawakened age-old prejudice
against the poor amongst lay and professional sanitary administrators, who considered them a
dangerous segment of the population in terms of public health preservation. Whether as foci for
epidemic outbreaks in overcrowded slums or bearers of the filth and immorality thought to
generate disease, the culpable poor seemed to necessitate aggressive management and
oversight.170 After the first great wave of cholera, whose disproportionate devastation of the
impoverished had sparked riots in various cities throughout Europe, administrators set their eyes
more firmly upon the problem of ameliorating the destitution of, and in turn increasing state
surveillance over the poor. Contemporary liberals in Spain pushed for expansive programs of
state intervention on the peninsula, including the linkage of home medical care for the poor with
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the charitable relief they required to adhere to complex nutritional, moral and hygienic regimes
deemed necessary for good health.171 In 1833, at the height of the cholera epidemic in Cuba,
concern over the epidemiological (and socio-political) consequences of poverty was translated
into a new administrative apparatus for the administration of charity, the Junta Central de
Caridad y Beneficiencia, which was to provide food, clothing and limited access to medical
assistance in hospitals and on the municipal level, particularly during epidemic crises.172
For the first time in the island’s history, secular colonial authorities could assert a more
pervasive presence in the sphere of hygiene, as dirt, disorder and disagreement with public
interventions in the private realm acquired even more explicitly political connotations. Of
course, the actual power and impact of the reorganized Junta de Sanidad and that of Caridad was
limited. Spanish legislation in both the peninsula and the colonies tended to be lofty and
impressive on paper but without the administrative rigor to fully implement its dictates.173 The
non-medical managerial elite that dominated said Juntas were often less than enthusiastic about
assigning funds for any intensive public project or sanitary intervention.174 But centralization and
secularization on this scale did affect the way Cubans felt state intervention in the public sphere
and, at least in the case of smallpox vaccination, their perceptions of state responsibility for
safeguarding the public good.
Vaccination was soon caught up in the fervor of sanitary reform. The conflict started
during Tacón’s tenure in 1835, in the midst of heightening ethnic tensions and intermittent strife
between many elite, creole-dominated institutions and the new administration. An administrative
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censor appointed to investigate the Economic Society denounced the Society’s patronage of
vaccination as an “inappropriate attribution” of this institution in light of legal precedent on both
the island and in the peninsula, which assigned “the police of public health” to local authorities
in the Ayuntamiento.175 The issue was deferred to the city councilman Don Manuel Ramírez
Gallo, who agreed with the censor that Spanish physician and Director of the Royal
Philanthropic Expedition Xavier Balmis’ original plan had been inappropriately altered and put
forward a tentative plan for reorganizing the service under local auspices. Tomás Romay, on the
verge of retiring as Secretary of the Central Vaccine Board due to bad health, responded with
some agitation against these accusations and challenged the proposed changes, citing both royal
precedent and the poor record amongst Ayuntamientos across the island in fulfilling their
obligations for remuneration of the service.176 Change however, was imminent as a special
commission was formed to investigate the issue.
What may have started out as a spiteful gesture in a charged environment turned into a
transatlantic case study of the old regime’s befuddled delegation of authority in matters of public
health The island’s Superior unta de Sanidad, “distressed that such an important service was
inadequately funded” and that oversight and financing of vaccination was “divided between
[multiple] corporations” eventually proposed the incorporation of smallpox vaccination under its
auspices to royal officials.177 Sanitary authorities in Madrid, in the midst of their own reform
program to rationalize and secularize public health services throughout the peninsula, took a
lively interest in the jurisdictional conflict over what remained, after several decades, the most
important Vaccine distribution center of the Caribbean, and were receptive to the proposal. By
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Royal Order of August 3rd, 1841, smallpox vaccination under the Central Junta and its subaltern
branches were assimilated into the Superior Junta.178 The main organizational framework,
including personnel, was largely retained, with the exception that vaccinators had to report their
activities directly to Junta authorities. A contribution of 2,000 pesos from the Ayuntamiento
sustained the service so that the Economic Society, “free of this strange commitment,” could
redirect funds to “another application more appropriate to its attributions ”179

Vaccinators and the New Order
Some nationalist historians of the vaccine have depicted this transition as a watershed
moment in socio-cultural and political understandings of responsibility for public health on the
island. After all, the state took over a service associated with specifically creole initiative in the
midst of surging inter-cultural strife and according to most accounts, did not perform very well at
the task.180 Indeed, vaccinators griped against changes in salary allocations and near his death in
1849, Tomás Romay, the creole patrician who led the service for decades, felt he had been
marginalized from the service and opined that the Junta had disregarded his suggestions for
reform.181 However, most vaccinators and their contemporaries saw the transition as favorable
(or at the very least benign) to their interests. Romay was a staunchly loyal Spanish colonial
sympathizer until the end of his life and played a pivotal role in writing the Reglamento for the
new service.182 With few exceptions, vaccinating corps that could have been alienated or
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disgruntled by institutional changes gave thanks for preserving their positions and enjoyed more
regular salaries.
Most importantly, from the early 1840s until the late 1860s, vaccination remained a
“preferential service” for the Spanish colonial administration to showcase its paternalist concern
for the population via the official retention of, and investment in, an “exemplary” vaccination
corps across the island, including 14 licensed practitioners in Havana itself by 1866.183 Its
umbrella organization, the Junta de Sanidad, was also a predominantly creole institution and the
elevation of the vaccine service to government administrative authority was not only “a
recognition of [the service’s] importance,” but gave creoles a chance to govern in administrative
positions that were elsewhere being restricted.184 The unta’s Secretary Angel José Cowley was,
like Romay, a creole medical elite from somewhat disadvantaged origins that embodied social
mobility through education and professionalization. Although reorganization of the service
placed a decentralized corps only indirectly under his supervision, professional vaccinators were
(for the most part) content to be absorbed under the auspices of an institution which “seizing the
opportunities of the favorable position of its funds and the happy circumstance of having
Secretary Cowley,” was ready to revitalize the branch and realize “not a few improvements,
achieved with general applause and great success ”185
Twenty years of intermittent readjustment and reform concluded with an even more
favorable arrangement for any who looked with nostalgia toward the past. In 1856, proposals
were put forth for a new (re)centralization of the service as the Central Vaccine Comission,
183

In 1866, total costs for maintaining Havana’s vaccinators ran to almost 17, 500 escudos, a comparatively hefty
investment within the domain of sanitation and public health. “Cuadro comparativo,” October 12, 1866, Junta de
Sanidad, Havana, No. 19, File 52, AN.
184
A.G.C., “Historia,” 386 See also López Denis, “Cólera, limpieza y poder,” 7 The Juntas de Sanidad were
composed of the administrative and economic elite of the colony. Licensed practitioners comprised only a minority
within the board.
185
A G C , “Historia,” 386

69

complete with a deanship which, like the Secretariat under the auspices of the Economic Society
decades prior, was responsible for personnel supervision as well as the management of statistics
and vaccine deposits.186 Creole practitioner D. Rafael Hondares eventually came to occupy the
post. Along with his predecessors Romay and Cowley, Hondares had been orphaned at a young
age and rose from humble origins to prominence under the auspices of creole society’s leading
institutions and intellectuals. Although he never became a leading patrician of creole medicine
(he in fact attempted to conceal the fact that he had only received a surgeon’s licensure from the
University of Havana), Hondares enjoyed a distinguished record and a few decorations for his
extensive medical military and civil service.187 His exalted language, eager interventionism and
stalwart regional pride must have shocked vaccinators, by then settled into their more mundane
roles as “civil servants,” to attention Far from resenting the unta de Sanidad, Hondares
considered its Central Vaccine Commission just the latest permutation of Romay’s original unta
Central, his vaccinators debtors of a legacy that stretched back generations. As he put it:188
“None of the illustrious patricians which so fervently engaged in the philanthropic mission of
proffering vaccine to all classes of society exist anymore, time and men pass, to be succeeded by
future generations; but the great discoveries which honor the human species in this century
which saw our birth are not forgotten, they arrive, at the most remote posterity, conserving
always their greatness and splendor…we throw ardent prayers up to the skies, in the name of
Cubans!”

This sense of satisfaction was strained and subject to definite limits as obstacles
(re)emerged to highlight the glaring problems of professionalization in the vaccine service. For
one, defects in the original constitution of the corps, including radically unequal pay scales, few
pathways to upward mobility, and the poor incentive to achieve and advance that these
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precipitated in staff, were preserved in the transition. Well after the demographic impact of the
continental wars for independence joined with those of the sugar boom to raise the
epidemiological and economic stakes for official vaccine provision, the service continued to
provide lucrative opportunities for just a handful of physicians with the advantage of luck and
seniority. Dr. Juan Angel Perez Carrillo for example, a contemporary of Romay, was the highest
paid vaccinator in Havana until reorganization in the late 1850s, enjoying a salary of 1200 pesos
a year. Combined with other stipends and private clientele, Carrillo could be considered an
exceptionally wealthy and well-placed physician, so much so that he gave up his income from
other public service positions when a royal ordinance forbade the practice.189
Yet for every highly paid vaccinator in Havana and across the provinces of Cuba, there
were dozens who received little or no salary. In the early 1850s, amongst the 15 vaccinators
responsible for Havana’s 130,000 souls, only 5 were remunerated Following Carrillo’s
exorbitant salary, the remaining four individuals could boast a pittance of only 300-360 pesos a
year.190 Since such positions were often held for life, only upon the death of a lead vaccinator
could others aspire to obtain the post, and then usually according to strict rules of seniority. Such
disparities might not have been so egregious in the heady days after the introduction of vaccine,
when the novelty of the technique and humanitarian rhetoric inspired dozens of physicians to
take up the practice pro bono. But with the official incorporation of vaccination as a “civil”
service, the language of self-sacrifice and moral incentive began to collide with the idea of
remuneration in the name of efficacy, stimulation and discipline. Sanitary administrators, eager
to praise the virtues of any personnel that did not impose financial burden, had to admit as early
as 1855 that the incentive for unsalaried work “would never be as efficacious and pressing” as
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for the remunerated, and that the mere hope of obtaining a post with salary “was a very weak
stimulus” for such an important service 191 There was little leeway for the state to demand
rigorous compliance with professional obligations. The system also left much room for
corruption, as unscrupulous individuals took advantage of titles without stipend to claim free
professional credits without ever wielding the lancet.192
The institutionalized lack of incentive and resource-scarce environment prompted
sometimes vicious intra-professional conflict. One of the most notorious occurred in the
adjacent, sugar-rich province of Matanzas. In 1847 Dr. Joaquín Valentin Riera, recently
promoted to second vaccinator in the city of Matanzas, demanded a salary from the Junta de
Sanidad despite his original contract to perform the function gratis.193 The problem stemmed
from a simple comparison with his partner, head vaccinator Dr. D. Tomás Pintado, who was
receiving 600 pesos a year for his work, a relative pittance which, when combined with income
from his other multiple institutional obligations and private clientele, totaled a small fortune. If,
as Riera understood, the second vaccinator was not a mere assistant, but “shared the same
attributions and authority” as the head vaccinator, then “inevitably that equality should be
reflected in an equal salary ”194
When Riera’s request was ignored by the administration and resisted by Pintado, the
basis for his petition transformed into a virulent denunciation of his colleague. Pintado quickly
became an “enemy” who refused to see Riera with a salary out of pride and greed, “abusing his
power and prestige in an attempt to steamroll justice and social considerations ”195 Nor was it
191

Ibid.
“Sesión de la Junta Superior de Sanidad,” March 16, 1847, unta de Sanidad, Havana, No. 11, File 38, AN.
193
“Dr Joaquín Riera al Excmo. Sr. Presidente,” February 1849, unta de Sanidad, Cartas de Matanzas, No. 2, File
38, AN.
194
Ibid.
195
“Dr Joaquín Reira al Excmo. Sor Gobernador Superior Civil,” uly 13 de 1849, Junta de Sanidad, Cartas de
Matanzas, No. 2, File 38, AN.
192

72

just a private inter-professional matter Content to “meekly perceive his salary without
compromising the comfort of his home to administer vaccine,” Pintado’s complacent indolence
and multiple posts made him “intolerably neglectful” of his professional duties to the branch,
dishonoring the medical profession and endangering the public interest.196 These damning
charges were responded in kind by Pintado, leading to a decade of investigative commissions,
vindictive accusations, and administrative bickering over purview. The conflict was finally
resolved with the death of head vaccinator Joaquín Pintado, but administrators never addressed
the root of the problem. In the winter of 1864, vaccinators in Matanzas again forced the issue of
“just” recompense by petitioning for a general raise in salaries in an unprecedented instance of
professional unity, only to have their request deferred and officially denied three years later.197
As demonstrated above, vaccinators could take positive steps as a corps to alleviate the
situation. In Havana, high-ranking vaccinators looking to spark the ambition of their assistants
and augment their personal prestige even created their own merit system of titles and awards,
prompting authorities to clamp down on the practice in 1856.198 Vaccination, moreover,
continued to provide professional perks of considerable importance. Many vaccinators utilized
their service history as a valuable reference and could claim preferential consideration for other
positions in the Junta de Sanidad upon leaving the service.199 The vaccination corps offered
opportunities and pathways to upward mobility for “the young and well-applied” and limited
avenues for research and experimentation (see below).200
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However, intra-professional strife between atomized individuals too often sullied the
reputation of the service, particularly upon the death of a vaccinator in a coveted post. Frequent,
intense struggles between the Junta de Sanidad, the city council and the executive over financial
responsibility and occasional bouts of insolvency in the branch exacerbated a sense of apathy,
disillusionment and overwork amongst many in the corps, sentiments which played a significant
role in several documented instances of ill-performance and resignation.201 Far from a
technocratic monolith with the power to impose its authority upon the intimate recesses of the
body politic, the unta de Sanidad’s vaccine branch shook unsteadily upon an antiquated
infrastructure and administrative inertia in the realm of public health.

Public Resistance and the Changing Face of Vaccination
Vaccinators’ intra-professional squabbles over salary and insufficient “stimulus” came at
a time of great struggles in the service’s relationship to a dire epidemiological portrait and a
changing public. Despite the extension of vaccination sites and augmentation of official
vaccinators following the transition, epidemic incidents actually increased in frequency,
particularly during the 1850s and early 1860s, when “almost without interruption, smallpox
wreaked havoc amongst us ”202 Although the extant documentation provides little
epidemiological information regarding smallpox’s points of entry, a good part of the increase
was in all probability the result of a boom in the clandestine slave trade, which between 1851 and
1860 brought an average of 12,000 slaves to Cuban shores, more than double what it had been a
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decade prior.203 The boom, part of a cyclical trend that responded more to economic stimulus
than to the dead-letter legislation and international treaties assembled against the trade, fed an
expanded trade volume and intercommunication with the Atlantic world, particularly in sugar.
Only during the 1860s, when the conclusion of the American civil war, effective Spanish
legislation and the outbreak of the first war of independence converged to make slavery
untenable, did the trade finally come to an end, with the last known slave ship arriving on Cuban
shores in 1867.204
Although the end of the legal trade in 1817 terminated the compulsory vaccination of
slaves at port, the vaccination project continued to maintain powerful linkages to the institution
of slavery Romay and the colonial establishment’s intense preoccupation with cutting the
productivity losses wrought by “a malignant disease which fed especially upon unhappy
[African] slaves” merged into legislative debates over the reconstruction and reform of the
service.205 Well into the 1860s, with the institution of slavery clearly on its deathbed,
vaccinators were admonished to visit rural haciendas without resident doctors because they were
“foci of infection” as well as a service of “special recommendation of the Crown ”206 Questions
of improving compliance, the quantity of lymph and even the quality of vaccination on haciendas
and amongst slaves more generally dogged administrators even as the “peculiarities” of the
African body and its reception of vaccine continued to stimulate interest.207

203

Bergad, Iglesias García and Barcia, The Cuban Slave Market, 31.
Bergad, Iglesias García and Barcia, The Cuban Slave Market, 33-34.
205
“Vicente Molina, Tomás Romay y Francisco Álvarez: Comisión de vacuna,” May 17, 1843, unta de Sanidad,
Havana, No. 11, File 38, AN.
206
“Proyecto de adición al reglamento general de vacuna,” December 23, 1861, unta de Sanidad, Havana, No 19,
File 52, AN.
207
“Diego Govantes a la unta de Sanidad,” March 26, 1855, Junta de Sanidad, Havana, No. 11, File 38, AN,
“Notas,” November 29, 1863, unta de Sanidad, Havana, No. 19, File 52, AN, and Dr. Luis de la Calle “Informe
Acerca de la Memoria del Dr. D. Juan G. Hava,” Anales de la Real Academia 3 (November 1866): 215.
204

75

The concern to maintain a disease-free workforce also extended to other forms of coerced
labor. As early as 1847, colonial officials mandated the vaccination of Chinese bonded laborers
imported to diversify the labor pool as international pressure and successive treaty agreements
put the institution of slavery on shaky ground. With increased enforcement of anti-slave trade
laws during the 1860s, thousands of slaves “emancipated” from slavers at sea or port became
state-owned indentured servants and thus subject to compulsory vaccination, “calming the fears
and anxieties of government and public” and serving as official examples of vaccination’s
effectiveness.208
Yet rhetoric and practice had changed perceptibly towards the incorporation of new,
often economically vital “public(s)” as the service regained its footing under the unta de
Sanidad. Without the legal slave trade at port to buttress vaccination numbers, sustain human
chain transmission and serve as fodder for propaganda, public establishments such as hospitals,
asylums, charitable institutions, prisons and military barracks became easy targets to promote the
service and reach broader swaths of society.209 Executive resolutions on vaccination in 1844 and
1846 ordered vaccinators to conduct obligatory visits to workshops as well as primary and
secondary schools.210 Subsequent legislation even required door-to-door sweeps through
neighborhoods under their jurisdiction, often with local authorities and law enforcement,
especially but not exclusively during epidemics. With the coverage that resulted, vaccinators
could “form a protective web [of herd immunity] in which any and all unvaccinated individuals,
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whatever their age, race, sex or condition, could be cloaked ”211 By the late 1850s, sanitary
authorities had assimilated and even surpassed creole medical patrician Tomás Romay’s early
proposals to expand professional authority amongst the majority of the population.
As a changing concept of the “public” broadened the scope of medical responsibility, so
too did concern over those segments of the population that eluded medical outreach and
intervention. For nearly forty years, Romay’s deep ideological sympathies with the mission of
economic growth, “civilizational” development and political order under the yoke of slavery and
colonialism facilitated the construction of an unyielding official discourse “Good fathers and
masters” of a patriarchal slave society who accepted vaccination were offset by a recalcitrant,
ignorant (and primarily poor) plebe.212 But from the 1840s to the late 1860s, a changing and
often self-reflective vaccine administration, set in the midst of a dynamic domestic situation,
seemed to inspire (or at the very least reveal) alternative formulations of the public and their
concerns.
The predicament of low vaccination rates amongst the impoverished, for example,
developed into an increasingly thorny issue amongst administrators and vaccinators after the
1840’s Concern rose in tandem with the dramatic increase of the poor and working class within
the burgeoning population of the capital, with the majority of urban workers employed in
tobacco manufacture. Tens of thousands of African slave, free black, Chinese indentured, poor
white creole and peninsular laborers manufactured cigars and cigarettes in hundreds of factories
as part of an export industry whose total worth in certain years approached that of sugar.213
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Growing numbers could also be found laboring in transport, domestic service, and construction
amongst innumerable other industries.214 A great many of the new working class migrated to
settlements such as San Lazaro, Guadalupe and Jesus Maria, constructed with wood, thatch,
stucco and tile on former estates of the wealthy as the latter relocated to neighboring suburbs.215
During smallpox epidemics, these primarily free black and mixed race neighborhoods were
considered dangerous foci of disease, with vaccination and revaccination the only plausible line
of defense.
A number of clergymen, sanitary administrators and vaccinators expressed sympathy for
the plight of the poor and working class in accessing vaccine, asserting that “misery, more than
ignorance or prejudice” discouraged public attendance 216 In a typical complaint from
neighboring province of Matanzas, one vaccinator opined that the “proletariat classes,”
particularly those from less centrally located neighborhoods and rural areas, had “limited means
of transport, and no ability to suffer the cost of getting [themselves or their children] vaccinated
in this city ”217 Another considered the pitiable destitution of growing populations “that had
nothing to cover their bare skins” a sufficiently compelling reason for their remaining
unvaccinated.218 Lay administrators joined the chorus regarding the legislated compulsion to
produce certificates of vaccination for school admittance, asserting that in the absence of local
vaccination center, parents “erred in favor of paternal love” in refusing to expose their children
to disease and hardship on long marches to designated vaccination sites.219 The result was not
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only privation of educational and even work opportunities for the poor in districts with
overzealous surveillance, but the closure of schools unable to maintain enrollment under the new
regulations.
Such sensitive social commentary was usually accompanied by much more traditional,
self-interested petitions for the appointment of new vaccinators in poor neighborhoods,
vaccination on work holidays and by domicile, and even police presence during rounds.220
However, the challenges inherent in reaching marginalized and uncooperative “publics” also
provoked a great deal of soul-searching and discussion as many looked beyond administrative
infrastructure to professional norms for a culprit. Professional negligence and accountability,
particularly the failure to appear on designated days to perform the operation on those willing to
undergo the operation, became a much more heated source of debate during these decades and
the origin of several official inquiries, resignations and dismissals.
In the spring of 1854, for example, authorities condemnation of vaccinators D. Manuel
Roig y Bravo and D. José Guillermo Diaz, who had absented themselves from their weekly
assignment in the neighborhood of Monserrate, suggested that their “pernicious example of
apathy and poor zeal” made the people’s “own indifference understandable ”221 A few months
later an angry parish priest from Salvador del Cerro called upon local authorities to replace the
lax local vaccinator, whose abandonment prejudiced his congregation and “provoked much
discussion amongst those who have come from afar with their children and been
disappointed ”222 Although most such incidents were successfully concluded with an excuse,
apology, and/or a resignation, exasperated authorities eventually sought to make examples of
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those who demonstrated sub-standard performance. In 1864, a small fury enveloped Havana
vaccinators Antonio Aragon and Miguel Gordillo, who “acted against their sacred obligations,
medical morality, society, government and their own interests” in neglecting their duties for
months at a time.223 Not only were they terminated after a year of litigation, but charges of
neglecting to remit vaccine matter to authorities, acting brusque or ill-mannered with the people
and more generally placing private over public interests were aggregated to their records.
Much more than professional discipline was at stake. If smallpox vaccination was, as
was often stated by colonial administrators, a preferred service of a paternal and concerned
Spanish Crown, cases of infraction or omission of duties and/or legislative ordinances could to
some extent be considered a political grievance that endangered the very existence of the service.
As one angry inspector put it:224
“if

the public, careless and guarded against the vaccine, does not see us solicitous, employed and
efficacious in all parts, if we don’t produce abundant practical results and statistics, sure
evidence that its sacrifices have not been in vain for a government that has entrusted this most
important and delicate branch of sanitation to us, in a word, if we do not able to prove our
worthiness then we renounce the future because it does not belong to us ”

Entrusted with a “sacred obligation,” licensed practitioners chosen for this “venerable
priesthood” should thus be exemplars of their kind, “punctual, experienced, humanitarian and
full of fervor ”225 Under pressure to ensure the highest standards of medical morality, inspection
and administrative surveillance of vaccinators became a key component of successive
reorganizations following the transition.
Unprofessional behavior was especially egregious when vaccinators had to compete with
other healers of the island’s variegated medical marketplace for the hearts and minds of the
223
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people. Though inoculators had presented little resistance to the establishment of vaccination as
compared with countries such as Great Britain, in which the older procedure had been well
established for decades prior, defects in vaccine technology and administration spurred
dissention about the benefits of vaccination amongst the wider healing community. One official
circular published in the midst of a terrifying smallpox epidemic in Matanzas province in 1866,
accused “professors of little medical faith and instruction” of actively discrediting the vaccine
These mostly unlicensed competitors “sowed the poison of doubt amongst simple peoples,”
attesting that the prevention of a necessary developmental disease such as smallpox facilitated
racial degeneration and that vaccination contributed to the extraordinary spread of other
dangerous illnesses such as tuberculosis, scrofula and typhoid fever.226
Evidence that this resistance to the vaccine was founded on a more popular, alternate
moral imagination emerged a few months afterwards, when Secretary of the Junta de Sanidad
and port physician Francisco Casales’ administrative summary of the obstacles facing
vaccination in the province indicted “a number of curanderos” for spreading rumors that
undergoing the procedure in times of epidemic led to the development of grave cases of
smallpox.227 The physician claimed to have personally witnessed one such curandero’s “most
scandalous exercise of the medical profession” upon smallpox victims and called upon the
authorities to prosecute him and four other “publicly notorious” healers for the same crime 228
Whether stoked by dissent within the healing community or popular disillusionment and rumor,
prejudice against the vaccine was widespread and persistent. Well into the 1890s, medical
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authorities felt the need to respond to public suspicions against vaccination’s ineffectiveness,
interference with dentition, revolution of the humors, communication of other diseases and even
its ability to attract smallpox (see chapter three).
Considering the technology of arm-to-arm vaccine transmission, people had a right to be
wary. The use of human vaccinifiers had a number of disadvantages that stoked popular anger,
including the transmission of potentially deadly diseases such as syphilis, erysipelas, and
leprosy The invasive and painful procedure often didn’t “take,” leaving people with a false
sense of security when not subjected to another operation. Human vaccinifiers also tended to
produce low levels of vaccine quickly expended in times of high demand.229 To a degree,
vaccinating authorities acknowledged and gave credence to popular concerns over the quality
and quantity of vaccine lymph and its role in disease transmission. Particularly during epidemics,
vaccinators complained of the “very little public confidence” in the vaccine’s preservative virtue
and agreed with the object of their frustration that the vaccine had “degenerated” and was
“everywhere so scarce it absolutely could not satisfy the needs of the people ”230
Petitions by local and sanitary officials for fresh material from England provided a
relatively easy stop-gap measure. However, as in other parts of the world, popular
disillusionment with the vaccine set into motion long-term changes in vaccine technology and
administration.231 The creation of a reliable system of submission and storage was a principal
reason for the inauguration of a Central Commission after the reforms of 1857. Indeed, every
principal reform following the transition included measures to improve the supply and quality of
vaccine material, with much emphasis on locating and utilizing domestic cows and calves as
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vaccinifiers “as in Gloucestershire, [England],” where enner had first experimented with the
cowpox (see chapter 3).232 Local town councils, which since the times of Romay had been
reserving monetary awards for anyone who could find naturally occurring cowpox in Cuban
countryside, were called upon to fund ever more eager vaccinators in their investigations.233
During the Matanzas epidemic, petitions for information on best practices and calls for
experimentation circulated amongst anxious vaccinators and administrators.
Publicly of course, challenges to the integrity of the procedure and the vaccine were
continually met with scorn and derision. As in cases of professional negligence, any public
attack against vaccination besmirched the paternalism and benevolence of the Crown. Echoing
Romay’s own insinuations decades prior, one administrator considered incredulity towards the
preservative a manifestation of nineteenth century rebellion against established regimes,
conforming to a “certain spirit of the age, disposed to convert the most sane doctrines into
problems ”234 Public acknowledgement of vaccination’s systemic and technological
disadvantages also undermined the professional medical ethic which made vaccinators exemplars
of their kind, stripping them of their pedagogical role as social engineers charged with the grand
project of public enlightenment.
Officially, individuals within a larger, “apathetic” general population were to blame for
poor coverage and repeated epidemics In fact, Romay’s early nineteenth century assignment of
responsibility for smallpox incidence to the “ignorance” and “immorality” of the particular was
echoed in larger medical stage as French physician Francois Joseph-Victor Broussias’ (1772-
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1838) “physiologic” medicine became intellectually fashionable amongst Cuba’s medical
elite.235 Disease, according to Broussais, was merely a localized form of irritation, attributable to
personal violation of appropriate dietary, sexual, moral and/or ideological behavior. The theory,
reinforced during the devastating cholera epidemics of the 1830s and 1850s, dovetailed nicely
with an official reaction which, despite an almost constant and sometimes intense investigation
of the systemic problems confronting vaccination, would accept no fault for popular
recalcitrance. As Secretary Angel Cowley lamented self-interestedly to the Captain-General in
1850:236
“If the vaccine is lost in this capital, although temporarily, it is not the Government, nor the Junta
de Sanidad, nor the licensed vaccinators who should be blamed for this fault; it is the public, the
public which receives this good at no cost, which should be inculpated for such a disgrace ”

Recourse to laws requiring obligatory vaccination of the entire population, if need be by
force (rather than its indirect variant, targeting select groups which happen to fall through state
auspices), would seem a natural solution to the problem of popular resistance in a highly
militarized, colonial slave society. According to historian of public health Erwin Ackerknecht,
absolutist or conservative regimes tended to place heavy emphasis on disease etiologies and
public health practices that impinge on individual autonomy in favor of community and state.237
These governments tended to rely on quarantines, cordones and by extension, obligatory
vaccination to combat disease within a contagionist framework. Liberal regimes, in contrast,
favored less intrusive practices, such environmental approaches, in both disease etiology and
control. Although subsequent historians have greatly qualified Ackerknechtian generalizations
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and drawn upon a more varied set of parameters for understanding the evolution of public health
practices, the vicissitudes of nineteenth century smallpox vaccination seem to have followed
political and economic proclivities of individual states more closely than prophylaxis against
other diseases.238
However, apart from an obscure mandate to vaccinate all children under 2 years of age in
1815, none for general compulsion existed in Spain under either royalist or liberal regimes until
its health legislation was revamped in 1904.239 The idea did not lack enthusiasts on either the
peninsula or the island colony. Despite the lack of effective precedence on the peninsula, Romay
himself had warmed to the idea of obligatory vaccination of all newborns on the island as early
as 1818, and threats of compulsion were quite common in the general press and amongst sanitary
administrators well past the transition in the 1840s.240 When officials in Havana’s Superior unta
de Sanidad became more systematic in their efforts to pass laws of general compulsion in the
mid-1850s, Sweden, a number of German states and even the liberal bastion of Great Britain had
already done the same, serving as effective models for new legislation.241 For vaccinators, the
promise of extending obligatory vaccination to the entire population fed into a much broader
technocratic dream. Besides the “slow methods of enlightened instruction” that undergird the
pedagogical functions of a new professional medical corps, compulsion permitted medical
authorities to assert their “police” authority, and their notions of moral, intellectual and social
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superiority, over the bodies of the general public.242 If the public would not submit “with
docility to the voice of science and authority,” then they would have to be saved from themselves
by the effective union of administrative power and medical prerogative.243
As the core became professionalized, their expectations for the fulfillment of this ideal
increased. Vaccinators were more than happy to expound upon on strategies for enforcing their
authority when a unique inquiry was made for this purpose in 1855, and their responses reveal
much about the mentality of the corps. Although a few voiced concern for maintaining
traditional methods of persuasion and outreach, all emphatically agreed that in the face of
persistent “indolence, abandon and worry, all government dispositions were in vain” without the
application of the more pressing measure of obligatory vaccination.244 Suggestions for
vigorously enforcing and strengthening existing laws of compulsion, such as mandatory
vaccination certification in schools and workshops, constituted a common thread. But dangerous
segments of the public who eluded vaccinator’s efforts necessitated much more direct coercion
Vaccinator (and for a short time, Decano of the Vaccine Commission) Diego Govantes, for
example, combined a limited sensitivity for the structural factors affecting with disease incidence
with stern calls for compulsion. Not only should all slaves and emancipados be required to get
vaccinated, with fines for negligence, but as for the “abject poor,”245
“which inhabit those humid, unhealthy areas in the outskirts of the population in which
epidemics primarily emerge, and amongst which, because of their ignorance, are often found
worry and abandon [towards the vaccine]…it will be necessary to obligate them forcibly to
receive the benefit of the preservative, not only for their own good, but also against the ills
occasioned against other classes when they serve (due to their surrounding circumstances) as
propagators for the disgusting and mortal smallpox”
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Ackerknetcht’s correlation of political conservative regimes with the adoption of
preventive technologies invasive of individual autonomy cannot explain the enthusiasm that
greeted vaccination as a smallpox preventive on the island. As discussed in Chapter One,
geography, epidemiological realities of smallpox introduction, and the penury of the colonial
administration in matters of sanitation dictated a preference for a comparatively cheap, easy and
targeted approach to prevention. Much, moreover, worked against the administration’s adoption
of coercive measures upon the free population. There was no effective precedent on the
peninsula, and whatever mandates did exist were strongly worded and poorly enforced. The
infrastructure required to sustain compulsion was insufficient and investment in health matters
comparatively miniscule. Aside from a few enthusiasts, in the colonies administrators initially
expressed timidity about stirring “public” sensibilities and crossing the line into the most private
of realms, painful invasion of individual bodies.246
However, early recourse to compulsion on the island, as compared to administrative
developments on the peninsula, was closely correlated with the political economy of a highly
militarized, colonial slave society. The initiative began, as in much of Europe and the world,
with fines. Even prior to the transition, in July of 1834, a fine of 25 pesos was placed upon those
who neglected to bring in their recently vaccinated children and slaves in for collection of virus,
a penalty eventually extended to all resisters.247 By the late 1840s, not only had this legislation
been republished several times, but the fines were being more systematically enforced and years
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later, raised for special cases, though the system seems to have been flexible enough to allow for
several instances of appeal and revocation.248
More regular enforcement of fines dovetailed with direct police intervention in enforcing
compulsion in individual homes and, increasingly, entire neighborhoods in the late 1850s and
early 1860s. The black, mixed race and infamously poor neighborhoods of Regla and Jesus del
Monte received the brunt of the new initiative, with vaccinators sending multiple petitions to the
executive for door-to-door vaccination with police presence during epidemic outbreaks in 1864
and 1865 The use of police “to remind persons that could incur such a reparable, if pernicious,
omission” and punish default was augmented in 1861 by mixed commissions which included the
local priest and town council members who together with vaccinators, scoured areas in times of
epidemic.249 Such commissions were intended not only to form a mobile corps that could reach
the invalid and destitute ill, but to exert a pressure that very much approximated force upon those
who might resist. After its successful implementation against the devastating smallpox outbreak
in Matanzas in 1866, the system of tamping down epidemic foci through the police participation
and mixed commissions became standard procedure.250 By the time obligatory vaccination was
passed a year later, the new system that would dominate late nineteenth century Cuban
approaches to epidemic smallpox was complete.

Reform and Disintegration
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The final triumph of obligatory vaccination and with it, the consolidation of professional
medical authority under a variation of sanitary “police” in 1867 proved a bittersweet victory for
vaccinators. From the late 1850s and throughout the 1860s, as royal officials via the Minister of
Ultramar expressed concern about the rising number of deaths on the island, the legislation
strengthening compulsion ran in tandem with three significant reforms (and a few minor
proposals) intended to address systemic problems in the service.251 Successful reforms had
included an expansion of salaried (and non-remunerated) personnel, some rationalization of
professional hierarchies and division of labor, and opportunities for young university students to
enter the field. They also, in an ever more intense manner, increased the responsibility of civil
authorities for management and outreach of what was intended to be just another civil service.
While it set precedent that would bode ill for vaccinators in the long term, such reforms had the
immediate effect of augmenting the coercive power of the service amongst the larger population.
Constant appeals for reform betrayed the rickety structure of the service, as the
professional priorities of vaccinators clashed with the hard realities of disease control.
Frustration became particularly pronounced during the epidemic of Matanzas (1866-1868),
whose fury upon the sugar and slave-rich province seemed to unleash the frustration of
administrators and vaccinators tired of poor performance and eager to embrace new initiatives.
Monopoly of the procedure by a relative handful of licensed professionals, for one, was cited by
members of the creole medical elite and administration alike as an impediment to dissemination
of the vaccine; allowing all regular licensed practitioners to perform the operation promised
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wider and less disruptive modes of access to vaccination for the population.252 Interest in
utilizing other traditional preventives, such as the construction of lazarettos, piqued as did a
growing curiosity about alternative international developments in vaccine production and disease
control.253 When Spanish physician and Inspector of the Vaccine Vicente Ferrer proposed an
investigation of vaccination services, particularly animal vaccine, throughout Europe in 1866,
administrators and staff alike applauded and approved the mission. Alongside hopeful
predictions for a popular embrace and the institutional success of the cowpox, one enthusiastic
endorsement of Ferrer’s plan to the Captain-General stressed that public hygiene on the island
necessitated profound changes. After all:254
“in Europe there has been great progress during the last cholera invasions, with respect to the
treatment of Asiatic cholera, the organization of small provisional hospitals, Casas de Socorro,
sanitary service at home, etc.,..such that it would be useful for us that [Ferrer] study the order,
legislation and implementation of modern lazarettos, general sanitary services and whatever else
could be of utility here ”

These investigations would not have been so dangerous to the integrity of the vaccination
service if not for their inextricable connection to a whirlwind of criticism against a vaccination
corps perceived by many administrators as decrepit. Despite myriad suggestions, proposal drafts
and effective reforms emerging from successive administrations after the transition (including
one by Romay himself) issues with professional organization and remuneration continued to dog
the corps for decades. As Inspector Ferrer, determined to streamline and rationalize vaccination
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service, railed in what had become a familiar condemnation before his departure to Europe in
1866:255
“In what is today called the Central Commission all is anomalous, irregular and dysfunctional
with respect to the service, such as the distribution of personnel and their income scales…a
personnel organized thus and reimbursed capriciously, without equity or reason in regards to
others of their class across the island, cannot demonstrate the enthusiasm and zeal which the
vaccine service, because of its peculiar nature, requires, nor have the desired incentive ”
Ferrer submitted an angry reform proposal to Havana’s Superior unta in 1866 to address
these issues through a thorough rationalization of the service, distribution of equitable salaries
for a simplified two-tier professional hierarchy, and the creation of professional step-ladders
based solely on merit.256 Whereas similar initiatives had been shunted aside years prior,
administrators were especially receptive to the Inspector’s ideas in a time of crisis. Instrumental
in revamping the administrative address of epidemic in Matanzas, Ferrer was also interested in
promoting a generalized transformation of the island’s epidemic response system and in 1867,
many of his general recommendations were codified into law. Heretofore, vaccination was
declared obligatory, all licensed practitioners could perform the operation, and a slightly reduced
corps of vaccinators were mandated by law to work intimately alongside civil authorities to
vaccinate entire populations.
Almost forty years before the metropole would adopt similar legislation, the island in
effect, had become field for experimentation with an organized and effective coercion, at least
during epidemic emergencies, when authorities and vaccinators often applied an early variation
of the celebrated “ring vaccination” technique used to extinguish the last epidemic foci of the
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disease more than a century afterwards.257 Despite the end of a monopoly on the practice, an era
of professional consolidation had been consummated with direct and unprecedented control over
the reluctant bodies of the public.
But vaccinators’ professional victory was short-lived, as deeper reforms shook their
foundation. The overhaul of 1867 in some ways intimated at future transformations. Besides the
newfound ability to vaccinate, all licensed practitioners in an epidemic district were called upon
to serve the sick-poor gratis and write prescriptions for both medication and local charitable
institutions “in case of need for clothing, food or money ”258 Established practices, such as the
use of mixed-commissions to enforce vaccination and traditional quarantinist restrictions on the
movement of people and goods were combined with new compulsions to recruit municipal
physicians, pharmacists, and lay-people to alleviating material conditions of the destitute.259

The Onset of War and a New Order
The close integration of public charity and medical attention reflected a heightened
interest in reaching (and controlling) the poor population, and the menace they represented to the
higher classes, at the local level. According to the Spanish Sanitation Law of 1855, which
represented only the latest codification of earlier nineteenth century liberal preoccupations with
the issue, Spanish town councils were required to provide free medical assistance to poor
residents. Across the peninsula, municipalities were to contract municipal licensed practitioners
to treat the destitute, conduct forensic analyses, collect statistical and epidemiological data,
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vaccinate the general population, consult with local authorities and fulfill additional obligations
as per individual negotiations with the municipality. 260 Reformers also created new institutions,
the Casas de Socorro, or “Relief Houses,” to serve as urgent-care facilities and charitable
distribution centers for the poor.
Although Cuba was governed by “special laws,” nineteenth-century Spanish legislative
legacies combined with the exigencies of a new reality in the Cuban political and socioeconomic landscape to spur the foundation of similar institutions and devolution of sanitary
authority Slavery’s imminent demise was to leave a large, impoverished African population
unshackled even as the strength and activity of proletarian labor organizations alarmed colonial
administrators and sympathizers during the late 1860s.261 Large populations of the mobile and
poor had to be addressed without breaking colonial coffers, which by 1868 was furthermore
spending large amounts of money trying to quell what would turn out to be a ten-year long
independence war (see below). Concerns over these impending and/or ongoing crises
harmonized with promises of reform by liberals in Madrid. Expanding responsibility for
sanitation at the local level seemed the most cost-effective way to maximize state oversight. By
early 1872, not only were all town councils obliged to maintain municipal doctors on staff but in
Havana, construction for 7 new “Relief Houses” was well under way 262
Vaccination services as traditionally understood were completely overturned. Rather
than retaining a large corps of professional vaccinators working under the auspices of a colony-
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wide public health institution, responsibility for vaccination became the special province of the
local town council, “at liberty to arrange for vaccine service in their districts as they see fit ”263
Although the legislation conserved the posts of vaccinators in good standing, town councils were
free to adjust salaries, personnel and material after brief consultation with the executive. In
practice this legislation sounded the death knell of regular corps vaccinators as councils, usually
reluctant to spend on expensive public health projects, either offered vaccinators the opportunity
to apply for new municipal positions or simply laid them off.264 The costly maintenance of what
was perceived amongst some public health administrators as a “dysfunctional” corps was made
even more superfluous when vaccination services were also being offered in the new “Relief
Houses,” a project introduced and guided to fruition by town council member and Inspector of
the Vaccine Dr. Vincent Hernández.265
Many vaccinators were stunned. Some seem to have continued their activities as if
nothing had happened. In neighboring Matanzas, former vaccinators were reprimanded for
inertia in the face of change, neglecting to submit applications for their new possible role as
municipal physician in confidence that their current status would be protected.266 In Havana,
former Dean Rafael Hondares doggedly continued to vaccinate on assigned days in the sacristy
of the church of Santo Angel Custodio, convincing other former corps members to do the same
after their salaries had been withdrawn. When this locale was taken from him due to repairs,
Hondares searched for another umbrella institution, the (in)famously creole Royal Academy of
Science, for protection of the vaccine and service.267 For Hondares and other disillusioned
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members of the corps, it seemed as if an era of professional prestige in the public service had
ended. The sense of betrayal was especially poignant as it became clear that peninsular
administrators were creating the conditions for a centralized vaccine institute at home even as
they dismantled and decentralized vaccination provision services in the colony.268
Worse, the rupture occurred as inter-ethnic tensions were themselves devolving into
violence. From the late 1860s onwards, creole hopes that imperial administrators would consider
reforms that integrated Cuba into the peninsular system as a ‘province’ rather than a ‘colony’
were repeatedly run aground.269 In October of 1868, small-scale sugar planter Manuel Cespedes
launched his “Grito de Yara” in Oriente province, a declaration of independence that inaugurated
a vicious ten-year war (1868-1878). The violence, and two more bloody wars for independence
that followed (1880-1883 and 1895-1898) shook the colonial structure to its core and
exacerbated ethnic and political tensions between creoles and Spanish immigrants looking to
preserve their political and economic privileges under the colonial system. Although all the
revolutions began and thrived in the economically depressed and demographically distinct
Eastern region, in Havana sympathizers formed underground associations to help the rebellious
regions. Money, arms, and men flowed to the centers of conflict from both the capital and
centers of Cuban exile in the Atlantic world. Numerous cafés of Havana teemed with the
whispers of a dissatisfied creole majority, as plans and programs of dissent and even
independence were launched by young educated creoles inspired by the potential for political
change in the Atlantic world.270
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The large Spanish population and a vacillating Spanish colonial policy exacerbated the
atmosphere of rebellion From 1869 to 1871, armed peninsular militias (the ‘Volunteers’)
patrolled the city and exerted vigilante justice on any intimation of disrespect to either the crown
or Spain.271 These “insolent armed mobs,” as Captain General Domingo Dulces referred to
them, composed largely of the immigrant working-class (army veterans, clerks, bakers, butchers,
tobacco workers etc.), managed to occupy the capital and oust reformist authorities sent from
Madrid to negotiate a settlement.272 Intransigent militias were subsequently reigned in by
Spanish authorities and some significant economic and political reforms (particularly concerning
freedom of the press and associational life) were gained in the late 1870s and 1880s.273
However, continuing friction and the onset of hostilities allowed hard-line governors and local
militias to periodically take on the mantle of intransigent colonial anti-reformism.

Conclusion
It was in this context that the Dean Rafael Hondares and his special corps of vaccinators
saw their foundations crumble. Although most creole medical professionals were relatively
moderate reformists, the radicalizing effects of war and vigilantism reverberated across the
profession. Not only was the colonial pact broken, but a professional trust in a paternal and
benevolent state was deeply shaken in the context of violence and war. For over sixty years, in
the midst of repression, rebellion, the articulation of criollo identity/nationalism, and the
transition from the Sociedad Económica to the Junta de Sanidad, smallpox vaccination had been
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a preferred service of the Crown. Despite its many inefficiencies and defects, the service was an
especially creole professional sanctuary for those who sought recognition from authorities and
the people alike for their ethic, valor and professional worth. Smallpox vaccination had enabled
medical professionals to move past the soapbox of a mere pedagogical mission, and impose their
will on a recalcitrant population more consistently and thoroughly than any other medical
preventative. Termination of the corps in the midst of colonial struggle would thus have longlasting consequences for the mystique of creole medical professionalism, the construction of an
imperial legacy in public health, and the creation of a Cuban identity.
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Chapter Three: Vicente Ferrer and the Cowpox Controversy

Introduction
Dr. Vicente Ferrer was about to embark on an adventure of a lifetime. From February of
1867 to March of 1868, the Secretary of Cuba’s Health Council and Inspector of the Vaccine
scheduled a whirlwind tour of Europe to acquire both ‘legitimate’ cowpox and the skills for its
mass production. Post-vaccinal mortality, infection, and ineffective ‘takes’ had abetted public
resistance to what was often a painful surgical operation; and health officials across the globe
had high hopes for the new procedure.274
Vaccine applied directly from the calf had some advantages over what was known as
‘ ennerian’ vaccination, or the arm-to-arm technique. With calf vaccination, physicians hoped to
avoid the accidental transmission of syphilis, leprosy and erysipelas from person-to-person along
human vaccination chains. Popular resistance and the problems of supply that often resulted
could also be more easily overcome; parents would not have to return their children to
vaccinators for the sometimes painful extraction of virus and via the calf, vaccine could be
produced in much greater quantities. Heady with the triumph of what he perceived as a major
scientific advance in preventive medicine, Ferrer went so far as to argue that the ‘purity’ and
‘virtue’ of a vaccine that had never passed to the human species was the only real guarantee of
preservation against smallpox. As an administrative official and field vaccinator of the colonial
public health service, he was determined to bring the benefits of this technical innovation to
Cuban shores.275
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Ferrer’s first stop was Naples, where Dr Guiseppe Negri had for decades been running
an institute based on extraction of vaccine directly from the calf From Negri’s Institute, Ferrer
travelled to France, Belgium, and Spain to visit similar animal vaccine production centers and
consult medical experts, eventually bringing two inoculated calves from the port of Cadiz to
Havana in the spring of 1868. Just a few months later, on the 27th of August, the Secretary’s
hopes were realized by royal decree; the crown granted him permission to establish the “Practical
Institute for Animal Vaccine in Cuba and Puerto Rico” as a private institution, at no cost to the
state.276 Ferrer’s original plans for the Institute were ambitious He sought not only to create a
permanent fount of cowpox vaccine available to both authorities and the public but to build a
research center dedicated to the investigation and discussion of animal vaccine. Modeled after
research centers he had investigated in Italy, France and Belgium, the Institute would allow
professors from the Spanish Antilles to congregate, conduct experimentation and promote their
work in a refuge “all the more necessary for the Americas because of its distance from centers of
scientific innovation ”277
The Institute was the first of its kind in the Americas, and preceded the establishment of a
similar center on the metropolis by four years. In the midst of public health dislocation and the
dismantling of smallpox vaccination services, Ferrer was also the first private institute to
consistently offer preventive treatment to the public. By 1872, the former Secretary boasted to
the Academy of Medicine in Madrid that he had vaccinated over twenty thousand people using
the new technique in both city and countryside.278 Although most of these were paying
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customers who purchased vaccine directly from Ferrer’s institute, donations to public officials
kept a steady supply of vaccine flowing in moments of scarcity. The confluence of public and
private interest also led the former Secretary to publish seminal tracts of public health
propaganda in favor of cowpox vaccination. Ferrer dedicated the last years of his life to
enhancing the prestige of his institute and technique and was recognized by contemporaries with
the Cross of Isabel la Catolica for his service in bringing calf vaccine to the colony.279
Yet Ferrer’s legacy does not reflect his scientific, institutional or personal
accomplishments In a national historiography that generally takes great pride in the island’s
precocious scientific development, Ferrer appears a marginal figure.280 Certainly, his projects hit
rocky waters as the colonial administration’s shifting and contingent financial situation
precluded institutional expansion from a production depot to a Caribbean-wide research center.
But Ferrer’s most determined opponents, that which most tarnished his image and soured his
victory, were other medical elites. While conflict over the relative merits of cowpox vaccination
was a relatively common feature of preventive health in the 1860s and 70s, disputes between
members of the Royal Academy and Ferrer’s cowpox was unusually prolonged and acerbic.
Former colleagues, some of which had struggled with Ferrer against the devastating smallpox
epidemics of the late 1860s, turned their backs on his newest project, offering a bitter estimate of
his service to the public and profession well after his death.281
Historical omissions of this nature are usually the product of defeat in scientific conflict;
particularly in the more traditional histories of science, hagiographies of the “winners” get all the
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spoils of recognition. In this case however, Ferrer’s procedure eventually dominated supply
Calf vaccine spread gradually but consistently for decades after its introduction; with calf lymph
supplying even the Academy of Medicine by the 1890s. Explanations for his virtual
disappearance from a well-worked historical record must be sought after in the socio-economic,
cultural and political realms. What did the Secretary symbolize for the largely creole medical
establishment of late nineteenth-century Cuba? And what motives, in the midst of disease, war
and ethnic strife, would contemporary and later medical elites have to effectively write him out
of Cuban medical history?

Origins of the Practical Institute for Animal Vaccine in Cuba and Puerto Rico
Dr. Vicente Ferrer (1823-1883), a native of Madrid and graduate in Medicine and
Surgery from the Royal College of San Carlos, was an ambitious physician in the Spanish naval
forces during the 1840s. Immigrating to Cuba in1857, the young doctor used his contacts and
professional acumen to quickly rise through the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy, eventually
becoming one of the islands most prominent sanitary officials. Promoted Secretary of the Junta
de Sanidad in 1863, he organized Civil Sanitation Corps for medical inspection of ships at port
and passed multiple regulatory frameworks for the maintenance and reform of public health.282
Ferrer’s most important work however, was in the extension and promotion of smallpox
vaccination services across the island of Cuba. Fellow professionals and administrators praised
the Secretary for his contributions as Inspector of the Vaccine in Cuba during the turbulent
epidemic years of the 1860s, citing his excellent work in the introduction, organization and
supplementation of vaccine stores in the western sugar plantation zones of provincial Havana

282

López Espinosa, “El doctor Vicente Luis Ferrer” at http://bvs.sld.cu/revistas/aci/vol12_1_04/aci08104.htm.

101

and Matanzas.283 Ferrer’s key role in extinguishing one of the worst epidemics in the history of
this region won him the coveted ‘Cross of Charity’ award in 1866, an honor of service to which
very few medical practitioners could aspire.
Ferrer was deeply affected by his experience as a public health official trying to staunch
the flames of recurring smallpox epidemics on the island. The Secretary experienced particular
frustration with the significant popular resistance to the procedure that accompanied vaccinators
throughout their campaigns in the western sugar zones of Matanzas and provincial Havana.
Vaccinators struggled against an almost constant scarcity of vaccine, as parents resisted bringing
their recently vaccinated children to return lymph, an operation “no mother tolerates without
repugnance and pain and which the majority resist ”284 Moreover, many despondently
encountered the “vociferous protests of vulgar and uncultured segments of the population, who
don’t believe in the efficacy of the vaccine ”285 Only with the aid of local authorities and the
threatening presence of a regular police escort was a truly expansive mass vaccination program
possible in many neighborhoods.
Vaccinators may have blamed popular ignorance for resistance to their preventive
imposition, but complaints about degenerated vaccine were not limited to the popular classes.
Debate over the relative effectiveness of different smallpox vaccines, both in Europe and the
Americas, had a long history. During the 1840s and 50s, the number of persons who, vaccinated
as children, were later confirmed as having contracted smallpox as adults had increased to a
notable degree. Physicians in the Academy of Paris began to seriously consider the immunity
offered by smallpox vaccine as limited in time and sought scientific consensus on the need for

283

Zambrana, Memoria, 12.
Vicente Luis Ferrer, “Memoria presentada a la Real Academia de Medicina de Madrid,” February 14, 1872, File
124, Doc. 5791, RANM.
285
Zambrana, Memoria, 12-13.
284

102

revaccination after a certain number of years to ensure continued protection.286 The failure of
life-long immunity became entangled with doubts about the current vaccine’s potency.
Prominent Parisian scientific figures such as the oft-cited Jean-Baptiste Bousquet argued that
revaccination was essential not only because of the vaccine’s natural limitations but also because
the original material had ‘degenerated’ in its long passage via human transmission and was in
need of ‘rejuvenation’ with its protean source 287
Professional and local rejection of a significant pillar of 19th century preventive medicine
left an impression on Ferrer, who began to publicly argue in the 1860’s that the problem of
vaccine scarcity and public fear would only be resolved with a technical advance in the source
and application of vaccine. According to the Secretary,288
“The vaccine would always encounter great obstacles in its propagation when the population was
not given true cowpox or vaccine lymph that was always effective or without a system of
vaccination capable of dissipating their concerns (which are not always without reason and
justice); to calm their spirits in respect to the transmission of syphilis and other diseases and to
free them of certain troubles, such as that of having to return the children to vaccination sites to
return lymph so as to extract virus ”

For Ferrer the problem was more than just an ineffective source of preventive, it was
systemic. Alongside many other public health officials associated with the service, as Inspector
of the Vaccine Ferrer became convinced that the institutionalization vaccination on the island
was “dysfunctional” and in need of a serious overhaul. During the 1860s, he submitted a series
of impassioned proposals and recommendations to streamline and rationalize the service while
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maintaining the basic integrity of a vaccination corps funded by state coffers.289 Even as many of
his recommendations were taken up by royal authorities, Ferrer was disillusioned with the
capabilities of the official vaccine service in the face of public apathy and resistance. After his
return from Europe he lamented that, “the most categorical laws, the most explicit instructions to
governors, all sort of pecuniary sacrifice, and the creation of vaccine deposits were not enough to
awaken desire for vaccine amongst the vulgar ”290 Ferrer was convinced that whatever measures
were undertaken by the government in favor this service, “they all broke down before public
indifference ”291
His disillusionment with public service probably played a role in his desire to create a
private institution for the production of vaccine. After all, resistance and apathy could not be
overcome without effective lymph and the creation of permanent deposits in the Juntas de
Sanidad (by Royal Edict in 1857) had clearly not resolved the issue of either vaccine scarcity or
popular anxiety about the material in circulation. By being the first to bring calf vaccination to
the colony, Ferrer could work around public health inadequacies and help supply the government
with the latest in vaccine technology. He could also enhance his prestige as a scientist and
medical professional; all while turning a profit with a service that had always been considered a
government obligation and a free public good.
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Figure 7: Naturally occurring cowpox from El Propagador de la Vacuna; Ferrer’s underlying
justification for the superiority of both his production method and vaccine was that both came
from the same original and ‘spontaneous’ form of cowpox (illustrated above) used by enner in
the late 1780s.

Whatever the relative weight of public versus private motivation, Ferrer returned to the
island determined to aggressively promote his method and Institute. In 1872, in the midst of
much medical controversy over the relative virtues of cowpox versus arm-to-arm vaccination, he
published what was to be one of a series of short tracts dedicated to popularizing knowledge
about his method. The Propagator of Vaccine: War Against Smallpox, [written] by a Friend of
Children and Dedicated to all Mothers was directed to a wide audience (including the rural
population), and can be considered one of very few public health manuals dedicated exclusively
to smallpox vaccination on the island. The tract included staged dialogue in response to general
queries about vaccination; ‘does the vaccine revolve the humors, does the vaccine produce
smallpox, is it safe to vaccinate during an epidemic?’292 But a great deal of the content was
intended to prove the superiority and distinctiveness of Ferrer’s innovation. According to the
292
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Institute’s genesis story, Ferrer’s cowpox was undiluted by “incessant passage through infinite
generations of persons with herpes, syphilis, and tuberculosis” and was thus a uniquely different
substance from the ‘human’ vaccine 293Not since enner’s original extraction of virus (or the
discovery of cowpox-ridden calves in Passy, France in 1836) had the original material been in
circulation outside Negri’s Institute in Naples Ferrer considered it his ‘mission’ to bring this
vaccine back to the colony, at his expense, for investigation and distribution.294

Figure 8: Comparison of vaccines from El Propagador de la Vacuna; Exact replicas of
sketches produced by the Academy of Medicine in Paris dramatically illustrated the differences
in virtue between Ferrer’s vaccine (on the left) and its human variant (shown at right)
Overall, the colonial officials were enthusiastic about Ferrer’s project Ferrer’s promise
to use his institute to serve royal authority and “facilitate animal vaccine at whatever hour for all
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its necessities of service no matter how great” sounded upon sympathetic ears during
increasingly alarming epidemic outbreaks in both Cuba and Puerto Rico.295 Cuba’s own unta de
Sanidad wanted to make Ferrer a salaried, official inspector of not one but three centers of
animal vaccine to be located in Havana, Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba. 296 Although
government support for such an ambitious plan of public/private collaboration was lacking, by
the spring 1872 Ferrer could proudly declare to the Royal Academy of Medicine in Madrid that
two more modest centers for the conservation and propagation of animal vaccine were being
constructed in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba under the direction of their Ayuntamientos.297
Other municipal governments across the island clamored to acquire the highly regarded cowpox
lymph; free donations of lymph to various public and private corporations across the island
continued into the 1890s.
Even as the full realization of these projects were stunted by colonial administrative
inertia and a precarious financial situation, elite medical colleagues turned an icy shoulder to
Ferrer’s introduction and institutionalization of the cowpox To some degree this was a response
to the former Inspector’s categorical imposition of his own professional and scientific
achievement. Ferrer had drawn a line in the sand; his propaganda on behalf of a “superior”
innovation required that other vaccinators accept their techniques as inferior and even dangerous
to the population. Former vaccinators and other physicians associated with the Royal Academy
of Sciences, some of which had struggled with Ferrer against the devastating smallpox epidemics
of the mid-1860s, reacted viscerally to their colleague’s attempts at professional aggrandizement
and offered a bitter estimate of his service to the public and profession.
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The Academy’s Response
Founded in 1861 by elite creole physicians dedicated to the principles of “science,
detached observation and experimentation,” the Royal Academy of Science in Havana had been
running its own vaccination services based on the arm-to-arm method since 1869 (see Chapter
2).298 Headed by former Dean of the Central Vaccine Commission Rafael Hondares (who was
not a member of the Academy) and former vaccinator Tomás Mateo Govantes, the Subcommission of the Vaccine reserved at least one day a week for free, public vaccination in the
Academy’s elegant salon As advisor to the government the Academy’s obligations included a
review of the scientific merit of medical innovations, and the colonial government requested a
report on Ferrer’s institute soon after its installation The Commission of Public Hygiene coldly
acknowledged the royal order authorizing the establishment of the institute and in September of
1869 submitted a scathing report against him and the Institute.
According to the report, members of the commission were offended by Ferrer’s argument
for the superiority of animal vaccine over the current arm-to-arm method. Ferrer’s exaggerated
claims about the absolute advantages of animal vaccine regarding transmission of disease (like
syphilis), productive capacity and preventive potency were interpreted by the commission as a
scientific and professional insult to their own vaccination efforts on the island. As asserted in the
report, “a vaccinator who fulfills his duty would never draw vaccine unless it was from a healthy
child and triumphs over, as they have to this day, resistance to returning lymph ”299 Moreover,
Ferrer offered no conclusive evidence about the possibility of animal-to-human transmission of
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bovine diseases such as tuberculosis and “that the same repugnance [towards vaccination
amongst certain sectors of the public] would [not] be produced with inoculation using a sick
animal ”300 Claims about the relative potency of animal vaccine and its life-long preservation of
an individual from a bout with smallpox struck the Commission as unsubstantiated and
unscientific propaganda.
An overt current of anger towards Ferrer’s professional and pecuniary ambitions ran
through the report If the stipulations regarding scientific research in Ferrer’s institute were
acceptable and even laudable, the private nature of his endeavor was condemned as
impermissible under the regulatory structure of public vaccination on the island.301 Vaccine
should be free and tubes of vaccine virus distributed without charge to any solicitor (particularly
hacendados). The sale of vaccine to the well-endowed was a threat to public health, for as one
academic argued after the report was concluded, “the people always seek and follow the coattails
of the rich, and unable to reach it, they will not get vaccinated ”302 What was worse, Ferrer was
trying to discredit human vaccine when his professional credentials included a service award for
the eradication of epidemics in western Cuba during the early 1860s, campaigns that relied
almost exclusively on the arm-to-arm method Ferrer’s petition was portrayed as a selfinterested and hypocritical attack on both human vaccine and Cuban administration of the
smallpox preventive, which “with more than 50 years of experience, has plainly justified its good
and sound effects; as Sr. Ferrer has himself proved, his brilliant success due to the benefits of the
current system ”303
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The Commission’s conclusion was categorically against the legitimation and
institutionalization of animal vaccination on the island. According to the report, Ferrer had not
provided sufficient evidence to conclude that animal vaccination enjoyed any advantages over
the arm-to-arm method. The new technique should only be admitted for research and
comparative study, “taking care that nothing prejudices the application of the current method
[italics in original] ”304 If its superiority is proven scientifically and with rigor, the Academy
could accept the institutionalization of animal vaccination under Ferrer’s proposed framework,
with the exception of its general disposition on the sale of vaccine. This latter clause is
“inadmissible, because this would serve as an obstacle to the propagation of vaccine…and
should be removed so that with more extensive dissemination come more beneficial results [for
the population] ”305
A heated debate ensued after Govantes read the Commission’s report and continued into
the late evening, during which a few academics demonstrated more sympathetic opinions of
Ferrer’s proposal Secretary Dr Antonio Mestre, widely considered an exemplar of scientific
objectivity in the Academy, admitted that diseases such as syphilis could be transmitted “with
the least lack of caution” via the arm-to-arm method and that cases of syphilis transmission “are
now numerous enough to draw attention and seek a means of preventing contagion ”306 Mestre
agreed with the report in that the relative superiority of animal vaccination had not been resolved
scientifically, but asserted that each technique had advantages and disadvantages to take into
consideration. In his discussion of contemporary debates in the Academy of Paris, the Secretary
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seemed to favor a moderate approach, whereby “both [human and animal vaccines] are
cultivated simultaneously so that the administration of good virus is always assured ”307
Other Academics went further Upon hearing Secretary Mestre play devil’s advocate
with the costs and benefits of animal vaccination, Dr. Joaquín Lebredo (a member of the
Commission) abruptly changed course. Arguing that the report should not have been presented
with such a scarcity of data, Lebredo thought that the Commission’s conclusion pre-maturely
discarded both the practice and research of animal vaccination, “when in reality animal
vaccination should be accepted and established, not as a special comparative study, but as a
method which also has established standards of proof and is already applied in enlightened
nations ”308 Although he along with other members of the Commission insisted that vaccination
be free, Lebredo understood that the Institute’s vaccination fees “could not be avoided, as it is a
private business; just as the public cannot be obligated to refer to this center ”309
An addendum to the final government response reflected the impact of these tempered
voices. Without accepting Ferrer’s claims concerning the superiority of animal vaccination, the
Commission conceded that the technique was backed by scientific evidence, as attested by its
practical administration in some ‘enlightened’ countries The Academy was therefore “not
opposed” to the establishment of the institute as stipulated in the Royal Order 310 However, the
Academy approved the Commission’s original conclusions and qualified this last show of
acceptance. President Gutierrez had been alerted that some Ayuntamientos on the island had
already requested animal vaccine from the Institute. Without evidence to suggest that animal
vaccination should substitute the arm-to-arm method, he argued for human vaccination’s
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preservation. Faced with the threat of both official sanction and public/private partnerships, the
addendum asserted that the government “cannot establish such an institute in an official or
obligatory manner,” since such a measure would prejudice human vaccine 311Responding to
Ferrer’s messianic exaggeration of animal vaccination’s benefits, the Academy seemed to look
upon both the institute and the practice of animal vaccination as threats to their professional
primacy in any state-led public health initiative against smallpox.
A flurry of heavily edited publications, composed in their majority by a secondgeneration vaccinator in the service and scion of a prominent medical family Dr. Tomás Mateo
Govantes and his close colleague Lic. Francisco A. Sauvalle, appeared in the Anales soon after
submission of the report. All reaffirmed a binary vision of smallpox vaccination in which animal
vaccine in Europe and on the island was framed as a dangerous innovation that was
comparatively ineffective and prone to mercenary ‘trafficking’ and monopoly 312 Although a
heavy silence eventually enveloped the issue and some exceptions to this position emerged in
later years, the Academy converted itself into the scientific and practical bastion for the defense
of the arm-to-arm method and human vaccine until independence in 1898.313 Many Academics
became convinced that the reason for government inability to enforce thorough and extensive
vaccination was its adherence to animal vaccine. As Dr. Mestre declared during the great
smallpox epidemic of 1878,
“The affinity for vaccination in the Academy can be explained not only because of the fear of a
bout with smallpox; but because, with the Casas de Socorro unable to rely on anything more than
calf vaccine ministered by [Ferrer’s] Instituto, many physicians preferred the arm-to-arm method
vaccine and counseled in favor of this in the heart of families and amongst clientele ”314
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The Science of Rejection
As Cuban historian of medicine Pedro Pruna argues, academic skepticism of calf
vaccination did not necessarily demonstrate a retrograde attitude towards a hygienically and
scientifically superior process.315 Even as cowpox vaccine became established throughout
Western Europe in the late 1860s and early 1870s, problems with successful ‘takes’ led some
corporations to rely at least partially on the arm-to-arm method for the duration of the nineteenth
century. In Madrid, consolidation of a state-sponsored vaccine institute that would centralize a
scattered and inefficient public health infrastructure was hampered by the quality and quantity of
cowpox vaccine. By 1876, after four years of scientific efforts to promote the method on the
peninsula, even fervent supporters of the superiority of cowpox began to consider it prudent to
conserve both methods simultaneously to assure the flow of good vaccine.316 In Paris and
Brussels, the bad performance of cowpox during the devastating epidemics of 1870 tarnished the
reputation of well-established institutes. Although cowpox continued to be utilized on a large
scale, some influential physicians became disillusioned with the idea of a total reliance on any
one technique.317 Academics witnessing these scientific controversies often based their
arguments against cowpox on clinical data that demonstrated the technique’s inferior results
when compared with its “human” variant.
Yet the Academy’s reaction went above and beyond a response based on empirical
detachment and objectivity, articulated as a complete repudiation of a technique with
scientifically-authenticated benefits (particularly as regards vaccine supply and assurance against
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disease transmission). Such an acerbic response is surprising considering the generally positive
opinion of cowpox amongst the medical establishment prior to Ferrer’s project. From patrician
vaccinator Tomás Romay onwards, vaccinators and laymen alike had conducted recurrent
searches for a spontaneous outbreak of cowpox on Cuban soil.318 In both the Cuban medical
press and the Anales, various historical and scientific pieces on vaccination praised efforts to
‘rejuvenate’ the vaccine by taking it directly from the cow, its original source 319 According to
the author, rejuvenation could mean either finding the original cowpox as spontaneously
manifested in nature or inoculating a calf with human vaccine. Arm-to-arm (or human) vaccine
was by no means denigrated and physicians made vociferous declarations against degeneration
as a primary problem in the extension of vaccination.320 But as one physician put it, the vaccine,
“becomes weak in its passage through so many organisms” and rejuvenation was the surest way
to ensure the vaccine’s legitimacy and potency amongst a select group of professionals and a
skeptical public.321

318

Romay’s earliest efforts to obtain spontaneous cowpox in Cuban rural areas later achieved epic status as a
demonstration of great personal sacrifice. See for example, Domitila García de Coronado, A la humanitaria
Sociedad de Recreo y Beneficiencia el Centro Gallego al propagar la vacuna gratuitamente al pueblo en 1887,
dedica estos breves apuntes históricos del ilustre Cuba Dr. y maestro, D. Tomás Romay y Chacón, a quien debe
Cuba este beneficio eterno (Havana; Imprenta de Howson y Heinen, 1888), 17.
319
Tomás Mateo Govantes, “Higiene: Memoria,” Anales de la Real Academia 1 (April 1865): 384-390. See also
Jean-Baptiste Bousquet, “De la inoculación de virus vacuno en la vaca, y de los efectos de esta inoculación sobre la
vacuna,” Repertorio Médico-Habanero y Boletín Científico 2, no.10 (March 1844): 259.
320
os de la Luz y Caballero, “Importancia de la vacunación y revacunación demostrada por hechos
experimentales,” Anales de la Real Academia 3 (March 1867): 383-396. Domingo Rosain, “Apuntes históricos
acerca de la introducción y propagación de la vacuna en la isla de Cuba,” Anales de la Real Academia 3 (February
1867): 352-360 and uan G Hava, “Breves consideraciones sobre la vacuna en la isla de Cuba,” Anales de la Real
Academia 3 (April 1867): 433-438. The latter two sources are each individual installments in multi-part series on
the history of the vaccine and its reform, respectively. It was also in the government interest to defuse doubts about
the efficacy of extant lymph and reassurances and remonstrations in this regard appeared during epidemic times.
Vicente Luis Ferrer, “Higiene pública: Vacunación y revacunación (Circular),” Anales de la Real Academia 3 (July
1866): 45-49.
321
Hava, “Breves consideraciones,” 433-438. Correspondence from affiliated physicians in France was also
reproduced to prove the superior effectiveness of vaccination from the cow. According to Mr. Danet, a physician to
the French Ministry of the Interior who conducted a study on the nature of vaccination and its effects on mortality
rates in prisons and other public institutions, vaccination from the cow had a success rate of 40%, as opposed to only
26% with the arm-to-arm method. “Correspondencia,” Anales de la Real Academia 3 (March 1867): 405-406.

114

Many Academics also demonstrated a general fascination with veterinary medicine and
its relation to human disease. Academy applicants such as Dr. Juan Moreno y Delgado,
defended the consolidation of veterinary medicine’s professional status in the late nineteenthcentury. Veterinary physicians cited the importance of animal-to-human transmission of disease
and the possible contributions of veterinary medicine in defining precepts for sanitary policing of
diseases such as smallpox, anthrax, rabies, sarna and typhus.322 Interest in the profilactic
potential of this relatively young branch of medical science increased exponentially with the late
nineteenth century bacteriological revolution.323 Pasteurian methods of serum and vaccine
production, which relied heavily upon animal experimentation, offered creole medical reformers
hope of developing preventive technologies for a tropical climate considered too insalubrious for
European civilization.324

Scientific Uncertainty and Professional Integrity
Scientific controversy’s chilling effect on popular acceptance of vaccination constituted
part of the reason for the intransigent Academic stance against the Institute. In Cuba as
elsewhere, accusations of a ‘degenerated’ and ‘ineffective’ vaccine were as old as the vaccine
itself and had resulted in a number of challenges to established medical opinion on the island.
Popular credulity of the vaccine’s effectiveness impeded public health initiatives and facilitated
market usurpation by the largely unlicensed competition, as “unscrupulous or ignorant
individuals spread rumors about the vaccine” for the benefit of their practice and personal
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prestige.325 Physicians who fulfilled their “sacred duty” to science and promoted vaccination
contended with widespread (and sometimes well-founded) popular beliefs about the procedure’s
dangerous ability to transmit disease, stir the humors, and disrupt normal infant dentition.326
Controversy in Europe over one of medicine’s greatest preventive technologies thus had
the potential to significantly undermine professional integrity and discredit the prestige of
medical science amongst the wider public. The nascent Cuban medical press of the period
carefully covered these debates in the halls of the Academy of Paris and beseeched vaccinators
on the island to investigate. Headed by some of the same physicians who would later pass
judgement on Ferrer’s Institute, short-lived periodicals such as the Repertorio Medico Habanero
y Boletin Cientifico (1843-) included frustrated calls for the speedy resolution of an issue which
“awakens doubt in the public and makes [our profession] laughable ”327
The necessity of revaccination was eventually approved by the Academy of Paris, but
unresolved discussions over degenerated vaccine had clearly left a bitter taste amongst the elite
medical establishment. Cuban academic commentators in the cowpox report echoed
conservative voices before them, arguing that the specter of doubt would disturb the peace
amongst families and lead to a preventive care divided by class.328 To some degree, the integrity
of the vaccine became synonymous with the scientific bedrock upon which medical science
rested.

The Politics of Public Health
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The political significance of smallpox vaccination in a milieu of war and internal strife
was moreover, not conducive to mutual understanding on the sensitive topic of public health.
Havana’s Royal Academy of Sciences, a bastion of creole medical prestige, was not immune to
the peninsular paranoia that followed the first (or subsequent wars of independence). Indeed,
beginning with the onset of the first war of independence, hard-line captain generals periodically
railed against a “refractory spirit without due respect to authority” that reigned in the halls of the
Academy, an attitude they considered suspiciously “alien for individuals pertaining to
‘enlightened’ corporations ”329 Separatists and even many reformist members suspected of
sympathies with the rebel cause were harassed, arrested and/or exiled. Disagreements over
scientific problems and/or administrative protocol quickly became political, risking the very
integrity of the Academy. Particularly from 1868-1872 and 1891-1898, the Academy teetered on
the brink of imperial administrative intervention and/or dissolution.330 After the American
intervention of 1898, famed Academic Manuel Delfin remembers that the Academy halls were
“deserted” by members who had been lost to political conflict and an atmosphere of fear:
“The ones who did attend [sessions] did not dare raise their voice, because over our heads danger
hovered, and because under this roof we did not feel safe. Every word was measured, every
gesture calculated, all thought silenced or enveloped in robes of the finest dissimulation ”
In times of hardline colonial revanchism, official suspicions were not staunched by either
the comparatively mild reformism of most members or the many services the Academy rendered
to the colonial government. Indeed, the problem was systemic and based on a prejudice against
medical practitioners more generally. Amongst professionals, creoles were disproportionately
represented in the medical sphere and physicians were thus particularly suspect for treason
during periods of repression. Blocked from obtaining many desirable public and administrative
329
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posts by colonial policies that favored the Spanish-born and economically squeezed by
technological and financial transformations in the sugar sector, creoles of the middle and upper
middle-classes sent their sons to medical school.331 Indeed, in the University of Havana, a
hotbed of creole dissent, the only licensure available to most creoles was in law and medicine;
the medical profession offered middle class creoles the opportunity to reproduce their social
status and forged paths of upward mobility for the lower classes. For political as well as socioeconomic reasons, Cuba in 1899 continued to have one of the highest ratios of physicians per
person in the world.332
Whether via overt administrative pressures on established associations and ‘seditious’
periodicals, the Spanish state was not blind to the insurrectionary potential of this medical ethos.
During the first war of independence, vigilantes and hard line governors acted precipitously to
quash what they considered to be creole centers of treasonous activity. In one of the most
notorious acts of violence, 44 medical students and a celebrated creole medical professor were
arrested by peninsular authorities and collaborating voluntarios on November 25, 1871. Charged
by a military tribunal with desecrating the grave of prominent Spanish conservative Gonzalo
Castanon, many were sent to prison or deported. Eight (including a 16 year old boy) were
executed as traitors to the mother country in an act that outraged creoles, shocked Spanish
liberals and reverberated across the Atlantic world.333
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Figure 9: A tribute to the innocence of the eight“martyrs” executed in 1871in the
Cementerio de Colon. Erected in the 1880s by physician and creole patriot Fermin Valdes
Dominguez, the mausoleum holds the remains of the 8 executed medical students. In response to
what had become a site of symbolic conflict, José Gener y Batet, the military tribunal judge
which had condemned the youths, built up his nearby, final resting place so as to tower over the
monument.

Making Enemies
Antonio Mestre, creole reformer and one of the most pre-eminent medical figures in
Cuban society, had envisioned the Academy as a “republic of science,” a haven where politics
and personal difference had no place.334 Imbued with positivist ideology of scientific certainty,
Mestre and other Academics believed that the scientific arena had the potential to “bring men
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together rather than drive them apart,” and utilized the idea of ‘objective’ science as their main
defense of a largely creole institution dominated by reformers.335
But in an atmosphere of violence, militarism and cultural conflict, personal and political
prejudice against Ferrer tarnished the image of his Institute and played a significant role in
delaying scientific acceptance of cowpox vaccination in the Academy. Ferrer’s previous intraprofessional conflicts with Academic vaccinator Rafael Hondares were particularly damaging.
During his tenure as Secretary of the Junta de Sanidad and Inspector of the Vaccine (1863-1868),
Ferrer had openly clashed with Hondares over sensitive questions regarding professional
credentials and reform. Hondares was a stellar creole vaccinator who had been propagating
vaccine under the auspices of the Central Commission for just under 20 years when he was
promoted to serve as the organization’s Dean In 1865 however, a Commission-wide review of
professional credentials revealed he was licensed only in surgery. With qualifications inferior to
many of his subordinates and insufficient for his official post, Hondares “listened to his
conscience” and prepared to resign 336
In consideration of the Dean’s experience and aptitude, Ferrer chose to temporarily
overlook Hondares’ ‘impertinence,’ but as Inspector of the Vaccine Ferrer was clearly irritated
by the deception. Equalizing salaries amongst professors who “did the same job, had the same
responsibilities and enjoyed the same professional pedigrees” had, after all, been a central
component of Ferrer’s reform proposal for the Vaccine Commission 337 Such a shocking
revelation from the very apex of the Commission’s professional ladder increased the severity of
perceived disfunction in the corps and demanded a strong response from its Inspector. In 1866,

335

“La vacuna en las Casas de Socorro,” Anales de la Real Academia 7 (March 1871): 551.
“Rafael Hondares al Capitán General,” October 1, 1865, Junta de Sanidad, Havana, No. 19, File 52, AN.
337
“Del Secretario a la Excmo unta Superior de Sanidad,” December 18, 1866, Junta de Sanidad, Havana, No. 19,
File 52, AN.
336

120

as Ferrer prepared the petitions for his voyage in search of the ‘true cowpox,’ he also submitted
an angry proposal to create a rational service based upon merit. The position of Dean was
eliminated since the officeholder “enjoys the highest salary [and] has the least work ”338
Hondares in particular was reprimanded as a “simple surgeon who, inferior to all in academic
aptitude” should have never taken on such a public responsibility 339
Ferrer’s critiques of the vaccine in currency on the island also seem to have intensely
annoyed Hondares Months after Ferrer’s departure in the February of 1867, the new Inspector
Pablo Fulla’s casual comments about vaccine scarcity and requests for information on routine
experiments with recently received English vaccine were misinterpreted as a condemnation of
the collective work of the Corps as a whole. With righteous indignation, Hondares clarified that
vaccine was scarce only because the Corps had succeeded in vaccinating an extraordinary
number of people of late, “saving this capital from a horrible and destructive disease” and
“ensuring that his [Hondares’] efforts have not been useless ”340 Importation of English vaccine,
associated in Cuba with the cowpox, was a waste of resources as well as a professional slight.
Hondares and a team of vaccinators had, according to a few accounts, managed to find it
amongst domestic cattle and successfully “replenished” the preventative some years prior
Moreover, the extant vaccine became the object of regional pride that would be tarnished
through importation of “foreign” elements As Hondares stated:341
“It’s not the first time, Mr. Inspector, that foreign vaccine offers negative results. If ours is good
and of proven efficacy in critical circumstances, why substitute it with another of foreign origin,
whose virtues are in doubt? The virus we have is originally of the cow and … I have had the
Glory of having obtained it on our own soil, together with other professors of the capital’s
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Central Commission, without any contribution from either the Government or the
Ayuntamiento ”
It was however, Ferrer’s legacy as a reformer that most impacted the reception of his
innovation amongst creole Academics. Reorganization of the Commission according to Ferrer’s
proposal was followed in 1871 by a total liquidation of the Corps (see Chapter 3). The newly
installed Liberal government in the metropolis decided to make the colony’s system of public
goods distribution a closer reflection of that on the peninsula. Public health services, including
distribution of charity, were in large part decentralized to the municipalities. Responsibility for
vaccination was no longer entrusted to a special corps of professionals; all licensed medical
personnel could perform the procedure. Preservation of the vaccine lymph devolved to newly
constructed charitable associations, the Casas de Socorro, and to municipal physicians who were
to give the vaccine no more preference than their other obligations. Hondares was crushed.
Despite the fact that Ferrer’s reform had not been radical in content or intended to dismantle the
institution, Hondares and other former vaccinators quickly associated him with the destruction of
their professional livelihoods and the public health Acting representative of the Academy’s
Vaccine Subcommittee, Hondares helped author the report condemning Ferrer’s institute and
would subsequently become cowpox vaccination’s most acerbic critic 342
Although other Academics demonstrated more moderation in their views of Ferrer and
his Institute, a strong association between the institutionalization of cowpox vaccination and the
destruction of public health infrastructure became generalized throughout the Academy. The
seven Casas de Socorro, which combined public health services such as vaccination with
charitable relief, were particularly targeted for censure. Accusations that the newly-installed
Casas relied solely on [ineffective] cowpox vaccine and actively suppressed press
342
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announcements of Jennerian vaccination appeared in the Anales shortly after the Academy’s
qualified censure of Ferrer’s Institute.343 The initial scarcity of public concurrence for
vaccination in the Casas and the publication of information on unsuccessful ‘takes’ amongst the
few who did get treated in these establishments only added fuel to the fire.344 Antonio Mestre,
widely considered a voice of disinterest and reason in the Academy, found it “lamentable that the
foundation of these Casas came just two months after vaccine service…was suppressed,” as this
prejudiced many against what should have been a progressive development in public health.345
Yet even Mestre came to believe that these institutions had disgraced their own reputation by
suppressing enner’s vaccine and the extinguished Commission, an aggression that amounted to
“a neglect of science and humanity ”346
As cowpox became directly associated with destructive changes in public health, arm-toarm vaccination was linked to a disinterested medical profession and glorified memories of a
formerly effective vaccination program staffed and led by creoles. During the particularly fierce
smallpox epidemic of 1871, Hondares could proudly declare to the Academy that thirteen
vaccinators associated with the recently extinguished Commission decided “not to abandon such
an important institution” and continued their service “with the same zeal, interest and efficacy as
in previous eras when such important work was remunerated ”347 More than fifteen years later in
1886, Hondares’ successor Tomás Mateo Govantes was lauded for his contribution to the same
effort “at the same moment that the service was being dismantled in favor of the Casas de
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Socorro and protection of the cowpox ”348 Just as the Commission had successfully extinguished
epidemics in the past, these vaccinators would work to counterbalance a clearly inadequate
system of preventive health provision.
Their “humanitarian” professionalism, contrasted implicitly with Ferrer’s rude pecuniary
ambition, was defined not only by their charitable preservation of the old organization, but by the
preventive technique they utilized. According to Dr. Tomás Mateo Govantes, vaccinator of the
old Commission and Hondares’ successor in the Academy, comparison between the two systems
demonstrated that “much more benefit is observed for humanity if vaccinators, without any other
interest than that inspired by [the public health], consagrate themselves exclusively to
propagating enner’s vaccine ”349 Their steadfast sense of duty not only multiplied vaccination
sites in times of epidemic, but “averted the disappearance of the richest source of prophylaxis
against smallpox ”350 The Academy, whose responsibility it was to watch over “the application
and disinterest of the professional practice of medicine” subsequently rewarded the old Corps
with an official and unanimous vote of thanks.351
Academics’ reaction is testimony to the powerful effect of vaccination on the formation
of a localized medical ethic amongst medical professionals Academics didn’t feel the need to
justify their arguments with references to late Enlightenment interpretations of the physicians’
“politic ethics” which bound the medical scientist to the betterment of society and state and had
formed the intellectual foundation of the vaccination project.352 Nor did they cite influential
medical ethicists such as John Gregory (1724-1773) or Thomas Percival (1740-1804) on the
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fiduciary responsabilities that linked medical professionals to a disinterested service on behalf of
their patients and were models for later deontological prescriptions.353 Even as these
philosophical predecessors certainly informed their broader professional consciousness, over
sixty years of free vaccine provision for the wider population seemed precedent enough. The
service had become idealized as the ultimate demonstration of governmental beneficence and
support for its subjects. Vaccinators, in turn, represented exemplars of the kind of moral
authority which validated professional distinction and countered age-old negative stereotypes
against licensed physicians.

Officials React
Ferrer never directly responded to charges of professional and scientific negligence in
either the popular or medical press If anything, he was sincerely pleased “for both the country
and common sense” that the two periodicals which had published critiques against him had
subsequently shut down.354 However, the controversy spread widely enough that he felt the need
to address it in his popular health manual, El Propagador de la Vacuna, in 1872. Directed to a
wide audience (including the rural population), the manual steadfastly defended both Ferrer and
his method against detractors. The issue was largely posed as one of professional self-interest
and human nature Vaccinators were waging ‘a ferocious war’ against him because “no one
loves a physician less than another physician ”355 Just as early inoculators of smallpox resisted
Jennerian vaccination as a scientific advance, vaccinators feared losing trust in a well known
353
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procedure and (it was implied) their professional niche To some degree, his opponents’ motives
transcended professional interests, as “it was the law of human nature to doubt and negate all that
is unknown ”356Ferrer’s institute was portrayed as just the latest scientific advance to suffer from
defamation due to ignorance and fear. Ferrer dismissed attacks on his own economic interests
and neglected to discuss the public health implications of a reorganized vaccination routine.

As

director of the Institute, his only interest was to rescue the reputation of cowpox from what he
believed was a very public libel.
Public health officials charged with public vaccination, however, could not afford to wax
poetic about human nature when confronted with accusations of imperial maladministration. In
the midst of a devastating Ten Years’ War for independence (1868-1878), a tense political
atmosphere compelled many colonial officials to address public complaints. Inspector of the
Vaccine and member of the Ayuntamiento Dr. Vicente Hernández approached Secretary of the
Academy Antonio Mestre personally in the spring of 1871 to clear up what proved to be the first
wave of resistance to official management of vaccination. Hernández was well aware that
physicians accused him “of working to destroy the beautiful edifice that our greatest men had
built for the vaccine; taking the jobs of public health workers, [and] giving preference to calf
vaccine, without the foundation or sanction of science ”357He admitted that the slow installation
of the Casas (which at time numbered only two) had resulted in few new jobs for physicians and
that public concurrence was still scarce.358
But Hernández vociferously denied accusations that these institutions were trying to
monopolize vaccination. On the contrary, the Inspector believed that the procedure “could and
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should be performed by any medical doctor [and] loudly protested” against rumors that he
suppressed publication of vaccinations outside the Casas de Socorro.359 Hernández passionately
disavowed any discrimination against enner’s method, asserting “has always been completely
convinced of the prophylactic efficacy of enner’s vaccine; but not being of an exclusionary
opinion, believed that calf vaccine has offered and continues to offer services that should not be
underestimated ”360 Although for reasons of supply calf vaccine predominated in these casas,
Hernández assured the Academy that the human variant was not excluded and requested that the
Academy “prove a true disinterest and love of humanity” by remitting some human lymph to
further its propagation.361
Mestre, true to his reputation as impartial arbiter, warmed to the arguments of Dr.
Hernández. Although Mestre clearly preferred the arm-to-arm method, he recognized that the
Inspector was a “zealous functionary who above all wanted to obtain good and abundant
material ”362 He even conceded that cowpox vaccine could offer good results under certain
conditions. A few Academics were even more constructive in their handling of the controversy.
Famed statistician Dr. Ambrosio González Del Valle, together with veteran vaccinators Rafael
Hondares and Tomás Mateo Govantes, drafted a proposal for the service that restored a shadow
of the old Corps infrastructure. The obligations of municipal physicians, local authorities and
regular police towards vaccination were carefully delineated and codified. Public practitioners
were granted space for the exchange of ideas in monthly meetings “endeavoring always to focus
their studies on the preservative pustule and the means for its conservation, so as to make this
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resource inexhaustible ”363 Although reliance on human lymph is implied throughout the text
and directly regulated in some of the statutes, the issue of cowpox vaccine was at least formally
disaggregated from institutional reform in that no specific preventative variety was explicitly
cited as preferable.
However, understanding and compromise between the Academy and official vaccinators
was relatively short-lived. Similar pro-Academy challenges to the colonial administration of
vaccination on the island soon re-surfaced in the medical and popular press. During the
particularly deadly smallpox epidemic in the winter of 1878, the Ayuntamiento of Havana
published an invitation to public vaccination in the Casas de Socorro, all of which were freshly
supplied with lymph from both England and Ferrer’s Institute A few weeks later, an anonymous
article appeared in the Cronica Medica Quirurgica, accusing the ayuntamientos of public health
maladministration during times of crisis. Official solicitation of virus from other corporations,
domestic and foreign, was proof that vaccine stocks were empty in the casas. Failure to maintain
a steady supply of virus had furthermore “forced a great movement of persons to the Royal
Academy in search of vaccination; thanks to which we [Cubans] do not find ourselves
completely deprived of virus ”364 Seven years after the permanent dissolution of the Central
Vaccine Board, the use of cowpox as vaccine material remained intimately interlaced with
concerns about colonial administration of vaccination. Faced with a dire public health situation,
the provincial government had failed to adopt practical measures “in harmony with the precepts
of sanitary science,” such as the creation of isolation houses for the sick, house calls in stricken
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neighborhoods and police intervention in cases of resistance to obligatory vaccination. 365 The
Ayuntamiento had also fallen victim to the ‘whim of fashion’ in their adherence to what many
physicians, domestic and foreign, considered the comparatively ineffective (and even dangerous)
cowpox vaccine.366
The government’s response was swift Inspector of the Vaccine Dr D José Argumosa
would not be as considerate as his predecessor in addressing accusations of administrative
shortcomings. Argumosa blasted the anonymous pamphleteer for trying to diminish the prestige
of the only municipal medical service in Havana. According to the Inspector, the municipality
had procured abundant material for the 14 vaccinators in the Casas, spread ample propaganda to
stir public opinion, quickly opened a new isolation house for the sick and gotten the police
involved in enforcing vaccination. The municipality’s only “crime” was to adhere to the counsel
of the highest public health authorities.367 Doubts raised by the government’s handling of the
crisis and the integrity of available vaccine material had the potential to compromise public
health outreach; already the Inspector noted a flurry of publications for popular remedies “very
discordant with the precepts of sanitation ”368
As for the use of calf vaccine, Argumosa unapologetically announced that although he
believed both vaccines to be effective, he personally preferred the cowpox and sarcastically
lamented that eminent doctors on the island could not reach agreement with the many “foreign
and civilized nations which continue to rely on this method ”369 The Inspector furthermore
considered vaccine from Ferrer’s Institute as good as the foreign supplies and was pleased that
365
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upon official request, “the distinguished Director provided it [vaccine] in abundance and
gratis ”370 While he praised the Academy’s disinterest and zeal, he thought the pamphleteer’s
efforts unnecessarily divisive It was not necessary to degrade the efforts of others “in order to
make [the Academy’s work] shine more brightly ”371 The Academy was just one of many
institutions and private individuals providing vaccine service; physicians tied to such institutions
had an obligation to “mutually help and promote one another to serve the common good ”372
After almost ten years of colonial militarization and ethnic polarization in the midst of
war, the local situation did not offer propitious ground for public criticism of what was now a
mature municipal public health service. The pamphleteer, who eventually revealed himself as
Academic Dr. Eduardo F. Pla, consequently rescinded much of his original critique against state
ineptitude when confronted by the vociferous protests of the Inspector and the loyalist press.
With somewhat exaggerated airs, Pla announced that he was “deeply affected that the Inspector
had wanted to interpret his refutation as an offense against respectable institutions and a censure
of his public works” when this had not been the intention 373 Much to the Inspector’s
satisfaction, the rest of their interchange (and Pla’s critique) would be limited “only to opinions
regarding the use of calf and human vaccination ”374 Amidst the language of high science and a
polite exchange of articles, political critique became subsumed and at least superficially
disaggregated from the controversy over the virtues of cowpox vaccination.

Conclusion
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The cowpox controversy contributes to our understanding of the political, social and
cultural bases of scientific method and belief systems. By the late 1860s, smallpox vaccination
had become an integral part of Cuban medical identity and political ethic. It was the
institutional, moral and cultural bedrock of creole medical professionals in a context of
broadening state responsibility for the public good. Although the arm-to-arm method had been
globally dominant during the first sixty years of smallpox vaccination, there was no inherent
revulsion to cowpox or the use of calves as vaccinifiers (or at the very least, “rejuvenators” of the
human variant), until the introduction of this technique coincided and clashed with the
dismemberment of the old Vaccine Corps.
The ‘dark shadow’ of public dislocation and private interest haunted public
administration of the cowpox for decades. Only in 1894 could the Secretary Luis Montane
publicly state that rumors about calf vaccine’s defects were absolutely unsubstantiated 375
Political dissent against the cowpox and all it symbolized had emerged and flourished under the
guise of scientific controversy. Resistance to calf vaccine may have been tempered and almost
entirely dissolved by the early 1890s, but until independence in 1898 (and even as the Royal
Academy relied on vaccine from two institutes dedicated to the production of calf lymph),
cowpox remained associated with imperial neglect and the dislocation of both public health
workers and their public.
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Chapter Four: Public Responsibility in the Republic of Science

Introduction
On December, 21st 1887, dignitaries, members of the press and a numerous public
converged outside Dr. D Tomás Romay y Chacón’s (1796-1849) birthplace in Havana to unveil a
commemorative marble plaque in honor of this “illustrious and enlightened son of Cuba ”376 The
hour-long ceremony, located on the festively decorated street of Empedrado, included speeches
by the Governor-general, municipal mayor and leading lights of the creole scientific
establishment. As a devastating smallpox epidemic ran its current of fear and mourning
throughout the city, speakers emphasized the august patrician’s contributions to scientific
advancement on the island, the formation of a regional medical press and of course, his “most
important and transcendental contribution to this nation and Humanity,” the propagation and
institutionalization of smallpox vaccination after its introduction to Cuban shores in 1804.377 The
commemoration, granted by the municipality after intense petitioning by leading creole political
agitator Sra. Domitila García de Coronado, was successfully concluded with “upmost order,”
after which attendees were graciously treated to sweets, ices and liqueurs by the owner of the
residence.378
Although the plaque submerged Romay’s legacy within the general triumphs of Spanish
preventive medicine (see figure 11), the significance of the event for the reaffirmation of a
‘Cuban’ identity was not lost upon the press Editors of all political stripes struggled to include
the full text of participant speeches as both “the distinguished lady” García de Coronado and the
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Ayuntamiento were lauded for their patriotic recognition of this eminent Cuban.379 One
newspaper, El Cubano, ventured to call the ceremony an “act of justice for a people that should
conserve, and revere, the memory of its illustrious sons ”380 Even the fiercely conservative
Diario de la Marina, which viewed any affirmation of Cuban regional pride warily, published an
emotive article in which students of Romay, “who had so recently shared precious moments with
this noble and enlightened figure,” could also softly opine that a narrow marble plaque served as
insufficient commemoration for a patriarch of Cuban people.381
Remembering Romay was a potentially incendiary political act. By the late nineteenthcentury, the legacy of smallpox vaccination had become deeply associated not only with the
cultural legacy of creole medical professionalism but with the assertion of a more mature Cuban
identity in a tense political atmosphere. Most historiographical discussion of identity and public
health in the colonial periphery is based upon the concept of a resistant ‘other,’ subjects who
formed identities in communal negation of intrusive colonial policies, particularly smallpox
vaccination.382 The implementation of public health in colonial Cuba, however, was complex,
layered and offered positive opportunities for identity formation based on cooperative action.
Many creole physicians imagined very specific roles for themselves in creating the ideal
conditions for regional (and national) uplift and the nurturing of a distinctly “Cuban” culture
When the imperial state failed to provide platforms for concerted action in the realm of public
health, creoles had recourse to a rather selective medical history, with early nineteenth-century
triumphs of smallpox vaccination under creole auspices playing a vital role in legitimating
resistence to colonial legacies they had helped create.
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Rebellious Medicine
The commemoration of Romay’s birthplace, spearheaded by a leading creole patriot,
came at a difficult time in creole-peninsular relations. Public acts of regional self-assertion or
protest against the status quo could be interpreted as seditious in the tense political atmosphere of
late nineteenth-century Cuba. Recent political developments had somewhat diffused the
potential for violence. The treaty of the Pact of Zanjón (1878), which set the terms for peace
after the first war of independence, had been predicated upon the extension of liberal reforms in
the economic and political spheres. Limited and often passed piecemeal by “special laws,” the
application of basic Spanish constitutional rights concerning abolition as well as freedom of
expression in print and assembly had a dramatic effect on public life during the last twenty years
of Spanish colonial rule. Civil society blossomed.383 Ironically, public expressions of ethnic
pride such as Domitila’s were made possible years after ethnic divisions had been aggravated by
repression and violent conflict. But the blatant assertion of creole identity remained
controversial for many Spanish colonial officials, especially when it was associated with
reformist creole professionals with their own press outlets and institutional centers of
organization.
Scientific and medical associationalism had always held a relatively privileged place in
nineteenth century colonial Cuba. As early as the 1840s, prior to the reforms which would
transform associational life amongst creoles on the island, physicians such as Nicolas Gutierrez
and Julio Jacinto Le-Riverend circulated several short-lived, scientific periodicals in the name of
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“science” and “public health ”384 Many creole physicians worked as public servants for colonial
sanitary institutions. Partly as a consequence of their ostensibly apolitical motives and
insinuation into the public realm, the foundation of institutions dedicated to science and/or public
health were permitted even prior to their foundation on the peninsula Luis Ferrer’s Animal
Vaccine Institute (1868) and Juan Santo Fernández’ Bacteriological Laboratory for the
Production of Rabies Vaccine (1887), for example, each preceded similar establishments on the
peninsula by a few years.385 Cuban scientists often collaborated closely with scientific pioneers
on the peninsula and looked to the same for institutional precedents. Yet medical dynamism on
the island was such that Cuban scientific entrepreneurs were not merely working with derivatives
of peninsular ideas and institutions, but harnessing the latest scientific currents in Western
Europe and North America.
Despite the association of creole medical professionals with subversion and independence
by intransigent militarists and Spanish colonial supporters, most professionals of the middle and
upper-middle classes were non-violent reformists.386 They favored autonomy for the island
within a Spanish framework, including the devolution of some legislative power to the island, the
extension of basic civil rights, and freedom of trade in what was essentially a liberal political
economy. Contrary to many traditional narratives, autonomists were not however, antinationalist. While political process was emphasized over violence and formal independence,
their writings indicate a keen awareness of a peculiarly “Cuban” identity and regional “patria” in
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need of preservation and rejuvenation.387 Considering their constituency, it is not surprising that
perceived obstacles to the fulfillment of their goals were situated in more than just political
process, but also in the epidemiological realm of disease.

Imperial Legacies
In 1887-88, Havana was in the midst of yet another deadly smallpox epidemic which
ultimately took over two thousand, two hundred lives and veiled the city in mourning,
constituting one of the capital’s major killers for those years and precipitously raising mortality
rates.388 Smallpox had ravaged the city in 1871 and 1878, with smaller outbreaks throughout the
early 1880s, but this epidemic was the most severe of recent decades.389 Although more efficient
vaccination initiatives would provide some level of respite for Havana’s inhabitants during the
next five years, the threat of smallpox sowed fear and anger amongst many in both the medical
and lay community.
The Spanish imperial state bore an unprecedented amount of responsibility for continuing
smallpox epidemics in the late nineteenth century medical press. As discussed in chapter 3, the
destruction of the centralized, island-wide vaccination institute in 1871 led many in the creoledominated medical press to lose faith in the government’s ‘paternal zeal’ for public health and
rail against unfulfilled obligations to address “such easily preventable diseases as smallpox ”390
Even the establishment of a provincial vaccination depot in 1879 under the auspices of Dr. Luis
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María Cowley, a physician from a veritable dynasty of creole vaccinators, “did not reflect the
great importance of vaccination and revaccination,” either in the number of vaccinated or the
districts served within Havana province.391 Apathy and governmental abandon (particularly at
the municipal level) led to weak vaccination drives, a dearth of hospitals and isolation wards for
the sick, and the repeated importation of disease via carelessly supervised Spanish maritime
commerce.392
Profilaxis against smallpox was not the only preventive public heath measure considered
to be in a state of abandonment. In the early 1890s, Havana was the largest city of the
Caribbean, bustling with over 200,000 inhabitants (not counting the fluid migrant population,
which numbered in the tens of thousands). 393 A busy commercial center at the crossroads of
traffic in the Atlantic world, Havana physicians and laypersons alike were keenly aware of the
hygienic conditions that prejudiced their island in the eyes of outsiders. According to one
member of the Academy, Havana would have nothing to envy other great cities of the world if
not for the myriad foci of disease that conspired against the public health, easily found:
“in streets converted into sewers and inundated with contaminated water during the night,
through which one must be pass quickly with nose and mouth covered so as to not breathe in the
impure air... in sewers of poor construction, whose mouths teem with the lethal effluvia of
several generations worth of vegetal and animal matter .. in a beautiful bay whose bottom serves
as a receptacle for slaughterhouse refuse that gives life and sustenance to innumerable insects of
all kinds… and throughout public markets where putrid and old fish is often sold under a veil of
ice and meat [if not putrified] often comes from raquitic and/or diseased animals ”394
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Indeed, Havana’s epidemiological portrait left much to be desired Tuberculosis,
dysentery, enteritis and meningitis persistently stalked the population, particularly in the poorer
districts on the outskirts of Havana’s colonial fortifications 395 Severe epidemics of cholera
(1833, 1850, 1867) and smallpox (1871, 1878, 1886) continued gripping the capital in waves,
augmenting mortality rates and striking panic amongst local authorities as disease decimated
whole communities.396 Yellow fever, an endemic disease which granted most locals permanent
immunity after a relatively mild childhood infection, stirred deep fear amongst recent European
and North American arrivals every summer and autumn. According to many contemporaries, the
colonial capital was one of the world’s most insalubrious places, a foci of disease for the Atlantic
world.397
Havana’s dire mortality statistics often supported these assertions Prominent academic
Dr. Vicente de la Guardia calculated that between 1883-1893 the capital had a general mortality
rate of 34 per thousand, a rate only better than that of Madrid and Lisbon amongst the major
cities of Europe and North America.398 In 1893, when many infectious diseases in the “civilized”
world were being checked by the sanitary prescriptions of a new hygienic science, statisticians
could assert with some confidence that at least in the capital, preventable infectious diseases such
as “smallpox, tuberculosis, diphtheria, malaria and many, many others” accounted for a
whopping 24% of all deaths.399 De la Guardia concluded that the application of “the most
precious laws of Hygiene,” could rescue over a third of these lives from certain death and make
Havana one of the most salubrious places in the world! Although by the late 1880s and early
395
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1890s, a few of the most frightening epidemic diseases (smallpox included) waned in strength as
a proportion of all deaths, their constant presence created an atmosphere of fear and anger
amongst many medical commentators in Cuba and abroad.400
Considering that the Spanish imperial state was in a position of marked international
decline by the mid-nineteenth century, the colonial administration was unlikely to resolve the
problem. Unlike Great Britain, de la Guardia continued, “which pours millions upon millions of
pounds” into the enforcement of local sanitation laws when mortality rates rise above 21 per
thousand for two consecutive years, a “disgraceful abandonment” of hygienic laws predominated
amongst the authorities of the Spanish state. 401 Municipal governments, to which responsibility
for public health had devolved by royal order in August of 1871, received particularly acrid
denunciations of public misadministration, noncompliance with basic obligations and penury in
the provision of sanitary services by commentators such as de la Guardia and a burgeoning press.
As one reporter desperately lamented in the periodical La Hygiene, “smallpox, malaria, rabies,
typhoid, tuberculosis, and we haven’t even a carriage with which to [aid the] service of
municipal physicians!”402
Particularly in times of epidemic, similar indictments against administrative neglect in the
realm of public health could be found in the burgeoning medical press of late nineteenth century
Spain and indeed, throughout most of the Western world.403 What made creole criticism of
Spanish mismanagement particularly fraught with tension was its situation within a colonial
environment laced with disappointment for reform, in which political and cultural alternatives to
400
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imperial rule were ripening into full fledged projects for independence. Although concessions
after the Treaty of Zanjón in 1878 included electoral reforms and even the formation of a
rudimentary party system, voting requirements and a carefully manipulated electoral system
precluded popular inclusion in government.404 The Autonomist Party, limited artificially to
constitute an extreme minority in the Spanish Cortes, was little more than a propaganda
mouthpiece with little ability to influence decision-making for either substantive political reform
or the transformation of an economic infrastructure prejudicial to domestic interests.
The neglect and penury of municipal Ayuntamientos, who were to supposed to represent
local interests and conserve public health, embodied for many the contradiction of piece-meal
reform and became inviting (and politically safe) targets for censure. In turn, the elite strata of
late nineteenth century civil society was represented by newly minted and largely creole medical
and scientific associations such as the Royal Academy (1861), the Anthropological Society
(1877), the Society for Medical Mutual Funds (1878), the Society for Clinical Studies (1879) and
the Havana Society for Hygiene (1891). These associations considered themselves obliged to
inform and lobby the government for application of the scientific precepts of hygiene, a
superficially neutral field for all political persuasions that benefitted the “public good ”405
Yet their voices often multiplied to little or no effect. The medical press assailed the
discourtesy of municipal governments that ignored sanitary prescriptions of scientific
associations and thus “threatened the lives of an entire people ”406 In the spring and summer of
1892, for example, fear that a cholera epidemic would cross the Atlantic to augment already
harsh epidemiological conditions during the hot and humid summer heightened tensions. In
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April, threatened by a public works project that included the extensive turn-over of soils for the
installation of water works, one critic writing for La Abeja Medica called for the resignation of
local council members “who did not know or could not fulfill that which in all civilized countries
is the popular investiture ”407 A few months later, another article in La Higiene declared that
“the health of the people is supreme law” and that sanitary neglect had justly “exposed [the
Ayuntamiento] to the harsh punishment of upright public opinion, which deserves respect and
attention in any cultured society ”408 In tandem, an observer in La Abeja Medica again lamented
that Cubans could take any pride in making “our sad history and civic-mindedness known, if we
are forever permitting all that makes us small and places us at the level of an oppressed and
raquitic people ”409 The close association between popular rights and sound public health policy
was expressed amongst advocates of the labor movement as well.410
Of course, as during the first half of the nineteenth century, individuals were condemned
for their failure to adhere to the tenets of private hygiene. As prominent Academic statistician
Dr Vicente de la Guardia himself testified, “our dominant character trait in all that refers to
hygiene is apathy and (sometimes) ignorance in both peninsular and creole ”411 The visibility of
the poor and racially discriminated made them particularly easy targets for condemnation
amongst the medical elite The colony’s wars of independence, the abolition of slavery and
periodic depression exacerbated economic conditions for the urban lower classes. From the
1870s onwards, migrants driven from the countryside into the capital and other cities across the
island in search of work inflated the number of urban poor. Charities, mutual aid and labor
organizations provided limited relief. Contemporaries in the press and public forums of the
407
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capital in turn voiced serious concerns about increased vagrancy, unemployment, prostitution
and crime, all of which were intimately linked with the problem of maintaining the standards of
private hygiene necessary to ward off disease.412
Poverty remained deeply associated with individual moral bankruptcy,
underdevelopment, racial degeneracy and disease.413 The upper classes could not afford to
ignore working class “neglect [of private hygiene] and slovenliness…since epidemics spread
from the most humble slum to the houses of prestige and power ”414 According to one author, at
the root of the problem were “uncultured blacks and mestizos and selfish asiatics, which have
been difficult to civilize and have greatly influenced the mass of our population,” fostering
scandalously unhygienic standards amongst the working class.415 Even representatives of a
growing late nineteenth-century organized labor movement campaigned for educational
initiatives in private hygiene Leaders in the Workers’ Congress of 1892 signaled an interest in
remedying the “lack of good hygienic habits and culture” on the part of many in the city’s
population, which together with bad living conditions and deficient administrative activism made
public health an urgent problem in Havana’s working class suburbs 416
However, unlike early nineteenth century medical commentary which centered very
much on private hygiene and individual responsibility for disease, the state bore a great deal of
condemnation for the dire sanitary plight of the poor and working classes in the medical press.
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Sympathetic physicians and political commentators noted that public health neglect in working
class neighborhoods of Pueblo Nuevo, Ceiba, esus Maria Sitios, and Arsenal, “leaves our
workers, our poorest classes, subject to the harsh law of necessity, which makes [them] inhabit
those places where anemia and tuberculosis are [their] only patrimony ”417 When a poor
individual “has the misfortune of taking ill, [he/she] is irrevocably condemned to die for lack of
funding” since most municipalities could provide home medical care and pharmaceutical
services but no isolation from contagious diseases or hospitals for more intensive treatment.418
Scathing critique of poor housing construction, water provision, vaccination outreach and even
ill timed public works projects put workers and all the city’s inhabitants “in imminent danger due
to the mismanagement and disregard [for the public good] on the part of our ill-dedicated
administration, which sees anything in reference to the public health with indifference and
disdain ”419

Sanitizing the Cuban Identity
Such insalubrity not only served as an example of stunted political reform and a neglect
of popular wellbeing, but also put into question Cubans’ ability to thrive as a society and govern
themselves. Environmental determinism, the idea that environmental factors such as climate
determine the health and degree of social, cultural and economic development in human
populations, can be traced back to the Hippocratic corpus of classical Greece.420 One of its basic
postulates, that excessive heat and humidity cause deviation from an ideal human form, became
firmly embedded in the western imagination with sixteenth and seventeenth century European
417
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exploration and colonization of the Western Hemisphere. As intercontinental disease exchange
accelerated, African and New World port cities in particular became known for their terrifying
and frequent epidemics.421 By the mid-nineteenth century, smallpox, malaria, and plague,
diseases well known on the European continent, combined with the novelty and terror of yellow
fever to produce an understanding of warm climates as insalubrious and decadent places.
Nature’s very abundance in tropical climates seemed to sow disease and degeneracy in human
beings, damaging man’s health, sense of industry and even his culture
It also endangered a carefully constructed, white “Cuban” racial identity Variants of
environmental determinism condemning tropical human populations to an “entirely uncivilized,
savage” existence eventually served to buttress the very popular nineteenth century idea that
tropical climates foster an inherent and scientifically measurable racial degeneracy, sown during
many generations of tropical existence. Prior to the nineteenth century and the elaboration of the
concept of biological “race”, few European naturalists had attempted to construct scientifically
organized racial hierarchies.422 However, the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species
(1859) and the evolutionary perspective this work introduced to the wider European public
during a period of imperial expansion gave new scientific validation to the philosophy of a
natural human hierarchy as formed by environmental determinants.423 British social evolutionist
Herbert Spencer, French anthropologists Armand de Quatrefages, Paul Broca, and Louis Agassiz
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and American polygenists Josiah Nott and Samuel Morton vociferously argued for the natural
inferiority of Africans and mixed-race peoples. Born and bred in the tropics for generations, the
darkened skins of tropical peoples (Africans in particular) were considered a product of their
environment; a divergence from an idealized European standard which had more than aesthetic
implications. The climate not only darkened their skin, the evolutionary trajectory had rendered
them “an undeveloped race, [which like] an undeveloped child” retained primitive anatomical
and mental faculties.424 Under the tenets of scientific racism, the tropics thus became a
fundamentally black natural setting, with degeneracy woven into the very biological fabric of its
condemned races.
From the early nineteenth century, Cuba’s international reputation as a raciallydegenerate torrid zone moved an increasingly self-conscious reformist elite to propel “the
progress of agriculture, the perfection of the arts, in a word, Cuban prosperity in all its forms”
through white immigration. By the last decades of the nineteenth century the programs had
made a significant demographic impact From 1841 to 1862, “whitening” settlement projects
and spontaneous European immigration tipped the population’s balance in favor of a white
majority.425 During the next three decades, more than 500,000 more immigrants, most from the
economically devastated Canary Islands, would land on Cuban shores.426 While many would
return to their homelands, thousands swelled the ranks of the working and commercial classes of
the cities and a significant percentage would work as laborers and/or small agriculturalists in the
countryside.
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Figure 10: Racial demographic trends as recorded in Spanish official censuses.427

Even as ethnic strife between creoles and the Spanish-born accelerated and multiplied the
myriad divisions of late nineteenth century Cuban society, creole reformers maintained a
generally positive attitude towards the whitening project The belief that African “barbarism”
was an impediment to the fulfillment of regional (or national) pride and civic-mindedness led
most white creole reformers to reject those of African descent as Cuban.428 Pioneers of the creole
reform movement such as Felix Varela and José Antonio Saco had helped construct a Cuban
identity as against the sugar economy, the African slave labor used to maintain it, and those
elements in the Spanish colonial system that saw benefit in balancing the black and white
populations to sow fear of social revolution “Cubanness” was embodied by the white small
agriculturalist, which after generations on the soil not only imbibed the distinct culture and
427
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customs of criollo culture but also grew an array of products for a diversified domestic
market.429 By the last decades of the nineteenth century, alternative formulations of Cuban
identity were being forged and propagated in both Cuba and amongst the exile communities in
North America and Europe (sometimes in stark opposition to the overtly racial boundaries of this
“imagined community”) 430 Yet the majority of elite reformers held onto this mid-nineteenth
century ideal and advocated for white immigration to make it a reality.
As a result, prominent Academics used complex statistical analysis to defy the “terrible
propaganda” that located the climate of Cuba amongst the most inclement for Europeans,
considering it “fit only for inferior races dedicated to exploiting the land for the exclusive benefit
of a small number of entrepreneurs ”431 Carlos J. Finlay, who would later become famous for his
experiments linking the Aedes mosquito to yellow fever, was one of the several late nineteenth
century statisticians who criticized the generally dismal portrayal of Cuban epidemiology as a
problem of faulty calculation. According to Finlay, mortality rates should be racially
discriminate and eliminate the impact of “exceptional” causes of mortality, “such as cholera
epidemics, which are not of this climate, smallpox, which is the result of neglect on the part of
some in obtaining the preservative and yellow fever, which does not attack [the indigenous] part
of the population ”432 Properly calculated, the white indigenous and acclimated population
offered mortality rates, “which can be favorably compared to the great cities of Europe” and
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demonstrated a marked superiority over those of African or Asian descent.433 Although it was
“absolutely irrefutable” that the environment constituted a real danger for the immigrant in his
first year of residence, subsequent acclimatization brought real benefits in terms of public
health.434
For creole reformers looking to racially sanitize the Cuban body politic, there was
nothing more unjust than to blame the capital’s insalubrity on its climate when it was due, “in
large part, to our bad customs, our backwardness and neglect” of public and private hygiene 435 It
was instead the entire Spanish colonial ethos which should be associated with a “backward”
cultural heritage, unfit for nation-building. Even as intellectuals inverted the extant racial logic
of tropical colonization and reported with relief the decline of “inferior races” in relation to those
of European descent, human activity and socio-economic and political circumstances remained
important agents of disease causation. Academic statistician Marcos J. Melero pointed out in his
own statistical analysis of racial demography, “those that intimately know our society understand
that it was not the climate which caused [the relatively high mortality rates of the afro-Cuban
population], but the horrid system of life and work to which men brought from Africa were
submitted to on our agricultural enterprises ”436 For many reformers, Spanish colonial rule was
inextricably linked to African slavery, devaluation of white colonization, and administrative
neglect of the public good. Such legacies fostered international infamy and endangered carefully
constructed regional (and proto-national) identities based upon exclusive notions of race. It also
distanced the imperial state from what an internal elite deemed its “civilizing” mission
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In 1893, in the wake of florid celebrations commemorating the 400 year anniversary of
Columbian contact, Dr. D Diego Tamayo reiterated rather common beliefs amongst the reformist
and nationalist creole medical elite in his sociological study of “The Causes of Mortality in
Havana ”437 According to Tamayo, the Spanish cultural heritage (and even resident
peninsulares) helped create a climate unpropitious for general sanitary reform, the construction
of large public works, or even community-building. Forged upon the short-term gains of war
and conquest and marked by literary intellectual traditions inclined towards the marvelous
“imaginary,” the Spanish mindset could not justify long-term planning for the public good or
assimilate the “simple, prosaic language” of the technical sciences 438 Past and present émigrés
from Spain viewed the island of Cuba through a colonial lens, arriving on Cuban shores “not to
construct a new, more prosperous home,” but for private interest and with an eye towards
returning to the mother country.439 Lacking a sense of stability and possession of their adopted
land, inheritors of a conquest mentality could not see the population as a social “organism”
which must “keep vigil over the air we breathe, the ground we walk on, the houses we inhabit,
finally, anything that can perturb physiological function and make life difficult and disagreeable
for the community ”440
Since Cuban identity was conceived by many reformers as derivative of Spanish
ancestry, critics of poor public and private hygiene tended to blur the line between direct
condemnation of Spaniards (and/or Spanish colonialism) and island society as a whole.
Complaints about generalized Cuban neglect were many and medical gadflies seeking to place
the blame for Cuban insalubrity on Spanish colonialism had to be careful about the severity of
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their remarks in the face of censorship and political repression. However, the associational
constructs between colonialism and “underdevelopment” in the intellectual and practical realm
were there for separatists (including some medical professionals) to grasp. For these, the
Spanish legacy was more than just an administrative disaster in the realm of public health. As
the oft-reproduced quote by famed mixed-race intellectual and political agitator Juan Gualberto
Gomez declares,441
“There is nothing Spanish about our scientific, literary and philosophical progress Spain has
always neglected this capital point of colonization. Consequently, our men of literature and
science have had to petition foreign lands for foundational knowledge and inspirational sources.
We cannot [suffer] a metropolitan politic distinct from our understanding of American
principles, so that old European custom may govern us ”

Remembering Romay
In this context, the commemoration of Romay’s birthplace in late 1887 was of great
cultural and political significance. From the late 1860s until the 1880s, nowhere was colonial
neglect more evident than with smallpox vaccination Framed as a “sacred obligation” in the
early nineteenth century, devolution of authority to the municipalities and the absence of a
centralized vaccine institute dedicated solely to smallpox vaccination left the service “if not
wholly ignored, then almost completely unattended ”442 Moreover, the event came in the midst
of one of the most devastating epidemics of the past quarter-century. Imported due to lax
regulation of incoming ships from French and Spanish Transatlantic Lines, the epidemic of
1887-1888 took over 2,000 lives in the capital and thousands more island-wide.443 It inspired the
creation of new legislation reaffirming obligatory vaccination, the tightening of regulatory
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statutes regarding quarantine and disinfection, and the expansion of a provincial institute
dedicated solely to the production and service of smallpox vaccine (see below).
Public commemorations and the writing (or re-invention) of the history of vaccination
under the auspices of this creole patriarch were thus a cultural and political affirmation of rights
and equality. If Romay represented the epitome of personal sacrifice in the name of the
profession and public health, he also exemplified the perfect union of creole interests and state
power.

Figure 11: A graphic of the commemorative plaque placed in Romay’s birthplace by order
of the Royal Ayuntamiento in the winter of 1887. It is no irony that Romay’s commemoration
vaunts the “honor and prestige of Spanish medicine!” While the details of the Ayuntamiento’s
contentious debates concerning passage of this proposed homage are unavailable, the emphasis
on Romay’s contributions to Spanish medicine can be interpreted as a slight by intransigent
colonialists, a re-affirmation of creole contributions to Spanish history, or both.
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As Domitila’s petition to the Ayuntamiento testifies, Romay wasn’t merely a promoter of
vaccination or even a model of creole professional medical ethic. Vaccination was tied to his
many other civic and social activities for consolidation of creole power and the cultivation of
elite Cuban culture. He was a prominent member of the Sociedad Económica, a creole bastion of
science and culture, and under its auspices became an educational and public health reformer
who pursued the pedagogical application of “scientific” medicine in the University and
hospital.444 Romay also made a name for himself in defense of Cuba’s reputation against
climactic and racial determinism. His famous studies on (and experiments with) the cure and
prevention of yellow fever, his persistent emphasis on the application of hygienic standards for
incoming European immigrants and his membership on the White Immigration Board could be
interpreted by later generations as an early example of elite creole patriotism and allegiance to a
racially-exclusive Cuban identity.445 His name, along with those of reformist Spanish
contemporaries such as the Bishop Diaz de Espada y Landa, would always be pronounced with
“heart-felt gratitude amongst cultivated creoles,” because both zealously guided creole society
towards “dignified and great cultural accomplishment ”446
Romay’s greatest and most uncontroversial achievement (at least from a political
standpoint), was of course the introduction and propagation of vaccine, one “amongst many
other blessings which not only Havana, but all America and Humanity owe him ”447 As
discussed previously, smallpox was an Old World disease infamous for its destruction of a
“virgin America,” so much so that vaccination was portrayed as a sacred act of colonial
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redemption.448 Until the 1820s, the colonial state ideologies of productivity and public
obligation dovetailed with elite creole professional ambitions to reach a nearly perfect symbiosis
in the name of vaccination for the “public good” and energetic individuals like Romay could
play prominent roles in reshaping public health structures both within the colony and across the
Atlantic world. The history of the vaccine, it was said in homage to this seminal figure in early
smallpox vaccination efforts, “was a history of Romay ”449
Indeed, the many mid-to-late nineteenth century histories, medical memoirs and
panegyrics that include Romay and his achievements created and perpetuated the vaunted creole
physician’s legacy as a cultural icon 450 Romay was celebrated as a “brilliant star” dedicated to
humanity and science “who [together with the Spanish king Carlos IV, leader of the Royal
Expedition Dr Xavier Balmis and the Patriotic Society] gave health, life and glory to Cuba ”451
The Royal Academy, which had not officially sanctioned the publication of medical history in
the Anales until June of 1871, included a number of histories of the vaccine prior to this date.452
In these and other publications, Romay often eclipsed Balmis and even Jenner himself as a
scientific spirit embued with excitement of discovery and fervor for the vaccine’s propagation
The sacred mingled with the secular in some of depictions, as Romay’s widely lauded qualities
448
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of superior patience, fortitude, self-sacrifice, wisdom and oratory skills included portrayals of his
life as a series of trials,
“suffered by a spirit deserving of a hero of antiquity, testing the elevated temple of his soul, and
to the fiery glimmer of immortal genius that illuminates his apotheosis, are joined the soft glow
of the aureola of the just which rest in peace ”453

Histories of both Romay and the smallpox vaccine could be used for more than creole
cultural assertion in times of political and economic displacement; they also became spaces for
competing versions of anti-colonial politic. While most authors blamed persistent smallpox
epidemics throughout the nineteenth century on ‘bad’ administration implicitly connected to a
negligent imperial government, others were more critical of internal factors. Antonio García
Coronado, for example, true to his more conservative reformist tradition, blamed the dislocation
of the independence wars for the resurgence of smallpox. Observing the relatively high incidence
and mortality rates from smallpox from 1870 to 1879 as compared with later years, Coronado
noted that when war disappeared the country “entered into an era of prosperity in all spheres ”454
Echoing the reformist repulsion to destruction and violence as mediums for change, Coronado
praised the “blessed shadow of peace [through which] agriculture flourishes, industry develops,
commerce prospers and the arts and sciences progress ”455 All these had an effect on hygiene,
“that most important branch of medicine, which has not other mission than to care for the public
health ”456 Coronado’s emphasis on the negative effects of war, vulnerable island topography,
and his balanced and comprehensive criticism of public health administration made his history
exceptional as a statement in favor of political moderation in a time of war and ethnic
polarization.
453
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Tropical Redemption and the “Republic of Science”
The selective use [and abuse] of creole patrician Tomás Romay’s historical and cultural
legacy became an important source of legitimation for those licensed practitioners who used their
professional platforms to both address perceived vacuums in late nineteenth century public
health and participate in the flourishing civic life of Cuba in the post-Zanjón era. The great
question was whether or not to get involved in the colonial government’s administrative
apparatus. This was especially true with regards to smallpox vaccination, a symbol of progress,
civilization and creole cultural achievement. While some used the name of Romay for cultural
affirmation in an autonomous sphere of action from colonial authorities, others considered their
duty to revive his legacy of public collaboration with the state in the name of public good.
A few physicians followed in the footsteps of Vicente Ferrer, founding private,
autonomous institutes for smallpox vaccination in the name of public health. After his death in
1883, his Institute for Animal Vaccine was taken over by Doctors Antonio Albertini and Enrique
Porto until 1892, when his son Luis Ferrer became director.457 Albertini and Porto subsequently
created their own animal vaccine production center in the capital that same year. Their center,
which procured and renovated vaccine periodically with material sent from Dr. Ernest
Chambon’s Animal Vaccine Institute in Paris, became the government’s sole provisioner 458 A
third vaccine center appeared in the capital in 1890 with Dr. Domingo Cabrera at its head.
According to one historian, all three centers were said to be “perfectly hygienic and well
maintained ”459 Although they charged for their products and services, they “freely donated
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whatever vaccine was necessary” to the Municipality and the Royal Academy, thus performing
“an important public health service to the state and deserving of society’s gratitude ”460
Ferrer, of course, had a complicated relationship with Romay’s legacy His introduction
of cowpox vaccine to the colony in 1868 became the epicenter of a sometimes vicious intraprofessional conflict regarding the new technique’s merits and its relationship to the privatization
of public health. The cowpox was converted into a symbol of professional greed and contrasted
explicitly to the “sacred material bequeathed by [Spanish expeditionary physician Xavier]
Balmis and [Tomás] Romay,” conserved faithfully by the Royal Academy via the arm-to-arm
method.461 Scarred by conflict and recognizing the close association between creole patriotism
and Romay’s medical achievements, Ferrer veered away from using the creole patrician as a
symbol of his own innovation in his propaganda pamphlets for the cowpox. He instead
compared himself either to discoverer of the vaccine Edward Jenner or to fellow Spaniard Xavier
Balmis, since “it is writ that only the Spaniard consistently sows good in America ”462 Only with
widespread adoption of the technique were the negative cultural, economic and social stigmas
associated with the cowpox superceded and even claimed for Romay’s legacy 463 In any case,
the creole patrician figured very little in the early origin stories of those who promoted these
vaccine centers, and the conflict surrounding the cowpox might have even prompted these
institutions to maintain their autonomy even as they provided free material for the government
and other vaccine associations.
The creole-dominated Economic Society, through which Romay had coordinated the old
Vaccine Board’s activities for the first thirty years of the service, inaugurated a small-scale,
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public vaccination service under the auspicious title “Centro Romay,” in 1880 464 However, the
Royal Academy’s Sub-commission of the Vaccine, very self-conscious of their “sacred duty” to
“maintain the flame” bequeathed by eminent creole medical predecessors, can be considered the
immediate cultural and institutional inheritor of Romay’s old Vaccine Board after the service
was decentralized from 1868 to 1871. As a semi-autonomous institution with an obligation to
consult the government in matters of legal medicine and hygiene, the Royal Academy more
easily approached the state. Certainly, this institution often exhibited a marked enthusiasm for
engaging the public realm, particularly as gadfly, ready to “make manifest the great gaps in the
public administration of hygiene ”465 Even before decentralization, Academics exposed
scientific inconsistencies in the laws regulating the application and confirmation of good vaccine
and criticized statutes limiting the practice of vaccination to a select few individuals.466 Soon
after the municipalities took over the service, public criticism of the state dovetailed with calls
for obligatory vaccination, effective quarantine, reform of existing municipal regulations and
requests for the creation of a remunerated and centralized institute dedicated exclusively to
smallpox vaccination. The Academy also took an active role in drafting regulatory statutes and
reform proposals for public vaccination initiatives. 467
Yet in the fulfillment of its “most sacred obligation,” that of smallpox vaccination, the
Academy remained wary of getting entangled in the administrative apparatus of public health
service, effectively losing its autonomy to become just another arm of colonial government. In
September of 1881, prompted by Academic insistence on making smallpox vaccination
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obligatory, the government offered the Vaccine Sub-commission an opportunity to claim a
leadership position in the creation of a new smallpox Vaccine Center, following precedent on the
peninsula.468 The Sub-commission would be charged with the preservation and distribution of
vaccine lymph, oversight of the scientific and practical administration of vaccination throughout
the island and inspection of all vaccination centers, public or private.469 Dr. V. B. Torralbas
eagerly presented the proposed regulatory framework (drafted by the sub-commission), stating
that taking on such a responsibility would “put our Academy in possession of something useful
that would elevate its prestige ”470
Not everyone agreed. Concerns about what work obligations the Academy should and
would be able to shoulder in a central vaccine center dominated the discussion during September
and October of that year. Most academics seemed leery of taking on such a heavy administrative
duties. Subcommittee Director Govantes chose to interpret the statutes liberally, considering
participation of the subcommittee members voluntary and their fulfillment of all statutory
obligations optional.471 But as Torralbas had stipulated and Finlay had warned, the intention of
government was to create a “scientific core” that does not merely consult with the government
on scientific matters concerning the vaccine but “intervenes and inspects those individuals
charged with vaccination ”472 Once Academics understood the requisites for adopting the
proposal, enthusiasm withered. While the Academy voted in favor of the Sub-commission

468

Pruna, Real Academia, 353. For the presentation and discussion of the proposal, see “Centro general de vacuna”
and its corresponding “Discusión” in Anales de la Real Academia 18 (June 1881): 180, 214-217. The Reglamento of
September 14th, 1876 places all vaccination centers, private or official, under the direction of the Academy of
Medicine in Madrid, which constitutes the central board of directors.
469
Pruna, Real Academia, 353.
470
“Discusión,” 215
471
Ibid., 216-217.
472
Ibid., 216.

158

taking on the mantle of the Central Vaccine Corps, they resoundingly negated performing
inspection of vaccine centers across the island, effectively nullifying the vote.473
Surely, practical considerations served as a strong check upon the desire for many
Academics to adopt a great and symbolic responsibility; concerns about the amount of work, the
cost of material and dearth of personnel pervaded the discussions. But the desire to maintain
autonomous “republic of science,” built up so carefully throughout 15 years, was also a powerful
motivation for rejecting such initiatives. The Academy saw itself as an elevated bastion of
scientific exchange and collaboration, constantly on the defensive against “uncontrolled
passions” and aggression by those who “whether to injure some person or satisfy an most unjust
rancor against this land, sought to rip [Cuba’s] most precious cultural icon from its breast ”474
The institution would have disappeared “amongst the ashes of such a disturbed society” if not for
its “superior spirit and exquisite tact, with which it maintained itself in the high, serene realms of
science ”475 The late nineteenth century “Republic of Science,” as articulated by Antonio
Mestre, distanced itself very consciously from political intrigue in the public realm to remain
afloat.
By no means did Academics (or at least their most engaged spokesmen) consider their
diminished and indirect political role insignificant in social terms. The Academy held itself up
as an exemplar of “disinterested” professionalism, research and culture in a profoundly
materialistic society. Their work had implications for individual professionals participating in
the “medical priesthood” and sowing sacrifice, humanitarianism and civilization in their path

473

“Discusión del reglamento para el cuerpo de vacunadores,” Anales de la Real Academia 18 (June 1881): 277279.
474
Juan Santos Fernández, “Vidas comparadas de algunos académicos,” Anales de la Real Academia 45 (June
1908): 9-10.
475
os I Torralbas, “Discurso del Sr Vicepresidente,” Anales de la Real Academia 38 (1902): 5. For discussion of
the dimensions of this “Republic,” see Pruna’s, “National Science,” 412-426.

159

This is not to say that some Academics did not bemoan their purely consultative position. As
President Nicolas Gutierrez voiced in May of 1869, the lack of a systematic civil registry, regular
sanitary police, and forensic medical services created “tremendous obstacles for the fulfillment
of [basic] obligations ”476 But because the Corporation “was deprived of initiative” it could only
“deplore the deficiency of organization in these spheres” and took advantage of its consultative
time with public authorities to do just that.477
Political society, as a reflection of the public health, also depended greatly upon the
overworked institution One of the Academy’s core obligations was to “enlighten with science
both the Government and Nation” through statistical inquiry, regulatory oversight and scientific
debate.478 The vast knowledge accumulated laid the basis for preventing needless loss of life,
facilitating public instruction, fomenting the white population and thus acting as an “advanced
centinel of social order” upon which “the exercise of civil and political rights may rest ”479 As in
other national contexts across the Atlantic world, not only was the body politic “medicalized”
but the state of medicine and public health became inseparable from political, social, and cultural
well-being.480 Yet to accomplish the requisite tasks of what the creole elite and many
government officials considered civilizational uplift, the Academy had to walk a fine line
between different forms of public service and political engagement.
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The majority of Academics were not alone in privileging the principle of autonomy from
government, even when it was tied to such “sacred” and very public obligations as smallpox
vaccination. As Reinaldo Funes Monzote argues, the medical sciences flourished during this
period and constituted a predominately creole civil space from which to participate in the public
realm, independent of government auspices.481 Even the Havana Society for Hygiene, founded in
1891 by Dr. Antonio González Curquejo and famed for its practical interventions in the realm of
preventive medicine, carefully negotiated clear boundaries between its sphere of pragmatic
activism and government initiatives in public health The Society sought to “fight against the
denigrating inertia that today humiliates us in foreign eyes” by “extending its beneficent
influence upon the family,” propagating smallpox vaccine, dictating rules for home sanitation,
and forming medical councils to inspect and report on conditions at the neighborhood level.482
Yet the association, as an author in its unofficial organ La Higiene put it, should be
careful to work within a “special sphere of action, independent of all governmental management”
without allowing this to “impede our taking to all spheres of public administration our valuable
and effective initiative ”483 By the end of the colonial era, so many mutual aid, educational,
scientific and public health organizations had promoted and even administered the vaccine in the
capital that the colonial government’s role in extirpating smallpox epidemics was sometimes
erased altogether in the public memory. Associations such as the Society of Pilar, which
administered free vaccine amongst its many other philanthropic mandates, was lauded by later
commentators for filling a necessary void, “when we did not have a Secretariat of Sanitation, but
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only physicians such as Romay and his descendents who tenaciously opposed the onslaught of
smallpox ”484
Clearly, the vacillating colonial politic and deepening ethnic strife of late nineteenth
century Cuba could not support the kind of cohesive creole/Spanish elite collaboration of
Romay’s era Paradoxically, for many medical elites, preserving the legacy of “great patricians”
such as Romay meant keeping a safe distance from the political activism he embodied as an elite
creole physician who bridged the gap between civil society and state initiative in order to
broaden the scope of the public health apparatus. In such an atmosphere, the Royal Academy
considered it their main obligation to critique, petition, draft proposals, and preserve the “sacred
material” and method of their hallowed predecessors, not to participate in any general
administrative oversight of the preservative. Other organizations, such as the Havana Society for
Hygiene or the Society of Pilar, also considered it prudent to keep a safe distance from
government auspices, fulfilling a philanthropic (and patriotic) duty free of political interference.

Turning the Tables: The Provincial Vaccine Institute
Other creole elites were more enthusiastic about (or at least more effective in) directly
harnessing governmental power in order to further public health goals and thus highlight the
legacy of official collaboration inherited from creole medical activists such as Romay. Luis
María Cowley was an Academic and member of a veritable dynasty of vaccinators. As
University Chair of Hygiene and Public Health, Cowley lectured on comparative sanitary
legislation and found much lacking in the devolution of authority for vaccination to
municipalities and the Casas de Socorro by Royal Order in 1870. Legal imposition, he taught,
was necessary to effectively enforce the vital practice of vaccination and revaccination, “so that
484
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governments are obliged to maintain official institutes [dedicated solely to the conservation and
provision of free public vaccination and] functioning under scientific and practical
guarantees ”485 Named secretary of the newly created Provincial Board of Sanitation of Havana
(1879), Cowley promptly endorsed the foundation of an official vaccine institute for all Havana
province.486 In the ashes of the devastating smallpox epidemic of 1878, the public health
reformer found a receptive ear in the Governor General, who granted permission for the
inauguration of the Institute with Cowley as Director in June of 1880. Similar institutes, though
smaller in scale, were created in the cities of Matanzas and Cardenas.487
With much help from a few critical supporters within the Havana provincial government,
the new Director spearheaded the creation of an impressive edifice for the production and
research of smallpox vaccination At first the Institute’s activities were limited to a few
personnel administering vaccine from Havana headquarters once a week and working with
municipal physicians to schedule regular vaccination in other district centers.488 But within a
decade, Cowley had a number of state-sponsored vaccinators directly under his authority.489
This staff collaboration closely with municipal authorities to coordinate vaccination and regulate
the distribution of vaccine on a rotational basis across Havana province (and on many occasions,
across the island). They also launched door-to-door campaigns, collected statistics, regulated
production of vaccine and conducted research in the Institute’s laboratory 490 An admirer and
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enthusiastic commemorator of Romay, Cowley had seemingly reconstructed a modernized,
public version of the Junta Central on a provincial level.491
The smallpox epidemic of 1887-1888, the most deadly of the preceding quarter-century,
helped legitimize public investment in the Institute and expand its jurisdiction to make it “rival
those of Europe and the Americas ”492 In the midst of scathing public criticism and popular
despair, certain critical sectors of the administration moved in favor of reform, passing a flurry of
legislation which bolstered the regulatory framework for smallpox prevention. Old laws were
given new life. In July of 1887, the Superior Sanitation Board reaffirmed the compulsory nature
of vaccination and obligatory house-to-house vaccination by mixed commissions of municipal
physicians and authorities in times of epidemic.493 Later statutes strengthened municipal
regulation of disinfection and isolation of the sick. All provinces were obliged by law to
maintain an Institute dedicated exclusively to vaccination and these were duly created in
Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe and Santiago.494 During the epidemic,
Cowley’s vaccinators had pushed the regulatory boundaries of their service. In November of
1889, after the epidemic had run its course, the Institute received formal recognition and license
to continue carrying on its work in a broad capacity. 495
The Institute’s strategy of collaboration with sympathetic authorities paid off. By the
early 1890’s, smallpox vaccination had once again become a model of good public health
administration

Although funding and status was always on precarious footing, the Institute’s

work played a significant role in diminishing the incidence of smallpox in last decade of the
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nineteenth century, particularly during epidemics. Records indicate the Institute had vaccinated
over 100,000 people between 1887 and 1895, when the final war for independence broke out.496
From 1889 to 1893, mortality rates plummeted, hitting single digits in 1889 and 1893 and
registering no deaths from the disease in 1892.497 The success of the Institute’s efforts against
such a preventable and symbolic disease as smallpox led one scientific contemporary to declare
that “it was the first time that the vaccine service had been well attended by public administration
in modern times ”498
Even the generally critical medical press agreed that times had changed. Domingo
Madan, a contributor to La Higiene, thought one had to be “myopic to not see the progress [of
hygiene] amongst [all classes of] the population,” particularly when it came to smallpox
vaccination.499 The vaccine, which “used to be repudiated by the poorest classes, is now
solicited” eagerly by the same and those who neglect to vaccinate their children “are considered
ignorant ”500 Another article published several months later praised the exemplary efforts of the
Civil Governor and the Provincial Sanitary Board towards extinguishing the smallpox epidemic
that had been imported into the capital that year, hoping that “it would serve as a model for what
we can accomplish in respect to other diseases which [are so common as to] seem natural
amongst us ”501 Even as the Ayuntamiento was blasted as “a constant obstacle and refractory par
excellence” in its lack of adherence to the tenets of public hygiene, the work of the provincial
Sanitation Board and its Vaccine Institute in particular were praised for their successful inroads
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against the menace of epidemic smallpox. 502 Criticism on the part of physicians calling for
centralized vaccine institute dissipated as the Provincial body began to fill a void left by the
closure of the Central Vaccine Board twenty years earlier.

Expanding the Preventive Net
Cowley wasn’t the only elite Cuban physician who believed that intense public
collaboration with colonial officialdom was both beneficial for the public good and a legacy of
early medical pioneers. Other preventive medical interventions also flourished in the more
tolerant political milieu of post-Zanjón Cuba and brought forth opportunities for medical
activism. By the late 1870s and early 1880s, the new science of bacteriology had revealed a
world of microbes to an increasingly interconnected (and competitive) international network of
scientists.503 French chemist Louis Pasteur’s successful attempts to attenuate the virulence of
certain microbes and use the weakened organism and its byproducts to immunize both animals
and people was of immediate use to physicians and scientists looking to foment bacteriological
sciences in the “periphery ”504 As with the introduction of smallpox vaccination in the early
nineteenth century, “practical” science legitimated the expense and labor required for the
introduction of new medical technologies in a resource-poor environment.
In Cuba, the initiative was spearheaded by creole physician Juan Santos Fernández, who
inaugurated the Histobacteriological Laboratory and Institute for Rabies Vaccination in May of
1887 An “altar upon which to raise the temple of science” and educate the next generation of
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physicians in scientific medicine, the Laboratory was also explicitly founded to produce rabies
vaccine according to Pasteurian methods and served as a platform for public health initiatives
against a number of other diseases.505 Serums to prevent or attenuate the effects of tetanus,
streptococcus, leprosy, cancer, equine disease and diphtheria were produced, as were vaccines
against carbuncles and swine plague. While some of these products proved to be ineffective
(such as, for example, the anti-cancer and leprosy serums), the Fernández’ laboratory was the
first to successfully manufacture rabies vaccine and later anti-diptheria serum in the Americas
and together, these initiatives constituted the laboratory’s greatest triumph in the realm of public
health. Offered for a relatively low price and donated to the poor at no charge, these preventive
technologies raised awareness about (and reduced mortality rates due to) diphtheria and rabies in
the capital, with no contribution from government authorities.506
Although Fernández would eventually be placed in the pantheon of Cuban physicians
who “through private initiative…paved the way for knowledge of science’s greatest triumphs,”
the Academic and prominent public figure actively sought governmental support and
intervention to buttress his medical activism.507 In the summer of 1886, prior to the
establishment of the Laboratory, a select committee of medical doctors embarked on an
expedition to investigate bacteriological techniques in Pasteur’s recently installed Institute in
Paris. Bubbling with enthusiasm about the possibilities of utilizing the new science to resolve
pressing public health issues upon their return in the spring of 1887, Fernández joined with
committee members to call for the foundation of publicly funded bacteriological laboratories
under the auspices of the Sanitation Board and colonial University The “little attention” paid by
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the colonial government to these suggestions convinced Fernández and his supporters to take full
responsibility for the foundation of a Cuban bacteriological laboratory.508 Fernández and other
physicians also exerted continuous pressure for public legislation on disease prevention through
the Laboratory’s main press organ, the Crónica Medica Quirúrgica, founded in 1875.509
As we have seen, many autonomous scientific, medical and sanitary associations lobbied
political authorities for improved scientific infrastructure and services. But Fernández and his
close supporters at the Laboratory were more than just gadflies of the state, and instead
attempted to integrally link their services to the public administration. For example, towards the
final months of 1887, Fernández petitioned for the Laboratory to take over forensic and juridical
clinical services for the colonial government, a motion approved soon afterwards. Such duties,
which had been an onerous burden to the Academy prior to devolution of medical services to
municipal authorities in 1870, were eagerly taken over by Fernández’ Laboratory in order to
relieve the “high costs” and “insecurity” associated with many cases of “deficient juridical
services ”510 During the 1890s, as part of a “recalcitrant minority” of Academics, Fernández
(along with Academics Gabriel Casuso, Braulio Saenz and Diego Tamayo) even tried to convert
the Academy into an “official” organ of the anticipated and autonomous Cuban province, sowing
discord amongst Academics seeking to maintain distance from the vicissitudes of turbulent and
increasingly violent colonial politics.511 The “high priest” of Cuban colonial medicine after the
deaths of Antonio Mestre (1887) and Nicolas Gutierrez (1890), Juan Santos Fernández clearly
believed that negotiation with even the most intransigent Spanish colonialists in the name of
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public health was the best way to demonstrate the utility of the sciences and commemorate the
work of great Cuban pioneers of preventive medicine such as Romay.
Only after he failed to acquire desired political reforms and the Spanish colonial
government’s support for his scientific initiatives did he re-write his own professional history
and also that of his hallowed predecessors. In establishing, through private initiative, an
autonomous bacteriological Laboratory which pioneered the production of both rabies vaccine
and anti-diptheria serum in the Americas, Fernández claims he was only following in the
footsteps of his illustrious mentor Romay.512 According to historical accounts of Cuban
smallpox vaccination in Fernández’ memoirs (published in 1918), it was only through Romay’s
“private initiative” and at his “personal expense” that smallpox vaccine was introduced and
propagated for almost half a century after 1804.513 With the exception of token references about
Romay’s close collaborator and creole hero Bishop Espada y Landa and the (late) arrival of the
Balmis expedition, any and all of the colonial government’s collaboration, support and financial
aid for the Central Vaccine Board were virtually erased.514
With “diphtheria as with smallpox, individual initiative broke through epidemic
momentum” as Fernández became just one more of a “small group of physicians, zealous to
advance the prestige of their profession” and nation through the advancement of science and
public works.515 Looking back at a time “in which we lacked every [resource],” the private,
Cuban initiative which led to the introduction and propagation of smallpox vaccine, rabies
vaccine, anti-diptheria serum and the profilaxis of yellow fever was an example that should be
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honored by physicians everywhere.516 Reflecting both his inability to participate in official
service under an autonomous colonial regime and the post independence milieu within which he
penned his memoirs, Fernández reversed his previous public positions regarding the virtues of
autonomy from a colonial government which offered little for the Cuban public good.

Conclusion
Antonio González Curquejo, physician and professional activist associated with the
Society for Hygiene, famously remarked in 1913 that Spain had lost Cuba “more because of a
deficit in hygiene than its bad government ”517 The incisive remark touched upon more than what
had become the former colonial power’s dismal historical legacy of sanitation and public health
By the outbreak of the last war for independence in 1895, years before the Platt Amendment
imposed the marriage of popular sovereignty and the maintenance of a very particular public
health administration, epidemiology reflected the viability of political projects old and new. The
failures of sanitation and the persistence of diseases such as smallpox were utilized as symbols of
colonial decay even as early nineteenth century creole triumphs were vaunted to showcase the
triumphs of an autonomous (or even independent) Cuban “proto-nation ”
Pervasive problems of colonial reform and ethnic conflict became inextricably interlaced
with struggles over medical professional development in the public sphere. Of all colonial public
health interventions, the history of smallpox vaccination was central to the construction of protonational mythologies and duly manipulated to suit the needs of emergent political and social
activists in post-Zanjón Cuba. Interpretive struggles between those who drew on long traditions
of colonial collaboration and others who sought to distance themselves from damaging colonial
516
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legacies were stamped out however, by the beginning of a new moment in vaccination history,
with the American occupation from 1898-1901.
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Epilogue and Conclusion

The last Cuban war of independence against Spain broke out in February of 1895. After
3 years of deadly warfare, United States troops closed the chapter on Spanish colonialism on the
island with their first occupation in 1898. This epilogue investigates the centrality of smallpox
and its prevention for occupation policy and the continuation of colonial relationships under a
new metropolis. Nineteenth century professional disenfranchisement of smallpox vaccinators
had engendered a distinct and powerful anti-colonial narrative which Cuban medical
professionals continued to use after independence. Selective interpretations of smallpox
vaccination’s history thus played a critical role as a tool of resistance to US imperialism and in
the accompanying formation of a distinct national identity.

The Devastation of War
Smallpox continued to play a role in the construction of a cultural narrative after the
outbreak of war in 1895. Introduction of the disease was, by this time, almost exclusively
associated with the transatlantic Spanish transport of mail and troops. With the importation and
movement of more than 170,000 fresh peninsular soldiers, epidemic smallpox broke out almost
immediately after hostilities began. More or less virulent epidemic foci festered in different
points of the island throughout the war.518
Although yellow fever, under guise of “Generals uly and August,” exacted a terrible toll
on Spanish troops, smallpox also wreaked havoc amongst the newly arrived.519 As the war
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progressed and the Spanish military thoroughly enforced compulsory (re)-vaccination, it was the
civilian population which suffered most from the scourge. The Spanish general Valeriano
Weyler’s scorched-earth and terror campaigns herded hundreds of thousands of the nonimmunized Cuban rural populace into concentration camps in cities and towns in order to
deprive rebel camps of aid. Lacking food, adequate water supplies and basic shelter, thousands
died of smallpox and other epidemic diseases “which always court war”, feeding upon the
starvation and misery of reconcentrados and the civilian population.520 From 1897 to 1898,
when hostilities ceased, general mortality rates on the island reached their highest numbers in
recorded history.521
While the number of deaths from smallpox is disputed, its spread alarmed
contemporaries.522 With the exception of a few key institutions, the conflict prompted the
collapse of sanitary infrastructure dedicated to smallpox detection, prevention and treatment. 523
Even obtaining vaccination and care via private, licensed physicians became difficult as
professionals fled the island or joined rebel ranks. As epidemics gained strength, a number of
prominent Cuban doctors and municipal authorities publicized their concern over the situation
and organized public health campaigns to staunch the epidemiological disaster with physicians,
medicine chests, vaccine and food, “sav[ing] from certain death innumerable human beings who
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are dying in the most terrible state of abandonment ”524 But the logistical difficulties of reaching
populations in the midst of scorched earth warfare and overwhelming need were virtually
insurmountable.

American Intervention and Eradication
The concern was not limited to Cuba or Spain. Historian Mariola Espinola argues that
the United States feared Cuba as foci of the yellow fever epidemics which periodically
devastated nineteenth-century Southern economies. Such fear played a pivotal role in the US
decision to intervene militarily in 1898 and indirectly maintain a selective set of sanitary
standards on the island after troop withdrawal in 1902. Smallpox also played an integral and as
yet overlooked role as a causative agent for empire-building As United States’ investment and
commerce with Cuba grew throughout the nineteenth century, the North American press
regularly tracked smallpox outbreaks on the island and condemned Spanish authorities for
“doing nothing” to prevent its spread 525 During the worst epidemics of the 1870s and late
1880s, North American fears of smallpox’s introduction to Southern coastlines propelled the
exodus of travelers, inspired quarantines and cleared coastal towns of their inhabitants.526 The
importance of containing both yellow fever and the “loathsome” pox in Cuba, and particularly in
Havana, even served to legitimize an old dream of acquiring the island as a natural extension of
the United States.527
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With the onset of hostilities, the political and military implications of guarding US ports
from unchecked Cuban epidemics acquired new urgency. The North American press, which
circulated sensational accounts of Cuban suffering, contributed to create an atmosphere of panic
at the prospect of smallpox contagion. Reports surfaced of smallpox victims “hauled off in carts
of rubbish” to mass graves or left unburied for days by a people “reduced by starvation to
reckless despair ”528 Havana and much of the island became “a plague spot” scourged by the
disease, which, like the reconcentrados upon which it reigned, were in desperate need of
intervention.529
North American observers associated the persistence of smallpox and the dearth of
vaccination with Spanish administrative ineptitude and cruelty. A few members of the press
went further, transforming censures of the dire epidemiological situation into a general
condemnation of Spanish colonialism.530 As one New York Times reporter put it, the existence
of a “civilized community” in New York was evidenced by the quick containment of smallpox
outbreaks using the “simple precautions” of segregation and vaccination In Cuba:
“The utterly different condition of affairs shows the character of Spanish rule better perhaps,
than all that has been written about the oppression and corruption which in that island combine to
form what passes under the name of government. Not much has been said in the dispatches from
Havana about the ravages of smallpox there, chiefly, it is fair to suppose, because epidemics of
that and other diseases are taken as matters of course, to be endured with resignation and allowed
to run their course without interference. The natural consequence of this is a death rate of about
200 a week in the Cuban capital itself, while in the smaller towns, according to private letters
received here, more than every other house bears the disgraceful yellow card ”531
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The press represented the Cuban people as an almost equally offensive obstacle to
“civilization” through smallpox control and vaccination. The disease had long been associated
with the poor in both Cuba and the southern United States, especially “those ignorant classes of
Negroes who admit it as God’s will ”532 In a milieu of ascendant scientific racism, resistance to
vaccination and responsibility for its propagation had thus been racialized. For some legislators
and members of the press, the eradication of preventable diseases such as smallpox justified an
“enlightened” US occupation which could fulfill the responsibilities of “the white man’s
burden ” Sanitary successes against smallpox on the island could also serve as an example for
the benefits of vaccination for those areas of resistance, rhetorically defined as rural and of color,
who defied sanitary science and “civilization” at home 533
As American troops consolidated their victories and successfully occupied the island
during the autumn and winter of 1898, containing smallpox and yellow fever became US
priority. American soldiers were required to undergo compulsory vaccination to ensure their
protection against a disease that had greatly affected their Spanish military predecessors. Tens of
thousands of Cubans were obliged to do the same under conditions of martial law, “as a
precaution,” particularly in major cities and regions where troops were quartered.534 To maintain
the program, vaccine virus was declared a strategic supply and imported en bulk into the
territory. Despite claims that the Cuban people were “submitting cheerfully” to the new
compulsory vaccination orders, dozens of gendarmes were hired to enforce the law during
532
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vaccination rounds.535 A rigid system of inspection and quarantine, spearheaded by the US
Marine Hospital Service, gave priority to what necessitated “the greatest attention,” the
prevention of either smallpox or yellow fever from getting conveyed back to the United States
via military and naval communications.536
The end of hostilities, combined with the intensity of the vaccination initiatives, led to a
decrease in smallpox as well as general mortality rates. From 1897 to 1900, annual deaths from
smallpox in Havana plunged from 1,404, at the apogee of the epidemic, to only 2 cases.537 By
early 1901, a specially appointed commission was formed to institutionalize and regularize
sanitary successes via a critical review of existing legislation. On June 24, 1901, following the
advice of the commission, vaccination was declared obligatory by the military governor of Cuba.
From September 1901 to January 1902, 265,000 people were vaccinated in one of the most
extensive vaccination campaigns in Cuban history.538 Havana’s Provincial Vaccine Institute was
officially converted into a central depot for the entire island, though legal responsibility for
vaccination and the retention of official licensed vaccinators was left to the province and
municipality. The disease was effectively eradicated on the island, as republican Cuban
authorities effectively contained the small number of imported smallpox cases which occurred
every five to ten years.539
North American authorities utilized sanitary triumphs as an exemplar of imperial
benevolence and grounds for colonial occupation. As Major General Gorgas highlighted during
his summary report on statistical demography in 1902, the army would soon to leave an island
535
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transformed. A special commission confirmed the transmission of yellow fever via the
Stegomyia mosquito vector, “a discovery which in time would be placed amongst the greatest
benefits to humanity, only exceeded by that of enner,” enabling a targeted eradication program
Endemic smallpox was also eliminated on the island, “with only one incident in the past 18
months ”540 Most North American commentators agreed that American military muscle had
single-handedly realized the dream of disease eradication as a lesson to the world, to the benefit
of Cuban life and commerce. Cubans were expected to be “ever grateful to the American
nation” who had made the former a model to civilized nations 541 The danger of reversion to
unsanitary barbarism upon withdrawal of occupation forces seemed palpable. Despite
enthusiastic Cuban medical participation and massive sanitary investments during the early
republican period, under Cuban control the island, and specifically Havana, continued to bear a
reputation as foci of disease.542

Smallpox and Nationalism
Elites in the Cuban medical community expressed gratitude for a North American
sanitary intervention that had managed to push through historical professional agendas. The
eradication of smallpox and yellow fever had been a dream of the elite Cuban medical
community since the late eighteenth century, when epidemiological realities clashed mightily
with the prerogatives of economic growth and “civilizational” projects (see chapters 1 and 4).
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According to Jorge le Roy y Cassa, an early republican statistician, the eradication of smallpox
and yellow fever under North American auspices was “the most beautiful period in our sanitary
history.” Roy y Cassa agreed with General Leonard Wood that the American occupation
provided an example of “good administration [through which] thousands of lives could be saved,
the race could be made physically robust, and Havana converted into the most healthy and
prosperous of tropical places ”543 Great praise was reserved for military governor and chief
sanitary officers Dr(s) Wood and William C Gorgas, who “being medical doctors as well as
military men, understood better the great task of sanitation ”544
The American occupation and imperial priorities had greatly enhanced the medical
profession’s social and political role North American concern with protecting Southern
economies from the importation of Caribbean epidemic disease manifested itself in the dramatic
augmentation of Cuban sanitary infrastructure, the extension of medical authority over most of
the population, and the effective curtailment of unlicensed competition. Political instability,
together with outbreaks of epidemic disease (particularly those of yellow fever), aroused
legitimate fear of renewed North American interventionism in the young republic and stirred
patriotic passions at the highest levels of the Cuban government.545 Independence, as the Havana
Academic and public health official Dr Enrique B Barnet put it, “rested upon the fundamental
bedrock of both peace and health,” leaving men of science “with great responsibility” to
safeguard the nation.546
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Elite Cuban medical practitioners and sanitary officials publicly rejected the
interpretative discourse that derogated their contribution to the mission of sanitation and to
smallpox eradication in particular. Hundreds of Cuban, licensed practitioners had composed an
integral part of initial campaigns for smallpox control across the island. Cubans worked
alongside gendarmes in sanitary brigades formed under military occupation to isolate, disinfect
and vaccinate smallpox affected areas. Physicians cooperated with occupation forces to
extinguish epidemic foci in schools, hospitals, clinics and other institutions. The rest of the
licensed medical community was indirectly tied to the project via required reporting of
epidemiologically dangerous cases on pain of fine.547
Cuban medical elites had also participated enthusiastically in the creation of a permanent
sanitary infrastructure for the maintenance of widespread smallpox vaccination. In early 1901,
the occupation government organized a Vaccine Commission to review extant legislation on
smallpox prevention and control The Commission consulted Havana’s Academy of Science and
other members of the Cuban medical community with regards to their opinions on obligatory
vaccination. The Academy made a unanimous pronouncement in its favor and “expressed with
pleasure” that most physicians on the island shared this sentiment 548 The Commission,
composed almost entirely of Cuban medical leaders, including former Director of the Provincial
Vaccine Institute Luis María Cowley, statistician and Academy vaccinator Vicente de la Guardia
and future Director of the island’s Department of Sanitation uan Guiteras, shortly afterwards
laid the legislative foundations for obligatory vaccination and the inauguration of a new central
vaccine depot in Havana.
threats to racial and ethnic hygiene, namely the dark-skinned Jamaicans, Haitians and other islanders who seasonally
worked on Cuba’s sugar plantations
547
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At the start of travelling season, accusations of Cuban disinterest and ineptitude regarding
proper control of epidemic diseases, including smallpox, peppered the North American press.
Frequent North American defamation of Cuban initiative and ability to control epidemics was an
especially egregious insult for a medical community that prided itself on its partnership in the
construction of a great sanitary edifice. That US smallpox vaccination and control policy varied
widely across regions and demonstrated such clear deficiencies in many southern states and rural
areas embittered Cuban observers.549 Some took to the pen to make a direct response. As chief
sanitary officer Juan Guiteras angrily retorted in 1910 to one such accusation of generalized
public health malpractice:550
“What facts have you… upon which to base your statements? Is it that we have less typhoid
fever than most of your cities?...Is it that we have managed to keep smallpox out of our territory,
though we are in communication with your States, where the disease prevails?... Is it that we are
maintaining at great expense a system of inspections all over the island for the destruction of
[Stegomyia] larvae [which transmits yellow fever]?”

Representing the island at medical conferences around the world, Cuban physicians and
sanitarians publicized original research and emphasized the potential lessons to be learned from
Cuban public health management.551 Many also emphasized the need to address oft-overlooked
endemic diseases, such as tuberculosis, tetanus and infant enteritis, which preferentially affected
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domestic Cuban populations.552 Most remarkably, Cubans continued the late nineteenth-century
use of public health histories and politics of remembrance to resist North American assumptions
and bolster national identities. Even as they celebrated North American sanitary work,
republican histories of public health and sanitation (such as that by statistician Jorge Le Roy y
Cassa) overwhelmingly highlighted the collaborative effort and Cuban accomplishment in public
health and disease eradication.

Romay and the Politics of Historical Memory
Specifically, historians resurrected Tomás Romay’s legacy in Cuban history of smallpox
vaccination, as histories of the colonial era published or re-published in the republican era.553
The breadth of this historical reclamation should not be overestimated. Relatively few histories
emerged in the wake of Spanish colonial collapse Romay’s likeness often paled in comparison
to that of Cuban Carlos J. Finlay, who first proposed and promoted the theory of the Stegomyia
mosquito as the vector for yellow fever. As Manuel García Mayo put it in a 1937 doctoral thesis
on the introduction of smallpox vaccination to Cuba, upon final reckoning Finlay was a scientific
“discoverer ”554 He could be exalted amongst the pantheon of medical heroes in defiance of
North American presumptions that had erased his memory in favor of the American occupation’s
scientists and scientific initiative Romay, in turn, only “established in his homeland an
experiment realized far from its frontiers, many years after its discovery and by strangers ” The
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only parallel, Mayo admitted, was that both tried to “safeguard their peoples from a most terrible
scourge.” In Romay’s case, he did not succeed in its eradication.555
Yet rescuing Romay’s memory became something of a project to build national
consciousness amongst some physicians and historians. As in the colonial period, republican
Cuban observers condemned the lack of cultural solidarity on the island. In a familiar strain of
complaint, one Academic argued that the Cuban people “looked upon their national institutions
(including their scientific ones) with indifference, when not distaste, always considering
anything their own to be the worst ”556 Romay became a means to build a politics of
remembrance and cultural appreciation of domestic achievements. As Mayo himself articulated,
it didn’t matter that “the men of today, forgetful and ungrateful, ignore completely these deeds of
yesteryear,” or that “their names do not figure amongst the greatest” the nation had to offer 557
Romay had succeeded: 558
“in establishing the essential norms and practices of [sanitation] for those who fought alongside
him and wove the marvelous network of smallpox vaccinal immunity. For this, upon redacting
these lines, we wish to preserve the memory, eternal and imperishable, of fervent devotion to the
virtuous example of his life and the venerable greatness of his work ”

The symbol of Romay as a creole cultural hero only increased after the revolution of
1959. The new regime formulated its preventive public health policy as a reaction to North
American imperialism and a source of legitimation for the new order. The centrality of
preventive public health combined with a “new” history of science and medicine in Latin
America to inspire re-interpretations of Romay and his role in early Cuban medical
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achievements.559 The Marxist lens could be unforgiving with regards to former hagiographic
traditions Historians transformed Romay’s image to condemn the narrow socio-economic
foundations which guided his work and prerogatives. Yet amongst Cuban historians such as José
López Sánchez (1911-2004), remembering Romay became less an exercise in the repudiation of
early commercial capitalism than a familiar embrace of early “Cuban,” creole patriarchs and
their concern for the public good.

Conclusion
This dissertation traces the radical transformation of Romay’s image and person from
their early nineteenth century origins. The medical patriarch played an integral role in fostering
self awareness amongst creole elites which had enjoyed unprecedented economic success based
on slave-powered commercial agro-export economy. Through his emphasis on promoting
enlightenment ideals of public happiness in the “patria” via smallpox vaccination and the Central
Vaccine Board, Romay led a licensed medical community towards a more public role in the
engineering of their society. But for most of the nineteenth century, their relationship to the
metropolis and the identities nurtured therein were overwhelmingly based on co-optation and
interdependence rather than conflict and alienation from Spain.
Romay’s historical representations shifted along with the fortunes of early creole medical
professionals on the island. In more than a rhetorical sense, smallpox vaccination was a
“preferred service” of the Crown for much of the nineteenth century. The Sociedad Económica
559
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and the Junta Superior de Sanidad showcased state paternalism and concern for the common
good. Medically licensed creoles utilized vaccination to protect its professional turf through the
enforcement of academic requirements and the articulation of scientific standards. These
professional platforms in turn legitimized the creation of novel, very public roles that included an
unprecedented amount of control over other colonial subjects Initial concepts of the “public”
service emphasized targeting African slave populations that powered the agro-economy and their
elite, creole masters. Eventually however, the concept broadened to include the poor and, in the
aspirations of many vaccinators, the entire colonial population.
Historians have often overlooked professionalization’s impact upon ethnic identity
formation and its relationship to anti-colonial resistance. Yet amongst vaccinators that identified
with the colonial project, war, repression and contemporary “creole” cultural constructions could
not significantly shake a strong sense of partnership with metropolitan power. Only when
vaccinators’ professional moorings fell away under pressure from systemic dysfunction and
continued epidemiological crisis did vaccinators and other creoles question Spain’s enlightened
colonial paternalism Service for the “public good” then became a double-edged sword which
could be wielded symbolically against the colonial system with every damning epidemic of
smallpox.
Creole medical professionals expressed their anti-colonial resentment in several ways.
Professional strife shaped scientific knowledge production and the application of new preventive
technologies as leading creole physicians resisted a perceived colonial preference for calf-based
vaccination. The new procedure’s introduction during institutional overhaul and its association
with former Spanish colonial public health administrator Dr. Vicente Ferrer led representatives
of the creole medical elite to identify calf vaccine with professional destitution and neglect of
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basic health needs. Inextricably connected to professional dislocation, Ferrer was virtually
written out of many Cuban histories on the subject and “his” cowpox subject to severe scientific
critique. Throughout the late nineteenth century, calf vaccination served as a source of
controversy and silence even as it was readily adopted throughout most of Europe and
eventually, by the Cuban Royal Academy of Science.
Creoles also used medical professional history to create collective memories and a
politics of resistance Specifically, Romay’s role in the establishment of a creole medical bastion
for the public interest was woven into the fabric of an implicitly anti-colonial narrative during
the late nineteenth century. After the Central Junta was dismembered, the civic goals of
preserving the Cuban population and “Cuban” identity seemed no longer compatible with the old
colonial order. The latter needed to be seriously reformed or, in the most radicalized minds,
shaken off. Loyalty to Romay as a symbol of creole patriotism and activism created a defined
range of action for late nineteenth century vaccinators who sought to expand the web of
smallpox immunity in a colonial context. Even after independence, conservation of Romay’s
memory continued to serve the needs of identity construction and anti-colonialism by
highlighting Cuban cultural achievement in the realm of preventive medicine and public service.

186

Bibliography

Archives
AN – Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Havana
AGI – Archivo General de Indias, Seville
AHN – Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
BNC – Biblioteca Nacional “ os Mart ,” Havana
RANM – Biblioteca de la Real Academia Nacional de Medicina, Madrid
NYAM – New York Academy of Medicine

Newspapers and Periodicals
El Papel Periódico
Repertorio Médico-Habanero y Boletín Científico
Propagador de la Vacuna
La Emulación Médica
Revista Médica de la Habana
El Eco de Paris
Crónica Médica Quirúrgica de la Habana
Revista de Ciencias Médicas
El Progreso Médico
La Higiene
La Abeja Médica
La Voz de Cuba
La Lucha

187

Diario de la Marina
El Cubano
nales de la cademia de iencias Médicas, ísicas y Naturales de la Ha ana
Revista Bimestre Cubana
The New York Times
New York Daily Tribune
Brooklyn Daily Eagle
The Minneapolis Journal
The Sun (New York)
The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.)
The Herald (Los Angeles)

Bibliography; Primary Sources
Díaz de Espada y Fernández de Landa, Juan José. Exhortación al uso general de la vacuna.
Havana: Imprenta de Don E.J. Boloña, 1806.
Fernández, Juan Santos. Recuerdos de mi vida. 2 vols. Habana: Imprenta y Ca, 1918.
Ferrer, Vicente Luis. El propagador de la vacuna: Guerra contra la viruela por un amigo de los
niños quien dedica este trabajo a todas las madres. Havana: [s.n.], 1872.
García de Coronado, Domitila. A la humanitaria sociedad de recreo y beneficencia El Centro
Gallego al propagar la vacuna gratuitamente al pueblo en 1887, dedica estos breves apuntes
históricos del ilustre cubano Dr. y maestro, D. Tomás Romay y Chacón, a quien debe Cuba este
beneficio eterno. Habana: Imprenta de Howson y Heinen, 1888.
García Mayo, Manuel. La introducción de la vacuna en Cuba. Habana: Editorial Alfa, 1938.
González Curquejo, Antonio. Datos para la historia: La Sociedad de Higiene de La Habana.
Habana: Imprenta El Siglo XX, 1913.
Guiteras, Juan. “An Article for the ‘Army and Navy ournal’ and Reply of the Director of Public
Health,” Sanidad y Beneficencia 5, no.1 (1911): 80-81.
188

---- Insect-born Diseases in Pan America. Habana: Imprenta La Moderna Poesía, 1915.
---- and Mario García Lebredo. Sanidad y beneficencia: Memoria. Habana: Imprenta La
Moderna Poesía, 1921.
Le Roy y Cassá, Jorge. Desenvolvimiento de la sanidad en Cuba durante los últimos cincuenta
años (1871-1920). Havana: Imprenta La Moderna Poesía, 1922.
---- La mortalidad infantil en Cuba: Notas demográficas. Habana: Imprenta y Librería de
Lloredo y Ca., 1914.
Massino, Cesar J. Bosquejo histórico de la vacuna en Cuba: Creación del primer centro de
vacunación oficial. Habana: Imprenta Librería Nueva, 1938.
Pérez-Beato, Manuel. Historia de la vacuna y progresos realizados en este ramo de la
administración en la isla de Cuba: Memoria. Habana: Imprenta Compostela Numero 89, 1899.
Pezuela y Lobo, Jacobo de la. Diccionario geográfico, estadístico e histórico de la isla de Cuba.
Vol.1. Madrid: Imprenta del Establecimiento de Mellado, 1863.
Piña y Peñuela, Ramón. Topografía médica de la isla de Cuba. Habana: Imprenta y
encuadernación del Tiempo, 1855.
Reglamento formado por la Junta Superior de Sanidad de la isla; para la conservación y
propagación de la vacuna en esta isla. Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitanía General Por
S.M., 1843.
Romay Chacón, Tomás. Obras completas. Compiled by José López Sánchez. Havana: José
Maceo ECAG, 1965.
---- Obras escogidas del Dr. D. Tomás Romay. Compiled by Ramon Francisco Valdés. Havana:
Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitanía General, 1858-1861.
Villoldo, Pedro “Smallpox and Vaccination in Cuba ” Public Health Reports 26, no. 1 (April
1911): 3-7.
Virchow, Rudolf. Report on the Typhus Epidemic in Upper Silesia, 1848. American Journal of
Public Health 96, no. 12 (December 2006): 2102-2105.
Wood, Leonard and S. Weir Mitchell, Small-pox as Found and Treated in Cuba during the
Spanish-American War. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Department of Health, 1909.
Zambrana, Manuel. Memoria de los trabajos de la comisión sanitaria de Pueblo Nuevo.
Matanzas: Imprenta El Ferrocarril, 1867.

189

Secondary Sources
Alden, Dauril and oseph Miller “Out of Africa: The Slave Trade and the Transmission of
Smallpox to Brazil, 1560-1831 ” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1987):
195-224.
Armas, Ramón de. Historia de la Universidad de La Habana, 1728-1929. Havana: Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales, 1984.
Arnold, David. Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in NineteenthCentury India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Baker, Robert B. and Laurence B. McCullough, ed. The Cambridge World History of Medical
Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Baldwin, Peter. Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830 – 1930. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Barnes, David. The Great Stink of Paris: The Nineteenth Century Struggle Against Filth and
Germs. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 2006.
Barona Vilar, Carmen. Las políticas de la salud: La sanidad valenciana entre 1855 y 1936.
Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2006.
Barrera, Antonio. Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific
Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.
Bergad, Laird. The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba and the United States.
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
---- Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: The Social and Economic History of
Monoculture in Matanzas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
---- Fe Iglesias García and María del Carmen Barcia. The Cuban Slave Market, 1790 to 1880.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Bethell, Leslie. Cuba: A Short History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Bhattacharya, Sanjoy, Mark Harrison and Michael Worboys. Fractured States: Smallpox, Public
Health and Vaccination Policy in British India, 1800-1947. New Delhi: Orient Longman
Limited, 2005.
---- and Niels Brimnes. “Simultaneously Global and Local, Reassessing Smallpox Vaccination
and Its Spread, 1789-1900.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 83, no.1 (Spring 2009): 1-16.
190

Bizcarrondo, Marta and Antonio Elorza. Cuba/España: El dilema autonomista, 1878-1898.
Madrid: Editorial Colibrí, 2001.
Campos Marín. Ricardo. “El dif cil proceso de creación del Instituto de Vacunación del Estado,
1871-1877 ” Asclepio 56, no.1 (2004): 79-109.
---- “La vacunación antivariólica en Madrid en el último tercio del siglo XIX: Entre el

especialismo médico y el mercantilismo ” Medicina y Historia 4, no.4 (2001): 2-15.
Cañizares-Esguerra, Jorge. Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science
in the Iberian World. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
---- and Marcos Cueto “Latin American Science: The Long View ” NACLA: Report on the
Americas 35, no.5 (March/April 2002): 18-22.
Cardona, Álvaro. La salud publica en España durante el trienio liberal, 1820-1823. Madrid:
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005.
---- And Paola Castañeda, Yadira Borrero y Margarita R D az “Pensamiento en salud pública de
los precursores ‘sabios’ de la independencia colombiana ” Revista de Salud Pública 12, no. 3
(2010): 474-485.
Casanovas, Joan. Bread and Bullets! Urban Labor and Spanish Colonialism in Cuba, 1850 to
1898. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998.
Cluster, Dick and Rafael Hernández. The History of Havana. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008.
Coleman, William. Death is a Social Disease: Public Health and Political Economy in Early
Industrial France. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.
Cook, Sherburne F “Francisco Xavier de Balmis and the Introduction of Vaccination to Latin
America.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 11, no. 5 (May/June 1942): 543-560.
Cortezo, Carlos María and Ramón Lobo y Regidor. Datos históricos acerca de la vacuna en
España. Madrid: Imprenta Católica, 1903.
Curtin, Philip. The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1964.
Danielson, Roswell. Cuban Medicine. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979.
Delgado García, Gregorio. “Antecedentes históricos de la atención primaria de salud en Cuba ”
Revista cubana de salud publica 31, no. 2 (April/June 2005): 127-131.

191

---- El cólera morbo asiático en Cuba y otros ensayos. Havana: Centro Nacional de Información
de Ciencias Médicas, Ministerio de Salud Publica, 1993.
---- Historia de la enseñanza superior de la medicina en Cuba, 1726-1900. Havana: Editorial
Ciencias Médicas, 1990.
Díaz-Arguelles Garc a, Nancy “Breve bosquejo histórico del Laboratorio Histobacteriologico e
Instituto de Vacunación Antirrábica de La Habana.” Anuario: Centro de Estudios de la Historia
y Organización de la Ciencia 1 (1998): 170-199.
Diez Torre, Alejandro R., Tomás Mallo, Daniel Pacheco y Ángeles Alonso, coord. La ciencia
española en ultramar. Madrid: Doce Calles, 1991.
Eltis, David. Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987.
Espinosa, Mariola. Epidemic Invasions: Yellow Fever and the Limits of Cuban Independence,
1878-1930. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Fernández Pérez, Joaquín and Ignacio González Tascón, ed. Ciencia, técnica y estado en la
España ilustrada. Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1990.
Foege, William H., John D. Miller and Donald A. Henderson. “Smallpox Eradication in West
and Central Africa ” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 52, no. 2 (1975): 209-222.
Friedson, Eliot. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. New
York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Fuente, Alejandro de la. Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
---- A Nation for All: Race, Inequality and Politics in Twentieth-century Cuba. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Funes Monzote, Reinaldo. El despertar del asociacionismo científico en Cuba, 1876-1920.
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004.
Galindo Santana, Belkys María, Denis Berdasquera Corcho, Lázara Alfonso Berrio, and Raydel
Martínez Sánchez. “Balmis y su humanitaria contribución para la eliminación de la viruela ”
Revista Cubana Salud Publica 31, no.3 (July-September 2005): 257-259.
Garc a Mora, Luis Miguel “Quienes eran y a que se dedicaban los autonomistas cubanos ” In
Cuba, algunos problemas de su historia, edited by Josef Opatrný and Simona Binková, 53-70.
Prague: Universidad Carolina, 1995.

192

Gardeta Sabater, Pilar “El nuevo modelo del Real Tribunal del Protomedicato en la Am rica
española: Transformaciones sufridas ante las Leyes de Indias y el cuerpo legislativo posterior ”
Dynamis 16 (1996): 237-259.
Geison, Gerald L., ed. Professions and the French State, 1700-1900. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
Giberga, Eliseo. Apuntes sobre la cuestión de Cuba por un autonomista. Miami: Editorial
Cubana, 2006.
Gidney, Robert D. and Winnifred P.J. Millar. Professional Gentlemen; The Professions in
Nineteenth-Century Ontario. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
Glick, Thomas F “Science and Independence in Latin America (With Special Reference to New
Granada) ” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no.2 (May 1991): 307-334.
Gómez, Pablo F “Afro-Atlantic Empiricism and the Circulation of Bodily Knowledge in the
Seventeenth Century Spanish Caribbean ” Paper presented at The Caribbean Epistemologies
Seminar, New York City, NY, December 9, 2011.
Gould, Stephen Jay. The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981.
Gualberto Gómez, uan “Por qué somos separatistas ” In Por cuba libre, edited by Emilio Roig
de Leuchsenring, 279-281. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1974.
Henige, David. “When Did Smallpox Reach the New World (And Why Does It Matter)?” In
Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade, edited by Paul E. Lovejoy, 11-26.
Madison, Wisconsin: African Studies Program, 1986.
Hennock, E P “Vaccination Policy Against Smallpox, 1835-1914: A Comparison of England
with Prussia and Imperial Germany ” Social History of Medicine 11, no. 1 (1998): 49-71.
Herbert, Eugenia W. “Smallpox Inoculation in Africa ” The Journal of African History 16, no.4
(1975): 539-559.
Hopkins, Donald. Princes and Peasants: Smallpox in History. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1983.
Huerkamp, Claudia “The History of Smallpox Vaccination in Germany: A First Step in the
Medicalization of the General Public ” Journal of Contemporary History 20, no.4 (October
1985): 617-35.
Jannetta, Ann. The Vaccinators: Smallpox, Medical Knowledge, and the “Opening” of Japan.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.

193

Johnson, Sherry. The Social Transformation of Cuba in the Eighteenth Century. Gainsville:
University of Florida Press, 2001.
Jonsen, Albert R. A Short History of Medical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Kennedy, Dane “The Perils of the Midday Sun: Climatic Anxieties in the Colonial Tropics ” In
Imperialism and the Natural World, edited by John M. MacKenzie, 118-140. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1990.
Kuethe, Allan J. Cuba, 1753-1815: Crown, Military and Society. Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1986.
Kumar, Anil. Medicine and the Raj: British Medical Policy, 1835-1911. New Delhi: Sage, 1998.
Kumar, Deepak “Unequal Contenders, Uneven Ground: Medical Encounters in British India,
1820-1920 ” In Western Medicine as Contested Knowledge, edited by Andrew Cunningham and
Bridie Andrews, 172-211. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
Lafuente, Antonio “Enlightenment in an Imperial Context: Local Science in the Late Eighteenth
Century Hispanic World ” Osiris 15 (2001): 155-173.
---- and os Sala “Ciencia colonial y roles profesionales en la América española del siglo
XVIII ” Quipu 6, no. 3 (1989): 387– 403.
Lanning, John Tate. The Royal Protomedicato: The Regulation of the Medical Profession in the
Spanish Empire. Edited by John Jay Tepaske. Durham: Duke University Press, 1985.
Latham, Stephen “Medical Professionalism: A Parsonian View ” The Mount Sinai Journal of
Medicine 69, no. 6 (November 2002): 368-371.
López Denis, Adrián. “Communities of Immunity in the Iberian Atlantic World ” Paper
presented at the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1825,
Cambridge, MA, August 6, 2009.
---- Disease and Society in Colonial Cuba, 1790-1840. PhD diss., University of California, Los
Angeles, 2007.
---- “Higiene pública contra higiene privada: Cólera, limpieza y poder en La Habana colonial ”
Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe 14, no.1 (January-June 2003).
http://www1.tau.ac.il/eial/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=565&Itemid=223
(accessed April 5, 2014).
López Espinosa, os Antonio “El doctor Vicente Luis Ferrer y la revista El Propagador de la
Vacuna ” Cuban Journal of Health Information and Professional Communication 12, no. 1
(2004). http://bvs.sld.cu/revistas/aci/vol12_1_04/aci08104.htm (accessed May 1, 2014).
194

---- Elena López Serrano, and os López Sánchez “El doctor uan Santos Fernández y la
Crónica Médico-Quirúrgica de La Habana ” ACIMED 10, no.1 (2002): 93-101.
López Pinero, José María. M. Seoane: La introducción en España del sistema sanitario liberal,
1791-1870. Madrid: Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 1984.
López Sánchez, José. Cuba, medicina y civilización: Siglos XVII y XVIII. Havana: Editorial
Científico Técnica, 1995.
---- Tomás Romay and the Origins of Science in Cuba. Havana: Centro de Estudios Marxistas,
1967.
---- Vida y obra del sabio médico habanero. Habana: Editorial Librería Selecta, 1950.
MacLeod, Roy and Milton Lewis, ed. Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Western
Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion. London: Routledge, 1988.
McClelland, Charles E. The German Experience of Professionalization: Modern Learned
Professions and Their Organization from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
McCook, Stuart George. States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish
Caribbean, 1760-1940. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.
McCullough, Laurence B. John Gregory and the Invention of Professional Medical Ethics and
the Profession of Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
McNeill, John. Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Miguel Tejedor Muñoz, Jesús, Jesús Moro Aguado, Juan Riera Palmero. El ejercicio médico en
España: la demanda profesional en el ámbito rural decimonónico, 1854-1863. Valladolid:
Universidad de Valladolid, 1998.
Moreno Fraginals, Manuel. El ingenio: Complejo económico-social cubano del azúcar. Havana:
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978.
Naranjo Orovio, Consuelo. “Cuba, una isla impregnada de guarapo ” In Francisco Arango y la
invención de la Cuba azucarera, coordinated by María Dolores González-Ripoll Navarro and
Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero, 27-40. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad Salamanca, 2009.
Navarro, Ramón. Historia de la sanidad en España. Madrid: Instituto de Salud, Carlos III, 2002.
Opatrný, Josef. Historical Pre-conditions of the Origin of the Cuban Nation. Lewiston: Edwin
Mellen Press, 1994.

195

Palmer, Steven, Juanita de Barros and David Wright ed. Health and Medicine in the circumCaribbean, 1800-1968. New York: Routledge, 2009.
Palmié, Stephan. Wizards and Scientists: Explorations in Afro-Cuban Modernity and Tradition.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
Parsons, Talcott “Professions ” In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills, Vol. 12. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
Peard, Julyan. Race, Place and Medicine: The Idea of the Tropics in Nineteenth Century
Brazilian Medicine. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
Pérez, Louis A. The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography.
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Peset, José Luis. Ciencia y libertad: El papel del científico ante la independencia americana.
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1987.
Pfeiffer, Carl J. The Art and Practice of Western Medicine in the Early Nineteenth Century.
Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 1985.
Piqueras, José. Las Antillas en la era de las luces y la revolución. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España
Editores, 2005.
Porter, Dorothy. Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient to
Modern Times. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Pruna Goodgall, Pedro M. Ciencia y científicos en Cuba colonial: La Real Academia de Ciencias
de la Habana, 1861-1898. Havana: Editorial Academia, 2001.
---- “National Science in a Colonial Context: The Royal Academy of Sciences of Havana, 18611898 ” Isis 85, no. 3 (September 1994): 412-426.
---- La Real Academia de Ciencias de La Habana, 1861-1898. Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas, 2004.
---- and Rosa M. González, Antonio Mestre en la cultura científica cubana del siglo XIX.
Havana: Editorial Academia, 1987.
Quiroz, Alfonso. “Eliseo Giberga y la pol tica económica del autonomismo en Cuba" in Apuntes
sobre la cuestión de Cuba por un autonomista, vii-xlv. Miami: Editorial Cubana, 2006.
---- “The Evolution of Laws Regulating Associations and Civil Society in Cuba ” In Religion,
Culture, and Society: The Case of Cuba, edited by Margaret Crahan, 55-68. Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003.

196

---- “Or genes de la sociedad civil en Cuba: La Habana y Puerto Príncipe en el siglo XIX.”
Ibero-Americana Pragensia-Supplementum 18 (2006): 89-112.
---- “The Scientist and the Patrician: Reformism in Cuba ” In Alexander Von Humboldt: From
the Americas to the Cosmos, edited by Raymond Erickson, Mauricio A. Font, and Brian
Schwartz, 111-127. New York: Bildner Center for Western Hemispheric Studies, 2003.
Ramírez Martín, Susana María. La mayor hazaña médica de la colonia: La Real Expedición
Filantrópica de la Vacuna en la Real Audiencia de Quito. Quito: Abya-Yala, 1999.
---- “Proyección cient fica de las ideas de Tomás Romay sobre la vacuna de la viruela.” Asclepio
54, no. 2 (2002): 109-128.
Ramsey, Matthew. Professional and Popular Medicine in France, 1770-1830. Cambridge, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Rigau Pérez, José G “The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in 1803 and the Adoption of
Immunization as a Government Function in Puerto Rico ” Hispanic American Historical Review
69, no. 3 (August 1989): 393-423.
---- “La Real Expedición Filantrópica de la Vacuna de viruela: Monarquía y modernidad en
1803 ” Puerto Rican Health Sciences Journal 23, no. 3 (2004): 223-231.
---- “Smallpox Epidemics in Puerto Rico during the Pre-vaccine Era, 1518-1803 ” Journal of the
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 37 (October 1982): 423-438.
Rodríguez Expósito, César. Bicentenario de Tomás Romay. Havana: Consejo Científica,
Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1964.
Saldaña, Juan José, ed. Cross Cultural Diffusion of Science: Latin America. Mexico City:
Sociedad Latinoamericana de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnología, 1987.
--- Los orígenes de la ciencia nacional. Mexico City: Instituto Ibero-Americano de Estudios
sobre la Ciencia y la Tecnología, 1992.
--- ed. Science in Latin America: A History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.
Santovenia, Emeterio S. El Protomedicato de La Habana. Havana: Imprenta Editorial Neptuno,
1952.
Shafer, Robert J. Economic Societies in the Spanish World, 1763-1821. Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1958.
Smith, Michael M. The “Real Expedición Marítima de la Vacuna” in New Spain and
Guatemala. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1974.

197

Stepan, Nancy. Beginnings of Brazilian Science: Oswaldo Cruz, Medical Research and Policy.
New York: Science History Publications, 1981.
---- Picturing Tropical Nature. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Tesh, Sylvia Noble. Hidden Arguments: Political Ideology and Disease Prevention Policy. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988.
Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Thompson, Angela T. "To Save the Children: Inoculation, Vaccination, and Public Health in
Guanajuato, Mexico." The Americas 49, no. 4 (April 1993): 431-55.
Torre, Mildred de la. El autonomismo en Cuba, 1878-1898. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1997.
Villoldo, Pedro. Smallpox and Vaccination in Cuba. Washington: Department of Public Health
and Marine Hospital Service, 1911.
Viñes, José Javier. La sanidad española en el siglo XIX a través de la Junta Provincial de
Sanidad de Navarra, 1870-1902. Navarra, Spain: Departamento de Salud, 2006.
Whitaker, Arthur, ed. Latin America and the Enlightenment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
1961.

198

